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Abstract 
 
Arguments have been forwarded that terminating a pregnancy affected by a congenital abnormality 
discriminates against those living with disabilities and makes negative judgements about their lives.   
 
For the clinical geneticist these arguments raise questions as to whether their practice is ethical.  In this 
thesis I aim to consider these concerns primarily from the position of the clinical geneticist by 
addressing ethical arguments.  I argue that the fetus does not have full moral status equivalent to a 
person and therefore terminating a disabled fetus is not comparable with ending the life of a disabled 
person, and so does not imply that the lives of disabled persons are not worth living. I further argue that 
the decision to carry out prenatal testing and abortion should not solely rely on disability and on the 
objective opinions of healthcare professionals. Central to this argument is that when considering 
whether or not prenatal testing and abortion are justifiable, it is important to take into account the 
specific and unique circumstances of the family, particularly the parents and pre-existing children.  
Parents’ reproductive autonomy therefore needs to be considered as well as the harm having a disabled 
child could cause; both to the future child to and those directly affected by their existence. 
 
I conclude that prenatal testing and abortion does not discriminate against those living with disabilities.  
Despite this, however, reproductive autonomy is not being respected in current approaches to prenatal 
testing as late termination of pregnancy can only be legally permitted where two healthcare 
professionals agree to it.  Therefore, in order to enhance reproductive autonomy I have made 
recommendations whereby the supportive role of the clinical geneticist can be further developed by 
their acting as an advocate for prospective parents when justifications for late termination of pregnancy 
are being considered by healthcare professionals. 
 
Key words:  prenatal testing, disability, discrimination, abortion, moral status, reproductive autonomy, 
clinical genetics 
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 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“The goal [of counselling] is to promote client autonomy, [to help clients] 
understand their options and choose a course of action that is most appropriate to 
them in view of their risk and their family goals and act in accordance with that 
decision.”1  
 
 
1.1  Aims and introduction 
 
Prenatal diagnosis has revolutionised reproductive medicine giving couples an insight into 
and allowing more control over the health of their future child, either by preventing the birth 
of a child affected by a condition or by maximising treatment options by having information 
available prior to birth.  As with many advances in the field of medicine, and particularly 
reproductive medicine, there are ethical concerns about whether or not these new 
technologies create more harm than benefit.  Advances in reproductive technology, for 
example, heighten concerns about abortion and add to the ongoing debates on this subject.2 
Objections are raised due to concerns about disability discrimination and how this may 
suggest that if termination of a disabled fetus is deemed acceptable then infanticide may 
follow.3,4 Although it will not be a feature of this thesis there are also those who are 
concerned that advances in reproductive technology will allow us to not only select against 
                                            
1 Fraser AC (1974) ‘Genetic counselling’, American Journal of Human Genetics 26, pp 636-659 
2 Savulescu J (2013)  ‘Abortion, infanticide and allowing babies to die, 40 years on’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 39, pp 257-259 
3 Singer P (2013) ‘Discussing infanticide’, Journal of Medical Ethics 39, pp 260 
4 Giubilini A and Minerva F (2013) ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 39, pp 261-263 
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certain features but also select for those characteristics which we may find more desirable,5 
such as intelligence or superior sporting abilities. 
 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to address two important questions which are relevant 
to those working in prenatal medicine where decisions are made in relation to terminating 
pregnancies which are affected by a fetal anomaly.  These two questions are relevant for the 
practising clinical geneticist to consider in order to satisfy themself that their practice is 
ethical.  The first question is whether specific prenatal testing discriminates against those 
living with disabilities as the detection of an abnormality may result in termination of the 
affected pregnancy.  Where termination is decided, based solely on the existence of an 
abnormality in the fetus, there are arguments that this makes judgements about the lives of 
disabled people, suggesting they are not worth living.6  This is one of the reasons why 
abortion has always been controversial and continues to be a topic for ethical debate.7,8 The 
second question is whether the existing decision making process regarding termination of 
pregnancy due to disability supports reproductive autonomy.  This second question is 
influenced by the fact that additional justification for a termination is needed where this 
takes place late in pregnancy and the current law dictates that two medical practitioners must 
make this justification.   
 
In this initial chapter, I will explain the aims of my thesis, and make clear that these are to 
be understood with respect to the role of the clinical geneticist in supporting and advising 
prospective parents with decision making during the prenatal period.  In addressing these 
two questions, the overall aims are to argue that prenatal testing does not discriminate 
                                            
5 Wilkinson S (2010) Choosing tomorrow’s children: the ethics of selective reproduction, Oxford 
University Press, p186 
6 Shakespeare T (1995) ‘Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people’ Critical Social 
Policy 15, pp 22-35 
7 Savulescu J (2013) ‘Abortion, infanticide and allowing babies to die, 40 years on’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 39, pp 257-259 
8 Giubilini A and Minerva F (2013) ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’,  Journal of 
Medical Ethics 39, pp 261-263 
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against those living with disabilities and also to consider the implications current practice 
has for reproductive autonomy, which I argue should be of paramount importance.  I base 
my arguments not only on the implications a prenatal diagnosis has on the fetus but also the 
future child within the context of its family.  The ethical framework that informs this thesis 
is the Four Principles developed by Beauchamp and Childress.9  This has been described as 
a culturally neutral approach to thinking about ethical issues in the healthcare setting and is 
based on four common basic moral commitments,10 these being the respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.  It is appropriate to use this as an ethical 
framework for this thesis because it is precisely the framework most used by those engaged 
in healthcare practice11 and this thesis is addressing issues from that perspective. 
 
As this thesis is considering the issues of disability discrimination and reproductive 
autonomy from the perspective of a practising clinical geneticist it is important to outline 
their role, which is to provide prospective parents with support and information that will 
allow them to make reproductive decisions.12 These prospective parents are generally those 
who have been identified as being at higher risk or who have a relevant family history, and 
are referred to the clinical genetics service by their general practitioner (GP) or obstetrician.  
These decisions may include whether to start a family at all, increase their existing family 
or to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy due to it being affected by a physical 
abnormality or genetic condition.  Prospective parents can be provided with knowledge 
about a particular condition that their future children may be at risk of and what the level of 
risk is for them personally.  Investigations such as ultrasound scans and tests to identify 
genetic mutations and chromosomal changes can be performed to identify more specific 
                                            
9 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF (2001) Principles of biomedical ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press. 
10 Gillon R (1994) ‘Medical ethics: Four Principles plus attention to scope’, British Medical Journal 
309, p 184 
11 Page K (2012) ‘The Four Principles: can they be measured and do they predict ethical decision 
making?’, BMC Medical Ethics 13(10), pp 1-8 
12 Kingston HM (2002) ABC of Clinical Genetics (3rd ed), BMJ Publishing Group, pp 10-11 
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risks and abnormalities. It may be on the basis of the results of these tests that prospective 
parents decide to terminate an affected pregnancy.   
 
It is important to note at this stage that having a child with a disability is not inevitably a 
negative experience or something that should be viewed as such.  As I will discuss in 
chapters four and five, what constitutes a disability is very subjective and whilst it is 
generally accepted that prospective parents would prefer their child not to be born with a 
disability, it should not automatically be viewed as bad news.  Prospective parents are still 
likely to want to gain more knowledge about the effects of the disability and how this may 
affect their future child’s life, and their own, just as many other parents gain information 
and knowledge about having a child generally so they can prepare themselves.  There is 
evidence that having a disabled child can have a positive impact on a family, for example, 
in terms of parents and carers having an increased sense of purpose, personal growth and 
extended personal and social networks.13  Having a disabled child may expose families to 
other aspects of life that add quality, which they would not otherwise have had the 
opportunity to experience.  I am conscious therefore that my thesis may appear biased 
towards the negative aspects of disability.  This is not deliberate but rather a reflection of 
the fact that it is generally only going to be those prospective parents who do view the 
disability in their child in a negative way who may ultimately decide to terminate the 
pregnancy.  As the central focus of my thesis relates to prenatal testing and abortion, 
particularly late in gestation where currently healthcare professionals have the final say, 
negative views of disability and the harm it may cause to the future child, and to the interests 
of the wider family, are inevitably more prominent. 
 
 
                                            
13 Stainton T (1998) ‘The positive impact of children with an intellectual disability on the family’, 
Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability 23(1), pp 57-70 
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What follows in this introductory chapter is an overview of the development of the use of 
genetic and genomic investigations in reproductive medicine and fetal management and a 
brief summary of the arguments I put forward to address the aims of the thesis.  
 
 
   1.2        Genetic and genomic medicine 
 
Genetic medicine is very topical at the moment with the development of the Department of 
Health’s ‘100,000 Genomes project’14 and great emphasis being placed on the importance 
of genetics in mainstream medicine.15 This will inevitably lead to more and more genetic 
discoveries and more conditions that can be identified before birth.  It is likely therefore that 
the number of genetic tests that can be offered to prospective parents will increase, both 
those offered as part of standard antenatal screening and those tests which are specific to a 
couple’s personal circumstances.  As the discovery of an abnormality during pregnancy may 
result in the prospective parents choosing to terminate the pregnancy, there is also a concern 
that abortions on the basis of disability will increase.16  This will understandably fuel the 
concerns raised by those who oppose prenatal testing and abortion on the grounds of 
disability that believe these actions are discriminatory.  It is important, therefore, as a 
clinician working with patients undergoing prenatal testing to be satisfied that the decision 
to have testing, and the decisions that then follow, are justifiable particularly where the 
outcome is termination of a pregnancy where the fetus has an abnormality.  
 
                                            
14 Genomics England (2015) Genomics England is delivering the 100,000 Genomes Project 
(www.genomicsengland.co.uk as cited on 21 October 2015) 
15 Clayton-Smith J, Newbury-Ecob R, Cook J, Greenhalgh L (2015) The Evolving Role of the 
Clinical Geneticist: A summary of the workshop hosted by the Clinical Genetics Society, 23rd-24th 
November 2014, p 8 
16 McGovern C (2016) ‘New prenatal testing could drastically increase abortion rate’, National 
Catholic Register Oct. 2 
 6 
Genetic factors play a significant role in disease with approximately three percent of 
neonates having at least one major congenital anomaly and two percent having a 
chromosomal or single gene mutation.17  Genetic causes are thought to be responsible for 
approximately fifty percent of severe mental retardation disorders, childhood deafness and 
blindness.  When considering these along with congenital anomalies they account for forty 
to fifty percent of childhood deaths.18  Clearly then genetic diseases have a significant impact 
on the health of the population and resources within our society.  Research in genetics has 
been particularly prominent over the last few decades with the Human Genome Project 
being at the forefront. This was officially inaugurated in 1990 with a projected time span of 
fifteen years.19  Its purpose was to acquire fundamental information about our genetic 
makeup allowing increased understanding of human genetics and the role of various genes 
in health and disease.20  The project was completed early in 2003.  Part of the remit of the 
project was to ensure that people had access to advice about the social and ethical issues 
associated with human genetics in order to ease public anxiety,21 recognising the fact that 
there are concerns about how genetic information will be used.  This has now been followed 
by the aforementioned ‘100,000 Genomes Project’ which aims to sequence 100,000 
genomes from around 70,000 people with rare diseases and their families, and patients with 
cancer.22  The aim is to create a new genomic medicine service for the NHS, which it is 
hoped will transform the way in which patients are cared for.23   
 
                                            
17 Metcalfe K, Kingston H (2002) ‘Who should be referred for genetic consultation?’, The 
Obstetrician and Gynaecologist 4[2] April, pp 64-68. 
18 Fraser AC (1974) ‘Genetic counselling’, American Journal of Human Genetics 26, pp 636-659 
19 Strachan T, Read A (2003) Human Molecular Genetics 3, London & New York, Garland 
Science, p 208 
20 Fraser AC (1974) ‘Genetic counselling’, American Journal of Human Genetics 26, pp 636-659 
21 Department of Health (2003) Our Inheritance, Our Future: realising the potential of genetics in 
the NHS, DOH: London 
22 Genomics England (2015) Genomics England is delivering the 100,000 Genomes Project 
(www.genomicsengland.co.uk as cited on 25 October 2016) 
23 Genomics England (2015) Genomics England is delivering the 100,000 Genomes Project 
(www.genomicsengland.co.uk as cited on 25 October 2016) 
 7 
These advances in genetic research mean that an ever-increasing number of conditions can 
now be diagnosed with more specific genes being identified.24  The results of genetic based 
tests have far reaching implications, not only for the individual tested but also for other 
members of their family who may also find that they too are at risk.  With regards to prenatal 
testing this will not only have implications for the fetus but also the prospective parents and 
wider family, not only in terms of their potential genetic risk but also in terms of the effect 
having a disabled child in the family may have on them.  It is essential therefore that patients 
understand the consequences of the decisions they make and they are empowered to make 
decisions that are appropriate for them and their own personal circumstances by the 
establishment of a supportive relationship with the clinical geneticist and other members of 
the clinical team.    
 
 
1.3         Prenatal testing and the clinical geneticist 
 
I will concentrate my discussion on specific prenatal testing which is carried out for those 
prospective parents who for some reason have been identified as being at risk of having a 
child with a genetic condition, rather than standard antenatal screening which is offered to 
all women who are pregnant.  I will explain the differences that exist between these, the 
latter being that in which clinical geneticists play a role, and give my reasons for limiting 
my discussions to specific prenatal testing below. 
 
Standard antenatal screening involves an offer of a test to a pregnant woman because she is 
pregnant and not because she, as an individual, is at any particular risk of having a disabled 
child.25  Some women may be identified as being at a higher risk of having a child with a 
                                            
24 Lucassen A, Parker M (2001)  ‘Revealing false paternity: some ethical considerations’, The 
Lancet 357(9261), pp 1033-1035 
25 Harper P (2004) Practical Genetic Counselling (6th ed), Arnold Publishing, London, pp 363-364 
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chromosomal abnormality by virtue of their age but generally there is no distinction between 
women who are offered these tests.  Improvements in antenatal tests have led to the 
introduction of standard antenatal screening programmes with all pregnant women now 
being offered testing for conditions such as Down syndrome (Trisomy 21) and neural tube 
defects, regardless of any prior risk.26 The conditions screened for can be extended for those 
at risk of particular genetic conditions such as screening for Tay Sachs syndrome in people 
of Ashkenazi Jewish origin.27   
 
Screening tests, therefore, are performed to identify those who may be at risk of having a 
disabled child and who will then be offered further more specific prenatal diagnostic testing, 
such as the analysis of specific genes to look for mutations.28  Standard tests include 
ultrasound scans to identify structural abnormalities and blood tests to identify certain 
chemicals in the pregnant woman’s blood, which when compared with other factors such as 
gestation and maternal age provide a risk of the baby being affected by a chromosomal or 
physical abnormality.29 For example, elevated levels of alpha feto-protein indicate an 
increased risk of a fetus being affected by a neural tube defect, and a low level may suggest 
a chromosomal change such as that seen in Down syndrome.30   
 
Standard antenatal screening therefore differs to specific prenatal diagnostic testing.  Clarke 
summarises genetic testing in the following way: 
 
 
                                            
26 National Institute for Health & Care Excellence (2016) Antenatal Care for uncomplicated 
pregnancies [guidance CG62], NICE (www.nice.org.uk as cited on 4 October 2016) 
27 Harper P (2004) Practical Genetic Counselling, Arnold Publishing, London, p 367 
28 Graves AE, Freeman S et al (2009) ‘Maternal age and risk for trisomy 21 assessed by the origin 
of chromosome nondisjunction: a report from the Atlanta and National Down Syndrome Project’, 
Human Genetics 125(1), pp 41-52 
29 Harper P (2004) Practical Genetic Counselling, Arnold Publishing, London, pp 365-366 
30 Kingston HM (2002) ABC of Clinical Genetics (3rd ed), BMJ Publishing Group, p 75 
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“Genetic testing may be carried out in many different contexts.  It is helpful to 
distinguish these contexts because the ethical issues that arise can be very different.  
Genetic testing can be offered to individuals because of their specific family histories 
or other circumstances, or it can be offered to large groups, to populations or 
subpopulations (eg all newborn infants or pregnant women).  The first type of testing 
is specific to the individual or the family context; the second type of testing is termed 
population screening.” 31  
 
At the outset, therefore, it is important to identify the distinct differences between standard 
antenatal screening and specific prenatal diagnostic testing.  As mentioned above, standard 
antenatal screening is offered to all pregnant women regardless of any prior risk, whereas 
specific prenatal testing is a diagnostic test offered to pregnant women due to the risk of her 
pregnancy being affected by a condition, either because the couple have a previously 
affected child or due to a known family history of the condition.32  Alternatively, they may 
have no prior history but an abnormality has been found during their pregnancy, for 
example, a physical anomaly identified on routine antenatal ultrasound scanning of the fetus 
which may be suggestive of a genetic abnormality.   
 
Standard antenatal screening may be diagnostic.  For example, the anomaly scan offered to 
pregnant women at approximately twenty weeks of gestation may diagnose a neural tube 
defect or congenital heart defect.  However, other tests such as the testing of levels of alpha 
feto-protein may provide a risk of the fetus being affected.  If the risk is above the defined 
threshold further diagnostic tests can be offered. 
 
                                            
31 Clarke A (1998) ‘Genetic Counselling’ in Ruth Chadwick (ed) Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics 
volume 2, San Diego, Academic Press, p 394 
32 Harper PS, Clarke AJ (1997) Genetics Society and Clinical Practice, Bios Scientific Publishers, 
Oxford, p 75 
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On reviewing the literature relating to standard antenatal screening there is evidence to 
suggest that such tests were motivated by the benefits it brought to society generally, rather 
than being aimed at the pregnant individual and her own interests.  Some believed that 
testing was more to do with the benefits to others than it was to the potential child.33  One 
of the ways in which the success of these policies was measured was by the reduction in the 
incidence of certain conditions.  Whittle referred to the positive impact antenatal testing had 
by noting the steady fall in the incidence of babies born with open neural tube defects.34  As 
advances in fetal therapy have not kept pace with developing diagnostic techniques many 
conditions identified before birth cannot be cured or treated.  The only way, therefore, for a 
reduction in incidence to occur would be by terminating affected pregnancies.  This suggests 
that a measure of success was the prevention of the birth of an affected fetus as opposed to 
the information gained from the tests being used for other purposes, such as preparation for 
the birth or in-utero treatment.  
 
A document produced by the Department of Health and Social Security in 1977 refers to the 
burdens imposed on society in caring for those with ‘handicaps’ and also discusses the cost 
benefit of antenatal testing.35  Relating to antenatal testing it states: 
 
“…..because caring for the handicapped can impose great burdens on our society the 
prevention of handicaps ….. in addition to its other benefits may save money.  The 
costs of providing amniocentesis for all expectant mothers over the age of 40 years, 
and maternal serum AFP screening for all pregnant women, would be more than offset 
                                            
33 Aksoy S (2001)  ‘Antenatal screening and its possible meaning from the unborn baby’s 
perspective’, BMC Medical Ethics 2:E3, Epub May 22 
34 Whittle MJ (1991)  ‘Antenatal diagnosis of fetal abnormalities’ in Drife J, Donnai D (eds) 
Routine Fetal Anomaly Screening, London: Springer-Verlag London Limited, p 35 
35 Department of Health and Social Security (1977) Reducing the risk: Safer pregnancy and 
childbirth, HMSO: London, p 48 
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by the economic benefits in terms of savings of expenditure on children and adults 
with Down’s syndrome and spina bifida.”36    
 
A little over ten years later the Royal College of Physicians provided further evidence for 
the motivation of antenatal screening policies: 
 
“Unless prenatal diagnosis is to be devoid of practical application when it reveals a 
major defect in the fetus, a responsible doctor must discuss with the parents the option 
of terminating that pregnancy and must in some circumstances provide information 
that may deter them from further reproduction.” 37  
 
Other authors refer to the ‘tangible benefits’ of such a screening policy, quoting avoided 
health service expenditure, education services expenditure, other public services 
expenditure and lifetime consumption by the child of other goods and services,38 confirming 
that such policies were assessed in terms of their resource consequences.  
 
Another problem that has been associated with standard antenatal screening is that it is 
performed by healthcare professionals, such as midwives and obstetricians, in a busy 
antenatal clinic environment where there is little time or training given in order to ensure 
prospective parents understand the implications of having these tests done.  Some have 
argued that this diminishes the choices of prospective parents and forces them down a route 
they may not otherwise have taken if they had had sufficient information.39  By contrast, 
                                            
36 Harper PS & Clarke AJ (1997) Genetics Society and Clinical Practice, Bios Scientific Publishers, 
Oxford 
37 Royal College of Physicians (1989) Prenatal Diagnosis and Genetic Screening: Community and 
service implications, RCP: London 
38 Henderson JB (1987)  ‘Economic evaluation of screening for fetal and genetic abnormality’ in 
Screening for fetal and genetic abnormality, London, King’s Fund consensus development 
conference, programme and abstracts 
39 Bennett R (2001) ‘Antenatal Genetic Testing and the right to remain in ignorance’, Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics 22(5), pp 461-471 
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prenatal testing aimed specifically at those who are known to be at risk, and therefore 
referred to specialist clinical genetics centres, is aimed at enhancing an individual’s or 
couple’s reproductive choices, whether their decision is to continue a pregnancy or opt for 
a termination.  This is the type of prenatal testing I will discuss in chapter three, with regards 
to reproductive autonomy.  
 
Fortunately there is now greater recognition for the importance of informed consent with 
respect to standard antenatal screening and the provision of information to pregnant women. 
For example, Public Health England has produced specific guidance for women regarding the 
availability of tests that are offered.40  This guidance explains to pregnant women and their 
partners that such screening tests will identify those who may be at risk of having a pregnancy 
affected by a disabling condition, but it is not diagnostic.  Those identified as having an 
increased risk will be offered further testing, should they want it, in order to try to establish a 
diagnosis.  The guidance makes it clear that screening tests are a personal choice and 
acknowledge that they may not be right for everyone.  Information is provided about the 
conditions that screening can identify a risk of, such as, the more common chromosomal 
abnormalities and physical problems that can be identified by ultrasound scan, for example 
spina bifida.  The aim of this guidance is to alert pregnant women that screening is available 
to them during pregnancy and to reassure them that whether or not screening is accepted is a 
personal choice, as are the decisions taken as a consequence of the results.  Whilst the 
guidance encourages women to seek more information about screening and encourages them 
to ask questions, this will still generally be provided by obstetricians and midwives in a busy 
antenatal clinic and, therefore, there may be limitations as to the quality of this information 
and the support that pregnant women receive. 
 
                                            
40  Public Health England (2014) Screening tests for you and your baby, NHS 
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As I will discuss in chapter 3 (section 3.8), those who are known to be at risk of having a baby 
affected by a disabling condition can be referred to a specialist in clinical genetics and fetal 
management. This will include specially trained counsellors and clinicians who can discuss 
the implications of prenatal tests with them in detail.  Research has shown that obstetricians, 
who are more likely to be discussing the results of standard antenatal screening with women, 
are more likely than genetic counsellors to direct their patients down a particular route.41 
Counselling provided by those working in clinical genetics is said to be non-directive, 
however, whether such counselling can be truly non-directive has been the subject of debate.42  
Just because the genetic counsellor ultimately leaves the decision as to what action to take to 
the parents, this does not mean that the information they have provided to the parents has not 
been biased in some way by their own attitudes towards the condition, or to termination of 
pregnancy generally.  There are also other individuals involved in such processes including 
those where decisions about a late termination of pregnancy are made and decisions by parents 
are likely to be influenced, or even overruled, at other stages of the process. I will develop 
this area of discussion in chapter six of my thesis with regard to fetal management and the 
decision-making around late termination of pregnancy. This being an area where I recommend 
developing the role of the clinical geneticist with respect to their professional relationship 
with the prospective parents. 
 
During genetic counselling the availability of further tests can be discussed and the accuracy 
to which they may provide results, as well as an opportunity to discuss the options available 
to the prospective parents should the result be unfavourable.  Whether or not these discussions 
are truly non-directive the prospective parents using these services do have the benefit of 
being provided with information about the condition being tested for and how it may affect 
them personally, and should ultimately be able to make the decision which best suits them 
                                            
41 Bernhardt BA, Geller G, Doksum T et al (1998) ‘Prenatal genetic testing: Content of discussions 
between obstetric providers and pregnant women’, Obstetrics and Gynecology 91, pp 648-655 
42 Clarke A (1991) ‘Is non-directive genetic counseling possible?’, The Lancet 338 (8773), pp 998-
1001 
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and their particular circumstances, ideally with no pressure from those providing the 
information. More importantly the decision that they do make is based on a more substantial 
amount of information and deliberation than they would otherwise have received in a routine 
antenatal clinic.   
 
As well as those patients referred following the identification of a problem during standard 
antenatal screening, a clinical geneticist will also be involved where prospective parents have 
prior knowledge of a risk and may therefore want to consider prenatal diagnostic testing.  For 
these prospective parents the geneticist will be involved in their care from a very early stage, 
possibly even before they contemplate a pregnancy.  Prenatal testing itself involves 
investigations during pregnancy which may be carried out on the woman or on the fetus 
directly in order to gather diagnostic and prognostic information.43 It is influenced greatly by 
advances in reproductive and genetic technology and will become of more relevance to 
increasing numbers of people as more conditions can be tested for, and therefore will have 
wider implications for the pregnant population. The information that is gained can then be 
used in a number of ways.   
 
Depending on the severity of the condition a couple may choose to terminate an affected 
pregnancy or, alternatively, the information gained may be used to inform those caring for the 
mother and fetus as to what the most suitable mode of delivery may be and what immediate 
treatment may be most appropriate to enhance survival or minimise ongoing neurological and 
physical impairment.  In-utero treatment may also be an option for a limited number of 
conditions allowing an abnormality to be corrected or its effects to be minimised, for example, 
the use of fetal surgery to repair some neural tube defects.44   
 
                                            
43 Kingston HM (2002) ABC of Clinical Genetics (3rd ed), BMJ Publishing Group, p 11 
44  Johnson MP, Sutton LN et al (2003) ‘Fetal myelomeningocele repair: short-term clinical 
outcomes’, American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 189(2), pp 482-487 
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Prenatal testing can also be used to determine the sex of the fetus where there is concern that 
a male fetus may be affected by an X-linked condition45 carried by the unaffected mother.  
Should the fetus be found to be female no further testing would be required.  However, 
should the fetus be male then further genetic or metabolic tests can be offered to allow the 
parents to discover whether or not the male fetus is affected.  As I will discuss in chapter 
four (section 4.4), with particular reference to conditions such as Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH), the availability of specific genetic tests can benefit the fetus by allowing 
the condition to be identified and treated, for example, by the use of prophylactic 
medications given to women with at-risk pregnancies.46   
 
Prenatal testing does not only include genetic tests but also ultrasound scanning at certain 
points in gestation which can provide information about the physical condition of the fetus, 
often in great detail.47  Neural tube and brain defects, facial clefts and heart and limb 
abnormalities can all be identified by ultrasound scanning, as well as many other congenital 
anomalies.48  Even very subtle physical differences can alert clinicians to the possibility of 
a congenital condition, such as thickening of the soft tissue at the nape of the neck (nuchal 
fold) and an increased space between the first and second toes, indicating a possible 
diagnosis of Down syndrome or other chromosomal abnormality.49  Often a combination of 
these different types of tests is used to provide clinical information about the fetus and its 
prognosis, some of which will have been performed during standard antenatal screening, 
before the pregnant woman is referred to the clinical genetics service. 
                                            
45 Females have two X chromosomes whereas males have an X and a Y.  In an X linked condition 
the mother has a faulty gene on one X chromosome, but also has a normal copy and is therefore an 
unaffected carrier of the condition.  Should that mother have a male child, there is a fifty percent 
risk of that child inheriting the X chromosome carrying the faulty gene.  A boy with an affected X 
chromosome will be affected by the condition, as he will have no normal X chromosome to 
compensate. 
46 Kingston HM (2002) ABC of Clinical Genetics (3rd ed) BMJ Publishing Group, pp 100-101 
47 Salomon LJ, Alfirevic Z, Berghella V et al (2011) ‘Practice guidelines for performance of the 
routine mid-trimester fetal ultrasound scan’, Ultrasound in Obstetrics & gynecology 37(1), pp 116-
126 
48 Kingston HM (2002) ABC of Clinical Genetics (3rd ed), BMJ Publishing Group, p 75-76 
49 Harper PS (2004) Practical Genetic Counselling (6th ed), Arnold Publishing, London, pp 122-123 
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Whilst there are a variety of different investigations available in the antenatal period some 
findings can create uncertainty with respect to the risk they impose.  This might, for 
example, include ‘soft’ markers in ultrasound scanning.50  These markers are considered to 
be variants of normal but are known to increase the risk of there being an underlying fetal 
chromosomal abnormality.  For example, choroid plexus cysts in the brain can be a normal 
variant which disappear during the course of the pregnancy, or they can indicate the presence 
of Edward syndrome (Trisomy 18).51  These markers, however, are not diagnostic.  Where 
two or more soft markers are present the risk of an underlying pathological cause increases.  
It is not difficult to see how the presence of these soft markers can cause difficulties for 
obstetricians, and anxiety for prospective parents, who will need to decide whether to take 
a ‘watch and wait’ approach or whether to engage in further testing, such as by 
amniocentesis, which could put the pregnancy at risk,52 bearing in mind that this could well 
be a normal pregnancy.   
 
These uncertainties are not restricted to standard tests performed during routine antenatal 
care.  As genomic medicine advances more of the genome is being tested, as opposed to 
individual genes.  This provides much more prenatal genetic data and, therefore, on the face 
of it would appear to place those parents who want information about their fetus in a better 
position.  However, where a specific gene mutation is found a diagnosis can confidently be 
made whereas genome sequencing can sometimes give unexpected results that may be of 
uncertain significance.53  The detection of these variants of unknown significance within the 
                                            
50 Van den Hof MC, Halifax NS (2005) ‘Fetal soft markers in obstetric ultrasound’, Journal of 
Obstetrics & gynecology of Canada 27(6), pp 592-612 
51 Gupta JK, Cave M, Lilford RJ, Farrell TA, Irving HC, Mason G, Hau CM (1995) ‘Clinical 
significance of choroid plexus cysts’, Lancet 346(8977), pp 724-729 
52 Akolekar R, Beta J, Picciarelli G, Ogilvie C, D’Antonio F (2015) ‘Procedure-related risk of 
miscarriage following amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling: a systematic review and meta-
analysis’, Ultrasound in Obstetrics & Gynecology 45(1), pp 16-26 
53  Donley G, Chandros Hull S, Berkman BE (2012) ‘Prenatal whole genome sequencing: Just 
because we can, should we?’, Hastings Center Report 42(4), pp 28-40 
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genome also present problems for those involved in prenatal testing of pregnant women as 
a clear diagnosis, and therefore prognosis, cannot be discussed with the prospective parents.  
For the purposes of my thesis I will limit my arguments in that they will only apply when 
there is certainty about the presence of disability.  This is particularly relevant for prenatal 
testing which results in late termination of pregnancy, as this currently cannot be performed 
unless that certainty exists. 
 
Once a diagnosis has been established ethical problems arise when one considers how 
prospective parents then use the information gained by such investigations; as there are 
essentially two alternatives.  The first would be to use this information in preparation for the 
birth of a child who may have a congenital abnormality or debilitating genetic condition, 
ensuring that the child was born at an appropriate treatment centre or that specialised 
treatment was commenced as soon as possible after or even before birth.  The other option 
is for parents to use this information to make reproductive choices as to whether they wish 
to continue with such a pregnancy or choose to terminate it. The clinical geneticist’s role at 
this point is crucial in supporting couples to ensure they make well-informed decisions based 
on balanced information.  It is also essential that couples are made aware of the limitations 
on their choices that may exist, for example, where termination would need to occur late in 
gestation. It is the use of prenatal testing for the purposes of terminating an affected 
pregnancy which attracts the most controversy largely due to the long standing arguments 
against abortion,54 but also due to the implications terminating such pregnancies may have 
for those living with disabilities caused by the very same conditions.55   
 
Those representing disabled people and those living with disabilities argue that investigating 
for, identifying and then terminating pregnancies affected by a disability encourages 
                                            
54 Gillon R (2001) ‘Is there a ‘new ethics of abortion’?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 27, pp ii5-ii9 
55 Parens E & Asch A (2003) ‘Disability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing: Reflections and 
recommendations’, Mental retardation and developmental disabilities research reviews 9, pp 40-47 
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discriminatory attitudes and sends out negative messages about the value of their lives.56  It 
is the ability of prenatal testing to identify a fetus with a disability that is the focus of this 
thesis in that this very fact allows a choice to be made regarding termination of an affected 
pregnancy.  However, as I will discuss in chapter four, it can also provide benefit and avoid 
harm, not only to the fetus but also to the wider family.  Whilst showing that disability 
discrimination concerns are unfounded, based on arguments about the moral status of the 
fetus, I will also argue as to why reproductive autonomy should be of overarching 
importance particularly where the birth of the child will result in harm, not only to the child 
themselves but also to the interests of other family members.  I will also move this debate 
on by considering what happens in reality when the management of a fetus affected by an 
abnormality, which is discovered late in gestation, is discussed by the clinicians involved in 
the care of the prospective mother, and how these decisions may not ultimately be made 
based on the arguments I have put forward.  Taking this in account, I will also make 
recommendations as to how practice can be improved by encouraging communication 
between prospective parents and the clinical team, and how this can be achieved by 
enhancing the role of the clinical geneticist, particularly in view of the supportive role they 
establish with prospective parents at an early stage during the prenatal period. 
 
 
1.4 Moral status, reproductive autonomy & disability discrimination 
 
In order to begin to answer my first question as to whether specific prenatal testing 
discriminates against those living with disabilities, I will initially consider the moral status 
of the fetus in chapter two. I will begin by discussing the moral status of the fetus as 
compared to a person who has been born.  If the fetus has full moral status equivalent to that 
of a person who has been born, and it is wrong to kill a person, it follows that we have a 
                                            
56 Shakespeare T (1995) ‘Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people’, Critical Social 
Policy 15, pp 22-35 
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strong prima facie reason to consider that it is also wrong to terminate a pregnancy, as this 
will involve killing the fetus.  This is, therefore, of great importance when discussing 
abortion under any circumstances.57  Where a distinction is made between fetuses based on 
whether they are disabled or non-disabled moral status arguably becomes a greater issue.  
The Abortion Act 1967 does distinguish between such fetuses. The Act allows severely 
disabled fetuses to be aborted throughout gestation, up to the point of birth, but does not 
allow the same for what is regarded as a normal fetus (unless the woman’s life is at risk).  It 
is understandable therefore that this raises concerns about a discriminatory attitude towards 
disability.  I will argue that the fetus does not have full moral status and therefore cannot be 
compared to a person who has already been born, as they do have full moral status in the 
relevant sense (not that they are fully responsible moral agents).  More importantly 
consideration needs to be made as to whether the disabled fetus has the same moral status 
as a non-disabled fetus and how we can reconcile the fact that late terminations are 
performed only under very specific circumstances, including the presence of severe 
disability.  I will argue that the disabled fetus does have the same moral status as a non-
disabled fetus and that it is not the existence of an abnormality in itself that justifies 
termination but the implications that abnormality has for the future child in the context of 
the family, including the prospective parents and pre-existing children.   
 
In order to support my argument that the disabled fetus has the same moral status as a non-
disabled fetus, and with regards to my second question with respect to reproductive 
autonomy, I will argue in chapter three that autonomy is of paramount importance due to 
the personal nature and gravity of the decisions that are being made. As reproductive 
decisions, whether it is to continue or terminate a pregnancy, will have far-reaching 
implications for those who are directly affected it is essential that healthcare professionals 
involved in this process engage with families so that they have a full understanding of these 
                                            
57 Warren MA (1973) ‘On the moral and legal status of abortion’, The Monist 57(1), pp 43-61 
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implications.  Healthcare professionals should not base their views and decisions solely on 
the clinical status of the fetus or the effects a disability may have on the future child alone, 
but should also take into account the effect on that child within the context of their family 
and the effects on the family itself.  This is particularly relevant where late termination of 
pregnancy is being considered, as it is the doctors who are going to perform the procedure 
who decide whether it can be justified, rather than the decision being made by the 
prospective parents themselves.   
 
Throughout my thesis, but particularly in chapter four and five, I have referred to the concept 
of harm.  This relates not only to the harm to the interests of the future child but also to the 
interests of the wider family.  As I will discuss in chapter four (section 4.2), harm is said to 
occur when someone has been made worse off than they would otherwise have been.58  
These harms need to be balanced with the positive aspects of having a child with a disability 
so that the overall position can be evaluated.  From the point of view of the family 
consideration needs to be given to the fact that they already have established interests to 
which harm could occur, and account needs to be taken of this by the clinical geneticist 
when counselling couples and by those arbitrating decisions about late termination of 
pregnancy. 
 
Before discussing the arguments put forward by those representing disabled people, who 
largely oppose prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy based on finding a disability 
in the fetus,59 I will discuss the current models of disability and the problems these create in 
chapter four (section 4.2.1).  I will discuss the concepts of health and disease (section 4.2.2) 
and what it means to be harmed in order to support my arguments in chapter three that 
                                            
58 Reznek L (1987) The Nature of Disease, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London and New York, p 134 
59 Saxton M (2000) ‘Why members of the Disability Community oppose prenatal diagnosis and 
selective abortion’ in Parens E, Asch A (eds) Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, Georgetown 
University Press/Washington DC, pp 148-149 
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reproductive autonomy ought to be respected as harm may occur not only to the future child, 
but also to the wider family and those who have a higher moral status than the fetus.   
 
Following on from my arguments that the fetus does not have full moral status and building 
on my discussion of disability and harm in chapter four, I will discuss in chapter five the 
arguments as to whether prenatal testing and subsequent termination of pregnancy does 
discriminate against those with disabilities, which are put forward by those representing 
disabled people.60  They argue that terminating a pregnancy based on the presence of 
disability is the result of judgements being made about the quality of the lives of disabled 
people and reinforces discriminatory attitudes towards them.61  I will argue that it is harm to 
the interests of the future individual child and those directly affected by the birth of a 
disabled child, such as the prospective parents and pre-existing children, which needs to be 
taken into account and this harm needs to be acknowledged by the clinicians responsible for 
the care of the mother and her fetus.  It is with regard to this that the clinical geneticist, in 
addition to providing the couple and the clinicians involved with information about the 
genetic condition, can ensure that those who ultimately make decisions about late 
termination of pregnancy take into account the harm to the interests of not only the future 
child, but also other directly affected individuals. 
 
Having then argued that prenatal testing does not discriminate against those with disabilities, 
but enhances reproductive autonomy, I will then discuss in chapter six the problems that 
prospective parents face in reality when they discover that their pregnancy is affected by an 
abnormality and the challenges they face.  I will discuss the way in which decisions in my 
experience as a clinical geneticist are made and how these are often counter to the arguments 
in support of prenatal testing and late termination of pregnancy.  Finally, I will put forward 
                                            
60 Shakespeare T (1995) ‘Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people’, Critical Social 
Policy 15, pp 25-35 
61 Gillott J (2001) ‘Screening for disability: a eugenic pursuit?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 27, pp 
ii21-ii23 
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recommendations on how this area of practice can develop in order to support reproductive 
decision-making better.  These recommendations include placing greater emphasis on 
considering the harms to the interests of the wider family when prospective parents are 
counselled, and to take these potential harms into account when deciding whether or not late 
terminations can be justified, rather than focusing on the clinical findings of the fetus.  There 
should also be increased involvement of the prospective parents, and where appropriate 
other family members, in a supportive and sensitive way during the process to assist 
healthcare professionals in justifying their decisions.  The supportive role of the clinical 
geneticist can be further developed as an advocate for prospective parents to ensure that their 
views are also taken into account. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Moral status of the fetus and Abortion 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
One of the reasons why there is opposition to prenatal testing is because a possible consequence 
of it is termination of pregnancy, and it is this that causes most controversy and debate.1,2 Those 
who oppose abortion often argue against it on the basis of the moral status of the fetus.  A 
clinical geneticist advises and supports prospective parents who may opt for a termination and, 
therefore, it is important for them to be comfortable with this potential outcome for the fetus so 
that they can give pragmatic advice and appropriate information.  In this chapter, I will discuss 
the moral status of the fetus with particular reference to those identified as having some form 
of congenital anomaly.  In doing so I conclude that decisions to terminate a pregnancy affected 
by a disability, particularly late in gestation, whilst needing greater justification do not in 
themselves discriminate against the disabled fetus or those living with disabilities. 
 
The foundation of my argument is that the fetus does not have the same full moral status as an 
adult human and, therefore, a disabled fetus does not have the same moral status as a person 
already living with a disability.  I also argue that the disabled fetus does not have lower moral 
status than a non-disabled fetus.  The concern that a disabled fetus has a lower moral status 
arises where termination of pregnancy is said to be justifiable on the basis that the fetus has, or 
is at serious risk of having, a severe disability.  This is also reflected in the current legislation 
                                                 
1 Savulescu J (2013) ‘Abortion, infanticide and allowing babies to die, 40 years on’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 39, pp 257-259 
2 Marquis D (1989) ‘Why abortion is immoral’, Journal of Philosophy 86, pp 183-203 
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on abortion,3 the limits of which are influenced by arguments about the moral status of the 
fetus.4  This tends to relate to terminations that take place after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy 
where termination of a normal fetus would not be permissible unless it was threatening the life 
of the mother. 
 
In order to do this I will discuss a range of arguments as to whether the fetus has moral status, 
and whether this is full moral status equivalent to that of an adult person.  It is generally 
accepted that it is wrong  ceteris paribus (to exclude, for example, self-defence) to kill an entity 
that has full moral status and, therefore, those who argue that the fetus has full moral status also 
believe that it is wrong to terminate a pregnancy.5  However, there are certain possible 
exceptions to this line of reasoning in the case of abortion, such as considerations as to the 
rights of a woman as presented by, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson.6  Whilst I recognise 
the complex array of arguments that exist in this area, the line of argument concerning the moral 
status of the fetus remains one of the most widely referred to central arguments in this debate 
and addressing it directly is important for any position that seeks to justify abortion on certain 
grounds.  I argue that the fetus, although a moral entity and deserving of some protection, does 
not have full moral status and therefore termination of pregnancy can be morally justified. 
 
The fetus is something that we may have moral obligations towards due to its importance to 
other people, but also due to its own future interests.  I will develop the position that moral 
status increases throughout gestation as the fetus acquires more characteristics of a person who 
has full moral status.  It therefore follows that as pregnancy progresses the protection that we 
should afford to the fetus increases, meaning that greater justification to end a pregnancy is 
needed the closer toward term the fetus reaches.  This is reflected in current clinical practice 
                                                 
3 Abortion Act 1967, HMSO: London 
4 British Medical Association (2014) The Law and Ethics of Abortion: BMA reviews, BMA 
5 Griffith S (2004) ‘The Moral Status of a Human Fetus: A Response to Lee’, Christian Bioethics 
10(1), pp 55-62 
6 Thomson JJ (1971) ‘A defence of abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1), pp 47-66 
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where greater justification is needed before clinicians will agree to perform late terminations of 
pregnancy.  This does, however, impact on certain freedoms of choice that a woman may wish 
to exercise as part of their autonomous reproductive decision-making, as I will discuss in 
chapter six.  One problem with this justification is that healthcare professionals tend to focus 
on the clinical condition of the fetus and the potential disability that may ensue.  These 
decisions, however, should also consider the fetus in the context of the wider family and take 
into account the potential harm to their interests as well. 
 
One justification offered for ending a pregnancy late in gestation, therefore, is where there is a 
substantial risk of severe disability in the fetus.  There are, however, concerns that this 
discriminates against those living with disabilities, suggesting that they have a lower moral 
status than those without disabilities.  I will argue that this is not the case and that the disabled 
fetus does have the equivalent moral status to any other fetus, and as such a disabled person has 
the same moral status as one that has no disabilities. 
 
 
 
2.2 Moral status 
 
When considering moral status this will be with reference to the characteristics that human 
moral agents such as ourselves attribute to other entities like the fetus.  Moral status is relevant 
where an entity matters morally to us for its own sake.  If something has moral status we cannot 
act in any way we please and we have moral obligations toward it, not because of any benefit 
this may derive to ourselves or other persons but because the entity has moral significance in 
its own right.7  Another corollary of this is that it is important to consider that entity’s well-
                                                 
7 Warren MA (1997) Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things, Oxford University 
Press, pp 3-5 
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being and its continued existence.8  It is, of course, not only those of the human species that 
have moral status.  It is generally accepted that non-human animals have moral status and we 
should not treat them in any way we please, although it is also generally accepted that non-
human animals have a lower moral status than human beings.  As such we can kill a non-human 
animal (humanely) but not a human person.9 
 
There are many theories as to when the fetus acquires full moral status, if at all. These views 
range from the conservative, often favoured by religious figures,10 to the view that the fetus 
only becomes a (full) moral being once born.11  I will discuss a number of theories in relation 
to what it means to have moral status and that two of the main theories, interest views and the 
acquisition of sentience, do not in themselves confirm full moral status on a fetus.  This 
distinction between moral status and full moral status is important to my thesis, as I argue that 
whilst the fetus does have moral status, this develops over time with the fetus becoming more 
morally significant as gestation progresses.  This is particularly relevant when considering the 
difference between a disabled fetus and a disabled person who has been born.  I will discuss 
the concept of being human in comparison to the concept of personhood in section 2.2.2 and 
the views that rely on psychological continuance as opposed to the physical characteristics that 
humans possess. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Dwyer JG (2010) Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority, Cambridge 
University Press, pp 9-26 
9 Spedding C (2000) Animal Welfare, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London & Sterling, VA, p 12 
10 Ohara N (2003)  ‘Ethical consideration of experimentation using living human embryos: the Catholic 
Church’s position on human embryonic stem cell research and human cloning’, Clinical and 
Experimental Obstetrics and Gynaecology 30(2-3), pp 77-81 
11 Gross M (2002)  ‘Abortion and Neonaticide: Ethics, Practice and Policy in four Nations’, Bioethics 
16(3), pp 202-230 
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2.2.1 What is it to have ‘moral status’? 
 
An entity with moral status is entitled to be treated with respect for their autonomy (should they 
have it) and self-interests.12,13 They are the subject of moral concern and should be respected 
and protected from harm.  Objects that do not have moral status have only instrumental value 
whereas, by contrast, human beings have intrinsic value in their own right and cannot therefore 
be treated in the same way as objects.  But what is it that gives them moral status?    
 
Between entities with full moral status and inanimate objects with no moral status there are 
beings for which it is more difficult to assign what degree of moral status they have.  This 
includes not only different species of non-human animals but also embryos and fetuses.  If these 
beings have full moral status they are deserving of the same protection as adult human beings.  
If this were the case, just as killing an adult human being would be morally wrong, it would be 
equally as wrong to terminate a pregnancy.  If, however, fetuses do not have moral status then 
abortion would not be wrong on these grounds and if this applied to a fetus at any stage of 
development abortion at any gestation of pregnancy, from conception to birth, would not be 
impermissible by appeal to its moral status.  
 
Warren puts forward the following view on moral status: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Kant I (1964)  ‘The groundwork of the metaphysics of morals’ in Paton HJ (ed) The Moral Law, 
Hutchinson University Library, p 43 
13 Galvin RF (2008) ‘Noonan’s argument against abortion: probability, possibility and potentiality’, 
Journal of Social Philosophy 19(2) pp 80-89 
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‘To have moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral standing.  It is to 
be an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations.  If an 
entity has moral status, then we may not treat it in just any way we please; we are 
morally obliged to give weight in our deliberations to its needs, interests, or well-being.  
Furthermore, we are morally obliged to do this not merely because protecting it may 
benefit ourselves or other persons, but because its needs have moral importance in their 
own right”.14 
 
Therefore according to Warren, for an entity to have moral status it must have interests in its 
own right.  A non-human animal has these interests, it can feel pain and pleasure and has self-
awareness and therefore has moral status.  A human person has higher function and greater 
interests than a non-human animal and, as such, has a higher moral status.  However, just 
because something does not have moral status on this basis we may still have moral obligations 
towards it due to the importance of it to the interests of those considered to have moral 
status.15,16 
 
For example, a family heirloom such as a piece of furniture has no moral status in itself.  It has 
no interests of its own and cannot experience pain or pleasure.  However, it is likely that it 
creates interests for a person with full moral status and they could be harmed (financially or 
emotionally, for example) if that item was destroyed or damaged.  It is the harm to the interests 
of this person with full moral status that leads us to have moral obligations towards the object.17  
Even if therefore, arguments that say that the fetus does not have moral status at all are accepted 
it does not follow that we do not owe moral obligations to that fetus. 
                                                 
14 Warren MA (1997) Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things, Oxford University 
Press, p 4 
15 Wrigley A (2013) ‘Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics 39, pp 15-18 
16 DeGrazia D (2007) ‘The harm of death, time-relative interests, and abortion’, Philosophical Forum 
38(1), pp 57-80 
17 Warren MA (1997) Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things, Oxford University 
Press, p 4 
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2.2.2 Being human 
 
Roman Catholic theory relies on moral status being bestowed upon those who are members of 
the human species.18,19 All living human beings from the beginning to the end of their lives are 
morally equal and have an equal right to life.  One problem with this theory is that the point of 
becoming ‘human’ is still an issue for debate.20  If it is agreed that this takes place at the point 
of conception then arguably all terminations of pregnancy are morally wrong other than those 
exceptions, for example, when the mother’s life is at risk.  Others, however, argue that being 
regarded as human occurs later, for example, when neural (nerve) tissue develops.21  
 
There is no doubt that an embryo and early fetus created by the fusion of gametes from adult 
human beings is a member of the human species.  It has its own human genetic code and if left 
undisturbed will usually develop into a human person.  This does not, however, mean that this 
confers moral status on that developing embryo and fetus which is equivalent to that of a fetus 
later in pregnancy, or to the person who is eventually born.  There is more to moral status than 
simply having the correct genetic make-up or being part of a particular species.  I agree that 
being human does have special significance, for example, in view of the importance of our role 
in the development of society and our capacity for reasoning and self-conscientiousness.22  
However, in order to be considered to have full moral status equivalent to an adult human being 
certain qualities and characteristics need to be present, and it is for this reason that I argue that 
the personhood view of moral status, which I discuss in section 2.2.4, is the most convincing.  
It is certain capacities that mark out a being as having full moral status.  In order for a human 
                                                 
18 Jones D (2001) ‘A theologian’s brief: on the place of the human embryo within the Christian 
tradition and the theological principles for evaluating its moral status’, Ethics & Medicine 17(3), pp 
143-153 
19 Jones D (2005) ‘The human embryo in the Christian tradition: a reconsideration’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 13(12), pp 710-714 
20 Jones D (2005) ‘The human embryo in the Christian tradition: a reconsideration’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 13(12), pp 710-714 
21 Donceel FJ (1970) ‘Immediate animation and delayed hominization’, Theological studies  31,  pp 76-
105 
22 Diamond C (1991) ‘The importance of Being Human’, Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement 29, 
pp 35-62 
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person to matter more than any other sort of thing in moral consideration it has to have qualities 
that no other organism has.  It is not enough, therefore, to consider such things as the ability to 
form family relationships, problem solving or expressing emotions, as these abilities have been 
shown to exist in non-human animals.23,24 It has been necessary, therefore, to identify why 
human beings are unique from other non-human animals by identifying certain capacities and 
capabilities.  As I will discuss, the notion of personhood encapsulates this uniqueness.  
 
Similarly, Warren argues that it is not genetic human beings who have a special moral status 
and a right to life but persons.25  As I will discuss in section 2.2.4, in order for an entity to have 
interests in its own right, and therefore moral status, it must have consciousness, for example, 
the ability to feel pain.  It must have self-awareness and be motivated by its own self-interest.  
Whilst the fetus does possess consciousness and the ability to feel pain at a certain point in 
gestation it does not possess the other qualities required for it to be regarded as having full 
moral status, such as an adult human being would have.  Adult human beings generally have 
all of those qualities mentioned above and, furthermore, are rational and able to make their own 
autonomous decisions. I argue, therefore, that the fetus does not have full moral status, just like 
a non-human animal does not, but it does possess some characteristics meaning that it does 
have some moral status.  Even if one argues, however, that the fetus does not have moral status, 
it is morally significant due to the nature of it in that it is human and belongs to someone with 
full moral status, and therefore we do have moral obligations towards it and it is deserving of 
protection.   
 
Therefore, at one end of the spectrum we have inanimate, non-sentient objects and at the other 
end we have adult human beings with full moral status.  The difficulty clearly lies with 
assigning moral status to those beings in between, such as the fetus.   Whilst I have agreed that 
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simply being part of the human species does not confer full moral status, I have argued that it 
does have some special significance. Therefore, whilst an embryo should not be afforded the 
same moral status as, for example, a viable fetus or term neonate, it does have a degree of moral 
status and as such we cannot do whatever we please with human embryos or pre-viable fetuses. 
 
 
2.2.3 Sentience  
 
Utilitarian theorist Jeremy Bentham argued that a being's capacity to experience pleasure and 
pain is what is important when considering moral status.26   He argued that we have a moral 
obligation not to kill or inflict pain or suffering upon such beings without good reason.  Our 
status in moral consideration according to Bentham is entirely reflective on our capacity to 
suffer.  As humans have a great capacity to suffer they tend to be more significant in utilitarian 
calculations governing our moral actions.  However, it is the sum total of pleasures versus pain 
that is of relevance and suffering of any organism, human or not, can count towards this 
calculation.  This means that non-human animals have equivalence to humans inasmuch as their 
suffering is considered equally morally relevant, but they do not suffer as much.  Based on this 
he believed that any moral obligation we have to protect humans also applied to non-human 
animals.  His theory did not place importance on whether a being could ‘reason’ but whether it 
could ‘suffer’.  I do not intend to consider all of the arguments in relation to this as it is generally 
accepted within our society that non-human animals, whilst having moral status, are not morally 
equivalent to humans and the way in which at least some non-human animals behave is not 
morally equivalent to the way in which humans behave in their communities.27 
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For the fetus it would mean moral status would develop over time as the physiological and 
anatomical developmental changes took place and as the nervous system developed, and, 
therefore, there would be very little difference between a fetus in the final stages of gestation 
and a neonate. This theory, however, does not currently help us to decide when during gestation 
a fetus becomes sentient and, therefore, according to this theory attains moral status, as there is 
no consensus as to when the fetus does begin to feel pain28,29 and this is a complicated concept.  
I do not intend to consider this here as I do not argue that there is a specific defined time in 
gestation when the fetus attains moral status, but that moral status increases over time as 
gestation progresses.  However, it is important to recognise that in establishing when a fetus 
feels pain it does not only depend on physiology and anatomy and the development of the 
nervous system, but also what is meant by ‘experiencing pain’ and the fact that different 
individuals may have different perceptions of and tolerance to pain, as well as the question of 
how we know when pain is being experienced30 and how this can be measured.   
 
 
2.2.4 Personhood 
 
Locke was the originator of personhood as a moral concept.  He described a person as “a 
thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking being in different time and place; which it does only by that consciousness which 
is inseparable from thinking and as it seems to me essential to it.”31,32 His theory provided the 
concept of a person as having the properties of being conscious, self-aware and rational.  Kant 
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also talked about rational beings that existed as an end in themselves rather than merely being 
in existence solely for the benefit of others.33 Locke’s theory of personal identity related to 
identity over time where we are the same person insofar as our consciousness in the present 
time is the same as it was in the past.  Other philosophers have discussed and defended Locke’s 
theory,34,35,36 however, this means that not all living humans would be regarded as persons, 
including neonates, infants and very young children and those with learning difficulties or 
dementia.  A human would not become a person until these qualities had been achieved and 
may then lose the recognition of being a person due to aging, disease or trauma, and it is this 
that makes such a theory unattractive as defending it results in the conclusion that what applies 
to the fetus also applies to neonates and severely incapacitated adults. This led to Giubilini and 
Minerva concluding that if abortion is permissible so too is infanticide and the reasons which 
make abortion permissible should also apply to terminating the life of a neonate.37  
 
The personhood theory only takes into account the psychological aspects of being a person and 
does not take into account any physical attributes.  It reflects and supports the view that the 
fetus does not have the full moral status of a person. 
 
Steinbock describes personhood as: 
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“Beings that have moral status must be capable of caring about what is done to them.  
They must be capable of being made, if only in a rudimentary sense, happy or 
miserable, comfortable or distressed.  Whatever reasons we have for preserving or 
protecting non-sentient beings, these reasons do not refer to their own interests.  For 
without conscious awareness, beings cannot have interests.  Without interests they 
cannot have a welfare of their own.  Without a welfare of their own, nothing can be 
done for their sake.  Hence, they lack moral standing or status”.38 
 
This particular definition, however, does not clearly define human beings from other creatures.  
Other definitions of personhood are problematic. For example, Harris believes those who are 
capable of valuing their own existence can be recognised as persons.39  This adds an extra 
dimension to Locke’s theory as it includes the ability to look forwards and to have control over 
and value one’s future.  However, the same problems occur in that if that human being loses 
that capacity they no longer remain a person.  Again, it would imply that a neonate or even 
young infant who does not appreciate the value of their existence would also not be regarded 
as persons and it would also suggest an individual in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) would 
not be classed as a person with full moral status.  However, in the case of a neonate or child, 
they could reasonably be expected to gain capacity in the future with increasing age, unlike 
those who lose capacity due to an ongoing illness. 
 
The fact that this theory suggests that if a fetus can be killed, as it does not have full moral 
status, then it should also be possible to kill a neonate or adult in a PVS seems intuitively wrong.  
As a society we do generally agree that other people should not be killed and this has raised 
much debate about the ethics of euthanasia, even where an adult person with capacity decides 
for themself that they no longer wish to live.  Whilst it is not a purpose of this thesis to discuss 
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the ethics of euthanasia I do agree that any decision made about the fetus, in view of me arguing 
that moral status is based on the personhood view, does also apply to neonates.  Although based 
on my view a neonate does not have full moral status, it does not mean that we can do as we 
wish to it.  It has moral status and is morally considerable but this is not equivalent to that of 
an adult human being (except one in a PVS for which the same arguments apply) and, therefore, 
I do agree that under very strict circumstances a neonate’s life could be ended, for example, if 
they were severely disabled and destined to have a life of pain and suffering or their survival 
was already limited by illness.  This, however, is based on views about access to euthanasia for 
neonates rather than arguments about them not having full moral status.  The arguments I 
discuss throughout my thesis, therefore, could apply just as readily to the position of a severely 
disabled neonate, just as they do to a severely disabled fetus.  However, as I have previously 
stated, even if it were argued that the fetus or neonate did not have moral status at all they are 
important to those with full moral status and as such we would still have moral obligations 
towards them, and this would need to be considered in the actions we take against them.  
 
Returning to Warren, she also concludes that the special moral status that is associated with 
personhood is defined in terms of what psychological characteristics and cognitive functions a 
person has.  This may include self-consciousness, self-motivation, self-awareness and 
reasoning.  An entity without such characteristics cannot be regarded as a person.  This means 
that the early fetus is not a person and a fetus later in gestation will also have fewer of the 
person-associated characteristics than some non-human creatures.  Based on this Warren comes 
to the conclusion that it is therefore ‘morally neutral’ to have an abortion and makes the 
controversial comparison of terminating a pregnancy with having a haircut.40 I agree that as 
gestation progresses the features of personhood develop and as such the moral status of the 
fetus is enhanced.  The fetus may not have full moral status but this does not mean that it is not 
worthy of protection and as such I do not agree with Warren that terminations of pregnancy are 
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‘morally neutral’.  It is generally regarded that persons have a prima facie right to life due to 
them having full moral status, however, this does not automatically mean that it is morally 
insignificant to destroy something that does not have full moral status; justification would still 
be needed.41  In arguing that moral status increases over time as pregnancy progresses this 
means that greater justification to end a pregnancy is needed later in gestation.  In early 
pregnancy when the fetus is completely dependent on the mother for survival this justification 
can be provided by the woman’s rights over her own body.42,43 However, as the fetus develops 
and acquires increasing characteristics and capacities more significant justification to perform 
a termination is required, such as it being a threat to the mother’s life or severe fetal disability 
that would cause harm to the future child or those with full moral status who would be directly 
affected by its birth.  As well as the clinical condition of the fetus and the potential harms to it 
as a result of this, the clinical geneticist involved in supporting the prospective parents must 
take these latter considerations into account during counselling, and ensure that those clinicians 
who are responsible for justifying their decision to perform a late termination, also consider the 
fetus in the context of the wider family and the potential harm to their interests as well. 
 
Steinbock44 is particularly concerned about Warren’s view of personhood as she describes it as 
justifying infanticide as a neonate is not significantly different to a late fetus in terms of the 
characteristics it has which relate to personhood.  Whilst this is true, the fetus is, however, still 
in-utero and therefore whilst it is morally significant the pregnant woman has full, and therefore 
superior, moral status. There is a difference, therefore, between a fetus and a neonate which is 
no longer physically associated with a person who has higher moral significance. 
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Due to the problems with the personhood view, in that it excludes neonates and those adults 
with severe mental disabilities or in a PVS, there is another theory.  The Animalist or Biological 
Species account of personhood relies on us being a member of a particular species and places 
importance on the physical and biological properties a member of that species has, rather than 
psychological abilities and functioning.45,46 Reliance on this theory would mean that if a person 
became permanently unconscious they would, by virtue of their physical being, still be a person 
and the same person as they had previously been.  It is the continuance of our biological 
functioning that maintains our personal identity according to this theory, not whether or not 
psychologically we continue to function.  A person would cease being a person when they were 
physiologically dead and when the biological processes, for example respiration, had stopped 
or following brain stem death.47  
 
On the face of it, this would mean that an anencephalic infant or an adult in a PVS is just as 
deserving of being protected as a person who is conscious, can feel pain and could suffer both 
physically and emotionally by being harmed or killed.  It is by appeal to these being members 
of a species whose members typically possess the properties that gives them personhood status. 
Species membership means that not every individual needs to possess the features of being a 
person, only a typical member of the species.  
 
I prefer to regard a person from the psychological perspective rather than basing what it is to 
be a person on their genetic makeup or biological functioning.  However, rather than suggesting 
that it is only those with interests that have full moral status I also wish to argue that the fetus 
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and neonate have some moral status which is of significance in that they do have some interests 
as well.  Wrigley,48 following DeGrazia,49 refers to these as time-relative interests   (TRIs).  
 
These interests mean that the fetus does have moral status and as such justification is needed to 
kill them, although these interests are not enough to give the fetus the full moral status that a 
fully sentient and psychologically developed person would have.  The concept of TRIs 
introduced by McMahan is described as an interest in continuing to live and includes a 
consideration of the amount of good the future of that individual may hold and also the 
psychological link between current interests and the future.50  In order to have TRIs one must 
have a psychological relationship between future and past self.  An infant will have weaker 
TRIs in continuing to live than a grown adult in view of the fact that the infant has very little 
awareness of its future self.  A patient with dementia will have weaker TRIs as they are less 
likely to be able to invest in their future self.   
 
The concept of TRIs is used as a defense of abortion arguing that the fetus, at least in its early 
stages, does not have TRIs.51  However, it can also be used to explain why greater justification 
for terminating a pregnancy is needed as gestation proceeds.  As the fetus develops and goes 
beyond the pre-sentient stage arguably it will develop some, although weak, TRIs.  Comparing 
the TRIs of an adult human to that of a fetus at any gestation does distinguish between the 
morality of killing a fetus and killing a person who has been born, and this is important when 
comparing a disabled fetus to a disabled adult and considering discrimination.  The concept of 
TRIs has been used as a justification for early abortion,52 where abortion takes place before the 
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fetal brain acquires the capacity to support consciousness.  It is thought that consciousness 
develops between the twentieth and twenty-eighth week of gestation53 and, therefore, after 
twenty-eight weeks the fetus will have TRIs, albeit weak ones, and hence the justification for 
abortion is greater.   
 
If we consider moral status to be related to a subject having interests in itself, rather than indirect 
interests to others, the embryo and early fetus have lower moral status than the viable fetus and 
that in turn has lower moral status than the fetus just prior to delivery.  In applying this theory, 
therefore, the fetus does have lower moral status, at all points during gestation, to the mother 
and her rights therefore outweigh that of the fetus.  That is not to say, however, that the fetus 
does not have any moral status but that it has not yet attained full moral status.  It also confirms 
that as gestation progresses and TRIs become greater moral status increases and, therefore, 
greater justification to terminate a pregnancy is required the later in gestation this takes place.   
 
 
2.2.5 Fetal viability 
 
In this section I discuss fetal viability due to its importance with regard to late termination of 
pregnancy. This is of particular relevance when considering fetal abnormality and disability 
discrimination.  Whilst I have argued that the fetus does not have the equivalent moral status to 
an adult viability has been identified as a significant point in gestation with regards to moral 
status.54 Viability is described as the point at which the fetus can survive independently outside 
the mother given appropriate intensive care.55  This could be different for a fetus that is affected 
by a congenital abnormality and, therefore, I will assume that this is only applicable to those 
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fetuses that have nothing about them that would hinder their ability to survive.  One 
consequence of this is that it gives a twenty-four week fetus the same moral status as a twenty-
four week neonate,56 who, apart from now being outside the uterus, is comparable in every 
other way to its in-utero counterpart.  
 
There are several problems, however, with identifying viability as significant in relation to 
moral status.  With respect to its position of independence should this be a basis on which moral 
worth is assessed?   Some argue that all adults have full moral worth regardless of their physical 
or mental condition.57  I have shown in section 2.2.4 that the psychological account of 
personhood identifies why this is not the case.  Even if it were assumed that all adults did enjoy 
full moral status there are a number of reasons why an adult may not continue to survive 
independently of other factors, just like a fetus of less than twenty-four weeks could not survive 
outside the mother’s body.   
 
A person with chronic renal failure can continue to live a full and active life.  However, this is 
on the condition that they have regular renal dialysis, something on which their life is 
dependent.  Similarly there are respiratory illnesses which may require a person to have 
overnight ventilation to enable their continued survival.  Whilst these examples show that even 
adult humans can be dependent on something for their continued existence this does not in any 
way lower their moral significance or worth.  Why then does the dependence of the fetus on its 
mother limit its moral status?   
 
The fetus is part of the mother until it is born and is said to be dependent on the mother for its 
survival until the point of viability.  However, I have already argued that she has a higher moral 
status than the fetus and therefore her rights are of greater importance.58 However, it is not with 
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the mother’s moral status that I am comparing, but that of a pre-viable versus viable fetus.  The 
independence theory of viability does not automatically confer moral status at that particular 
point in gestation; just as losing one’s independence does not result in the forfeiting of one’s 
moral status.  Independence or potential independence in itself does not suddenly mean that 
moral status should be granted, just as it should not be removed if independence is lost.   
 
A further argument against viability as a point at which the fetus gains moral status is the effect 
that medical technological advances have had on the viability of neonates.59  In 1967 when the 
Abortion Act was created long-term survival of preterm babies born prior to thirty-two weeks 
gestation was unusual.60   However, with advances in fetal and neonatal medicine, particularly 
neonatal intensive care, survival of neonates born at twenty-four weeks gestation is now 
frequent.61  If viability were to be taken as the time at which the fetus becomes morally 
significant this would mean that the moral status of a twenty-four week fetus now would be 
greater than a fetus forty years ago.  This alone, however, does not exclude viability as an 
argument for moral status.  It is not difficult to find other examples in history where the moral 
status of other groups has changed over time.62  Having lower moral status in the past does not 
affect their moral status now.   
 
However, what may be more relevant are the inequalities in neonatal intensive care which exist 
not over different time periods but in different geographical locations during the same era.  For 
example, whilst there may be a good chance of survival in the western world of a fetus born 
prematurely, this may not be the case in developing countries.63  Does this mean that a fetus 
elsewhere in the world, where survival rates are lower and therefore the point of viability is 
later in pregnancy, has lower moral status?  If that were the case it could also be extended to 
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other areas of medicine.  Cancer survival rates are better in developed countries due to 
diagnostic techniques and treatment.64  This does not mean those adults with cancer in 
developing countries are of lower moral status because their chances of survival are lower.  
Even within the United Kingdom different neonatal units will have different survival rates.65   
 
Therefore, identifying viability as the point of attainment of full moral status would not comply 
with the general belief that all persons are equal in worth66 and would suggest that some people 
have higher moral status than others (I have already talked about those in whom changes in 
their psychological attributes may affect them being classed as a person, but I am assuming 
here that those I refer to are psychologically a person).  If this is unacceptable for adult persons 
why should it be acceptable for the fetus? I do not accept therefore that the fetus has full moral 
status once it reaches the point of viability, as this point is too variable between different fetuses 
depending on their own intrinsic development and health, but also depending on their external 
environment once they are born.  A fetus with a disability, such as a congenital heart or lung 
abnormality, may not be viable at twenty-four weeks but may be at a later stage in development.  
This would suggest that the fetus with a disability at twenty-four weeks has lower moral status 
than the fetus without the anomaly at the same stage of gestation, which would be 
discriminatory and, therefore, morally impermissible. 
 
Some argue that the justification for third trimester abortion should be based on whether or not 
the fetus is a patient.67  If it is, then, as with any other patient, a physician cannot legally and 
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intentionally kill it, ceteris paribus.68   Chervenak et al69 argue that the fetus is a patient when 
it becomes viable but accept that viability may occur at different gestational ages depending on 
various factors including the existence of a congenital abnormality, and therefore the cut-off 
point may in fact be later than twenty-four weeks gestation, which is generally regarded as the 
point of viability.70  Curiously, Chervenak et al conclude that ‘any attempt to establish 
limitations on third trimester abortion on the basis of claims about the independent moral status 
of the third trimester fetus is bound to end in intellectual deadlock’.71 However, they then go 
on to say that the fetus as a patient has a form of dependent moral status and appear to rely on 
this to support their arguments that late termination of pregnancy should only occur where the 
anomalies in the fetus mean that death is a certain or near certain outcome or that there is an 
absence of cognitive developmental capacity which is ‘tantamount to death’.72  They argue that 
conditions which fall short of these criteria, such as spina bifida and most cardiac abnormalities, 
should not result in a decision that a pregnancy should be terminated late in gestation and to 
agree to a termination under these circumstances would be counter to the doctor’s professional 
integrity.73 They do not appear to take into account the potential pain and suffering which 
conditions such as spina bifida and some congenital heart malformations can lead to.  In more 
severe cases it is likely that the child, from a very early age, will need extensive surgery and in-
patient hospital care and may suffer significant morbidity throughout their life.  They also do 
not take into account the harm to the interests of the wider family that may occur.  It is accepted 
by them, however, that respect for a pregnant woman’s autonomy is a fundamental principle in 
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obstetric ethics, although, they go on to argue that this can be limited by the physician’s 
obligations to the fetal patient,74 unless it threatens the life of the mother.   
 
One problem with this argument is that if the fetus, after the point of viability, is to be regarded 
as a patient but can be killed if it has a severe abnormality as they describe, it would also follow 
that a neonate in the same condition can also be killed (infanticide).  Similarly, an adult patient 
who is affected by a condition which will soon result in death can also be killed (euthanasia).  
Chervenak et al are silent on this point and one argument to distinguish these situations from 
that of the fetus would be to consider the location of the fetus within the mother’s body.    This 
is a point which has also been noted by Savulescu,75 who also makes reference to the fact that 
the point and age of viability is affected by technology.76  
 
 
2.2.6 Birth – the transition from fetus to neonate 
 
Birth is another point at which the fetus is said to gain full moral status.77 According to my 
argument that moral status develops as gestation progresses I agree that at birth moral status is 
higher than it was at, for example, twenty-four weeks of gestation.  Under certain maternal and 
fetal conditions a termination of pregnancy can be performed legally without time limit.78  A 
termination performed after twenty-one weeks and six days of gestation must involve feticide 
to overcome the problems of viability and survival79.  As feticide is acceptable under these 
circumstances but infanticide is not this would suggest that the law recognises some 
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significance relating to birth.  This is not only of legal significance where an entity is not 
recognised legally as a person until it is physically born, with the fetus having no recognised 
legal rights, but it is also said to be of moral significance.80 Steinbock, however, argues against 
birth as being a morally significant stage in fetal development: 
 
‘There is not much difference between a newborn moments after birth, and a foetus 
moments before it is born.  How can a change merely in location have such a drastic 
effect on moral status?”81 
 
Warren, however, argues that as well as the change in location of the fetus, from inside the 
mother to outside, there are also changes in the biological connection to the mother which make 
birth significant.  Once delivered the fetus can exist independently and no longer potentially 
threatens the life of the mother.82  Whilst pregnancy is associated with risks to the mother it 
does not generally threaten her life.  Obviously there are some situations where continuing to 
be pregnant can threaten a woman’s life, and this is one of the justifications for termination of 
pregnancy, including late termination.  However, in general, without specific indication most 
fetuses do not confer any significant threat to a woman’s life, so is this a good enough reason 
to give the fetus a lower moral status than its delivered counterpart? 
 
Thomson argues that killing the fetus in self-defence is a justification for terminating a 
pregnancy83 and therefore a threat to a woman’s life may justify termination up to birth for such 
a situation.  Thomson, however, talks of self-defence as a reason to allow a woman to terminate 
a pregnancy even in the face of arguments that suggest that the fetus has the same moral status 
as a neonate, and therefore should not be killed.  Thomson uses an analogy to justify her 
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position.  She describes a villain throwing a fat man towards you as you sunbathe on a deck 
beneath the cliff he is being thrown from.84  If the man lands on you, you will be killed, however, 
he will survive as you cushion his fall.  To complicate matters further you are immobile with 
your leg in traction and therefore have no chance of being able to move out of the way before 
he hits you.  The only option you have to prevent your own death is to impale the man on your 
parasol.  This, Thomson argues, is justified.  The fat man is innocent but will kill you if he hits 
you.  You have the right, therefore, to take action to save your own life, even if this does result 
in the fat man’s death.  Thomson then goes on to compare this to the situation faced by women 
whose lives are threatened by their pregnancy.   On this basis, therefore, whilst the fetus is an 
innocent party it is threatening the life of the mother and as such she is justified in ending the 
life of the fetus in order to save herself.  This argument of course only works when we consider 
the situation where the woman’s life is at risk. 
 
This argument would not justify the termination of those pregnancies which are affected by a 
fetal abnormality, but which do not threaten the mother’s life.  Legally a seriously disabled 
fetus can be aborted but a seriously disabled neonate cannot actively be killed.  Ethically birth 
is also seen as a significant point in development with Warren arguing that infanticide, based 
on severe neonatal abnormality, cannot be justified, stating: 
 
‘…since it is possible to do more than ever before to enable people with disabilities to 
lead good lives’.85 
 
This argument could, however, also be applied to seriously handicapped fetuses and would 
serve as an argument against abortion on the grounds of fetal abnormality.  Warren’s argument 
implies that disability is not a good enough reason to allow infanticide and, therefore, one could 
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deduce from this that abortion on the grounds of disability could also not be justified.  These 
fetuses could be treated following delivery, or even in-utero.  Therefore, if abortion is 
acceptable but infanticide is not this suggests that the neonate has a higher moral status than 
the fetus. 
 
Gillon also considered this arbitrary distinction between the born and unborn, describing it as 
‘biological geography’: 
 
“… (a) human being does not have a right to life if it lies north of the vaginal introitus 
but has a right to life once it has passed south.”86 
 
A thirty-eight week fetus is as fully developed and one would assume as sentient as a thirty-
eight week gestation neonate.  There are slight changes from fetal to neonatal physiology as the 
baby takes its first breath, but these could not be considered significant biological changes as 
to bestow moral status as many premature neonates, who are generally regarded as having full 
moral status in addition to full legal status, do not undergo these changes without medical 
intervention.  Apart from its in-utero position and its umbilical attachment to its mother there 
is no difference. In section 2.2.4, I stated that the mother, being a person, has higher moral 
status than her fetus and in the event of her life being threatened a termination is justified up 
until birth.87 In the case of terminating a pregnancy, and therefore killing the fetus, one 
justification of this is the rights of a woman over her own body.88  However, if a fetus with 
congenital abnormalities or a condition that is going to result in a disabled person once born is 
not threatening the life of the mother, is it morally justifiable for this pregnancy to be terminated 
up to the point of birth when this is not an option in a normal pregnancy which is not threatening 
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the mother’s life?  Does this suggest that a disabled fetus has a lower moral status than one that 
is regarded as normal?  This is an issue which I will subsequently discuss in section 2.4. 
 
 
2.2.7  Moral status as a continuum 
 
Having considered what it is to have moral status and discussed the arguments as to when this 
occurs during fetal development, I have concluded that a fetus does not become morally 
significant at what is regarded as the point of viability or at birth, or for that matter any other 
discrete point in gestation.  The development of moral status is something that is continually 
evolving during gestation as the fetus attains more of the properties and characteristics 
associated with personhood.  The attributes of a person put forward by Warren do not suddenly 
develop at a particular point in gestation, but are achieved and developed gradually over time 
and they may not all appear at the same time. As personhood develops so too does moral status, 
with full moral status being achieved once the attributes of a person have been reached.  
Glover89 supports this view that becoming a person is a matter of degree and abandons the view 
that there is an abrupt transition.  He describes a one-year-old child being more a person than a 
neonate or fetus just before birth, but that each of these is more a person than an embryo.  Glover 
acknowledges that this theory does not resolve the issues surrounding moral status of the fetus 
completely as there is likely to be disagreement as to the rate at which acquiring moral status 
increases and when it is completed.  This will depend on which aspects of personality makes a 
human a person.90   
 
This view of moral status being on a continuum avoids the problems encountered by having a 
sharp distinction as to when abortion under certain circumstances is and is not acceptable.  It 
implies that abortions become increasingly morally wrong as pregnancy progresses meaning 
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that stronger justification for ending a pregnancy later in gestation is needed.  This enhanced 
justification may become clearer for the medical practitioners agreeing to perform the 
termination when they fully engage with the prospective parents in order to understand their 
reasons for requesting a termination, and the impact having a disabled child will have on them 
as well as the future child, which I discuss in chapter six.  The clinical geneticist, as part of the 
support they provide to prospective parents, should play a pivotal role in ensuring that the 
justifications for these decisions includes consideration of the interests of prospective parents 
and other family members, and that they are not solely based on clinical information about the 
fetus. 
 
Strong refers to the above view of moral status as having ‘considerable intuitive plausibility’,91 
with abortions earlier in gestation being less ethically problematic than those that take place 
late in gestation.  This, however, does not assist in deciding on the issue of whether a 
termination, for any reason, can take place at any time during gestation or whether this should 
be confined to certain extenuating circumstances, as defined in the Abortion Act.  If we are to 
accept that the fetus does have moral status and that this increases as gestation progresses there 
needs to be acknowledgement that with increasing gestation comes the need for increasing 
protection. 
 
 
2.3 Disability and Abortion Law 
 
The advent of prenatal testing and diagnosis has led to the increased identification of fetuses 
with abnormalities, both physical and mental. Ultrasound scanning during pregnancy has also 
become much more sophisticated with detailed physical imaging revealing an increasing 
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number of anomalies in fetuses.92  Advances in genetic medicine have led to the identification 
of more and more genes that cause disease and for which prenatal testing is available.  Offering 
such tests to pregnant women provides them with the opportunity to terminate an affected 
pregnancy if so desired.  Some abnormalities, however, cannot be identified until later in 
gestation resulting in the need for terminations to take place closer to term, around which there 
is additional controversy.  This is reflected in law in the form of the Abortion Act93 where, as 
well as for reasons of maternal interest, termination of pregnancy for fetuses considered to have 
a serious abnormality can take place after the point at which the fetus is considered viable 
(currently twenty-four weeks gestation). Applying this time limit, either in legislation or 
ethically speaking, does have implications with respect to the moral status of those identified 
as being at substantial risk of ‘serious handicap’.  If a fetus that is considered ‘normal’ cannot 
be terminated after the point of viability, unless it is threatening the life of the mother, why is 
it acceptable or justifiable to terminate a pregnancy where the fetus has been identified as 
having significant or serious abnormalities? 
 
On the face of it, therefore, the Abortion Act does appear to differentiate between and 
discriminate against those fetuses that have congenital abnormalities that would result in the 
birth of a disabled person.  Women who choose to have prenatal tests performed are able to use 
the information this provides to make decisions about their pregnancy.  If an abnormality is 
identified a woman may consider having a termination, however, the law imposes limitations 
on this.  It is sometimes the case that abnormalities cannot be identified before twenty-four 
weeks or some serious conditions may not develop until later in pregnancy.  Late termination 
(after twenty-four weeks) may allow pregnant women to continue to make choices about their 
pregnancy as relevant information becomes available to them, and may provide them with the 
options that are available to those women who receive information about the health of their 
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fetus earlier in gestation. I will discuss in chapter six the limitations that may be placed on 
women later in pregnancy due to the need for a late termination to be medically justified, and 
how developing the role of the clinical geneticist may assist prospective parents and healthcare 
professionals reach these decisions. 
 
The question of when the fetus becomes a moral agent affects what can be considered to be 
morally justifiable with respect to termination of pregnancy.  Pro-life arguments against 
abortion rely on the initial premise that it is wrong to kill a human being and on the second 
premise that a fetus has full moral status, therefore, concluding that it is wrong to kill a human 
fetus.94,95,96 In order to counter-argue these claims I have argued that the fetus does not have 
full moral status equivalent to the adult human person based on the personhood view and due 
to the fact that an adult has TRIs which are greater than that of a fetus.  However, this does not 
address the problem of permitting termination of pregnancy after a point in gestation due to 
serious disability, but not allowing the termination of a ‘normal’ pregnancy after the same point.   
 
If we consider abortion law to have developed by firstly considering the ethical principles, we 
can then consider the moral implications of this legislation.97  The current abortion law is not 
totally permissive or totally prohibitive and it is the presence of serious disability in the fetus 
that I am interested in.  As previously stated, the Abortion Act allows termination of pregnancy 
up to twenty-four weeks of gestation.  The ethical basis for this is that twenty-four weeks 
gestation is also regarded as the point at which the fetus is viable in that it could survive 
independently of the mother, although not necessarily without significant disability.98  Certain 
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maternal and fetal criteria, as outlined by the Act, will also sanction abortion up to birth, another 
significant point in fetal development and one in which others regard as morally significant.99 
Whilst obviously all terminations involve feticide, a termination after twenty-two weeks must 
involve additional procedures that ensure that the life of the fetus has been ended before the 
termination procedure takes place100.  This is to avoid the delivery of a live born infant and the 
anguish for the neonate, parents and staff that is inevitably associated with this.101  
 
Some argue that the fact that a termination may be permissible up to birth if the fetus has a 
severe disability, but not if the fetus is said to be ‘normal’, discriminates against those with 
disabilities who live in our society102 and that a common time limit should be adopted for all 
pregnancies.103  Abortion law has been developed over time taking into account ethical opinions 
regarding the treatment of the fetus at various points during gestation.104,105 This has led to the 
time limit of twenty-four weeks for abortion other than those performed under certain 
circumstances, including fetal disability.  On the face of it this does suggest that the law is 
unethical as it does distinguish between disabled and non-disabled fetuses and, therefore, 
discriminates against those with disabilities. 
 
There are two ways in which this could be seen to be discriminatory.  One is that terminating 
pregnancies due to fetal abnormality or disability at all confers lower moral status on those 
living with disabilities, suggesting that they would have been better off not to have been born.  
The second is that if one extends the argument that a normal fetus, or one with minor 
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abnormalities, cannot be terminated after twenty-four weeks gestation but a fetus with serious 
abnormalities can be, suggesting there is a difference in their moral status,106 then this would 
also apply to individuals already born with disabilities. This would, therefore, appear to 
discriminate against those living with disabilities and suggest they too have lower moral status 
than their non-disabled counterparts.  This could then have implications for those living with 
disabilities, for example, with respect to medical treatment and the impact this may have on 
resources within society generally.   
 
With respect to the first argument, terminating a disabled fetus does not discriminate against 
those living with disabilities any more than terminating a fetus for social reasons alone does for 
a non-disabled person. I have already established that the fetus, disabled or otherwise, does 
have a lower moral status than a person who has been born and, therefore, the two cannot be 
compared.  However, one can also see why it is not unreasonable for those representing 
disability groups to be concerned that such termination decisions will be considered to express 
discriminatory attitudes towards disability, especially as disabled and non-disabled fetuses at 
the same gestation are treated differently.   
 
This leads to the question of whether we ought to legislate to prevent such attitudes from being 
expressed in reproductive choices based on the argument that such attitudes may mould the sort 
of people who are allowed to live in society.  However, during my discussion of the arguments 
I intend to show that such terminations do not discriminate against those with disabilities. 
Parental and reproductive autonomy should not be overruled when a serious abnormality exists 
on the basis that it discriminates against disabled people.  
 
The second argument, however, is more difficult to refute on moral grounds.  If disabled 
individuals have the same moral standing as those without disabilities why can a disabled fetus 
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be terminated after twenty-four weeks of gestation but a physically and mentally unimpaired 
fetus cannot?   
 
Those already living with disabilities have the same moral status as other individuals and so 
too does the disabled fetus have the same moral status as the fetus that is considered to be 
normal.  The fact that some form of disability exists does not affect moral standing. The 
permissibility of late terminations where serious disability exists is not justified on the basis 
that the disabled fetus has a lower moral status, but based on the quality of life the future child 
would be expected to have if they were born, and the implications this may have for other close 
family members, and the harm it may cause to the interests of those who have full moral status.  
One could even argue that morally it is unacceptable to allow a baby to be born knowing it will 
have such severe disabilities as to have a life which is not worthwhile.107,108 However, if 
terminations are permitted on the basis of reducing suffering this would imply that infanticide 
and even euthanasia at any age should be allowed.   
 
Gillon agrees that if human fetuses are people and therefore disabled fetuses are disabled people 
it is morally unacceptable to kill such fetuses, as it would be to kill similarly affected adults.109  
However, Gillon argues that justifying abortion on the grounds of disability and rejecting the 
claim that fetuses are people with full moral status is not discriminating against those living 
with disabilities.  I have already discussed why the fetus does not have full moral status, having 
based my arguments on the personhood view.  Gillon argues that such abortions can be justified 
by providing the choice to pregnant women not to continue a pregnancy which would result in 
a disabled person.  He argues that if the fetus is not regarded as having full moral status then 
aborting an abnormal fetus does not discriminate against those living with disabilities, who 
have the same full moral status as other people who have been born.  As Gillon states: 
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“…if they do not yet have full moral status including a right to life, then there is simply 
no logical connection between making abortion available to prevent the creation of a 
disabled person and discriminating adversely against disabled people.”110 
 
As a clinician it is important to be able to reconcile the concerns about disability discrimination 
with the fact that the advice being given to prospective parents may ultimately result in the 
termination of a disabled fetus.   The decision to request and agree to a late termination will not 
only depend on the implications of continuing the pregnancy for the future child, but also the 
harm to the interests that is likely to occur to those with full moral status who are directly 
affected by the birth of the child.    The decision is also made with a view to promoting parental 
autonomy, which I discuss in chapter three.  Greater justification for ending a pregnancy should 
be sought as gestation progresses, particularly in the case of late terminations, for the reasons I 
have given above about moral status developing as gestation progresses.  The clinical geneticist 
can play an important role in ensuring that all of these harms are considered when justifications 
are made.  
 
The decision as to whether or not a termination can take place, therefore, is based on the degree 
of suffering that is going to occur to the future person once born and the consequential harm to 
the interests of the parents and other close family, such as siblings.  I will discuss the issue of 
harm in chapter four.   
 
Medical practitioners and specialists who have knowledge of the condition, parents with 
experience of it and adults who are affected can inform the decision as to whether or not a late 
termination can be justified.  My concern with viability being chosen as the point after which 
late terminations for serious disability are allowed is that viability does not mean survival 
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without serious complications. Babies born at twenty-four weeks gestation now have a 
reasonable chance of survival but at this gestation there is also a serious risk of disability.111,112 
If it is the detrimental consequences of serious disability that we are trying to avoid, and the 
harm caused by it, it would seem more appropriate to move this back to twenty-eight weeks 
which is a point in gestation where survival is likely and the risk of disability as a result of 
premature birth is much lower. 
 
The law on abortion is silent on the level of seriousness that is required to fulfil the criteria for 
a late termination.  There is no legal definition as to what level of substantial risk of serious 
handicap is needed for a late termination for fetal disability to be allowed.  Whether a risk is 
considered to be substantial may vary depending on the nature and the consequences of the 
abnormality and the disability that it causes.  The Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
(RCOG) state that an assessment of seriousness should be considered on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account all of the clinical information that is available.113   
 
As previously mentioned above, as well as justifying late termination of a disabled fetus due to 
the effect the abnormality will have on its quality of life, it is also important to consider what 
effect having a disabled child will have on the parents and their own interests, something which 
tends to be neglected in current decision-making, with clinicians concentrating on the clinical 
findings and prognosis for the future child.114  I have already established that adult persons have 
full moral status whereas the fetus does not, and, therefore, the parents, being autonomous full 
moral agents, should be able to decide for themselves what impact continuing a pregnancy 
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affected by a severe disability will have on them and their future quality of life.  This is 
something only they can decide and reflects the importance of establishing a supportive 
relationship with the clinical geneticist and other relevant healthcare professionals to ensure 
they are able to reach the best decision for them.  Having a higher moral status than the fetus, 
the parents are in the position to take precedence over that of the fetus when considering harms 
and benefits to either party.  Parents who, through no fault of their own, find out late in 
pregnancy that their future child is affected by a disability should not be disadvantaged as 
compared to those parents who find out before twenty-four weeks that their future child will 
have serious abnormalities and are therefore able to have a termination of that pregnancy. 
 
With technological advances in fetal medicine more information than ever can be obtained 
about an individual pregnancy and more predictions can be made about the clinical effects an 
abnormality can have.  No two pregnancies are likely to be the same and even those pregnancies 
affected by the same condition may result in different outcomes.  A fetus with Down syndrome, 
for example, may result in a child with relatively mild learning difficulties and no life 
threatening physical anomalies, whereas another pregnancy affected by the same condition 
could result in a child with profound learning difficulties and severe heart and digestive tract 
abnormalities, requiring extensive surgical procedures.  These differences in the phenotype 
cannot be identified by simply performing a genetic test to look at the child’s chromosomes 
(such as following amniocentesis).  Specialised antenatal scanning can, however, help to predict 
the level of disability and ongoing care that may be needed in order to assist parents in making 
a decision about continuing or terminating their pregnancy.   
 
To set specific criteria for what substantial risk means or what type of abnormality or condition 
is serious enough to warrant abortion may result in some terminations taking place where the 
disability may not have been particularly detrimental to the person’s life, or denying termination 
to some women whose child will have significant postnatal problems. The RCOG express the 
view that at a minimum serious handicap would require ‘the child to have physical or mental 
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disability which would cause significant suffering or long-term impairment of their ability to 
function in society’.115  As well as clinical implications of the abnormality, therefore, it is 
important to consider its wider effects.  The current guidance, however, refers to the impact on 
the fetus and does not make any reference to others who will be directly affected.  I will discuss 
harm in chapter four and the implications that having a pregnancy affected by a serious 
abnormality has not only on the future child but also other members of the immediate family.  
Healthcare professionals who care for prospective parents in these circumstances should not 
only consider the clinical implications of the condition on the fetus but also take into account 
factors which affect the family generally, such as their financial and social situation, how 
emotionally robust they are to cope with a future with a severely disabled child and whether or 
not the parents themselves are in good health, how many other children they have and what 
their state of health is.  Bearing all this in mind does make it clear that specific criteria cannot 
be put forward by which late termination can be justified.  It also highlights the importance of 
not only clinical geneticists and counsellors engaging with prospective parents, but also those 
who will ultimately decide whether or not a late termination of pregnancy can be justified. 
 
The impact of having a child with a serious disability on the wider family can only be 
established by effective interaction between the prospective parents and the whole healthcare 
team.  This view does not discriminate against the fetus because it has some intrinsic difference 
about it; rather, it focuses on the implications, which, despite medical and social interventions 
after birth, cannot be overcome.  It is possible that other pregnancies not affected by disability 
may also be seen to cause harm to the same degree.  If this can be established by healthcare 
professionals engaging with prospective parents it may mean that late termination can also be 
justified for reasons other than disability.  This would, therefore, require a change in the law as 
it stands now.  It may, however, be difficult to find the appropriate justification to end the 
pregnancy of a non-disabled fetus, as it is more likely that any extrinsic factors, such as poverty 
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and social deprivation or the risk of neglect, could be addressed once the child is born.  This 
highlights the fact that it is not the disability per se or the existence of an abnormality itself that 
justifies the termination, but the impact it will have once the child is born on the future person 
and close family members.  
 
To illustrate the point that the justification for a late termination is not based on the fact that the 
fetus has a disability, I will use an analogy relating to a non-disabled fetus.  I have previously 
said that it is difficult to see how one can justify terminating a pregnancy late in gestation when 
there is no intrinsic problem with the fetus, even where the potential future may consist of 
neglect or social deprivation.  These problems could be overcome with appropriate support and 
the future child could still have a life without harm or suffering.  Where there is an abnormality 
in the fetus which will cause significant harm with pain and suffering and, if after discussion, 
it is decided that this cannot be overcome for the future child or family this may justify late 
termination.  On the face of it, it may seem that the decision has been made based on the 
existence of disability.  I disagree, however.  The decision has been based on harm to the future 
person and their direct family and the impact of this can only be established by supporting 
parents and respecting their reproductive autonomy. 
 
Imagine a couple who have received the much anticipated and welcome news that they are 
expecting a baby.  All is well and they progress through their pregnancy and make plans for the 
future.  A civil war breaks out in their country and the people who live there are exposed to 
unimaginable terror and violence.  They witness the suffering of others and may even see death 
or injury to their pre-existing children.  Direct threats are made to their family including to their 
new baby, which is due imminently.  The situation is such that there is nothing they can do to 
change this and the civil war will continue for the life of the future child.  The couple decide 
that despite this being a much wanted pregnancy they do not want to inflict this sort of life on 
their child if they can avoid doing so and do not want to see their child inevitably suffer and be 
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harmed.  They have seen their other children suffer terribly and do not want to experience 
further harm by seeing this child meet the same fate. 
 
Adoption is discussed but the child could only be adopted by a family within the same war torn 
country and therefore the future child would suffer the same harms.  The couple would only 
contemplate adoption if the child could be taken out of the situation and not suffer.  Adoption 
in their case would not prevent harm to the child and the couple would still suffer harm knowing 
their child was being brought up in the same environment but with the added distress of not 
knowing what had happened to him or being able to try to protect him themselves. 
 
Justifying late termination in this case would be similar to justifying it when a disability has 
been identified.  Not because of the disability but because of the harms to the future child and 
family.  As with termination due to the presence of a disability, this scenario emphasises the 
importance of respecting reproductive autonomy as only this woman/couple can make the 
decision as it will inevitably have implications of its own and won’t be an easy decision to live 
with.  The harms of the decision will need to be weighed against the harms caused by continuing 
the pregnancy. 
 
 
2.4 Abortion: Women’s rights arguments 
 
I have considered the arguments in relation to the moral status of the fetus from the perspective 
of whether or not the fetus is a human being or is to be regarded as a person.  I will now look 
at the arguments put forward by women’s rights advocates to see whether these provide any 
further assistance in supporting my argument that termination of pregnancy is morally 
acceptable under certain circumstances. This is based on the account that the moral status of 
the fetus develops over time towards full moral status afforded to persons.  My thesis is 
concerned with prenatal testing and, therefore, it is necessary to consider abortion as 
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termination of pregnancy can be the outcome of receiving an unfavourable result following 
testing.  This clearly has implications for impaired fetuses and whether or not it is morally 
acceptable for there to be different rules in this situation when considering termination. 
 
Those who support termination of pregnancy for any reason generally rely on women’s rights 
arguments and claim that a woman should be allowed to terminate a pregnancy regardless of 
the reason and at any time during gestation.116  Many of these arguments relate to women having 
control over their own bodies and being able to decide what happens to them without 
intervention from others.117  Other advocates talk about a woman’s right to self-defence.118   
 
The first theory I will consider is one which is well rehearsed within the literature, that of Judith 
Jarvis Thomson.119  Whilst not necessarily agreeing with it herself Thomson starts her 
arguments by assuming that the fetus is a person and has a right to life.  Whilst the mother has 
a right to decide what happens to her own body, this does not necessarily supersede the right to 
life of the fetus.  This therefore suggests that abortion is morally wrong. 
 
From this Thomson then creates the scenario of the ‘unconscious violinist’.  This scenario 
supposes that a famous unconscious violinist has been connected to your kidneys in order to 
save their life from a serious ailment.  You are the only person who can save them.  To unplug 
the violinist would be to kill them and you are told that he will have to be connected to you in 
this way for the next nine months, although Thomson also poses the question as to what if this 
was for nine years or even for the rest of your life?  The violinist is a person and therefore has 
a right to life, but is the right greater than the right you have to say what happens to your own 
                                                 
116 Smith S (2004) ‘Abortion is every woman’s right’, Socialist Worker,  April 23, pp 6-7 
(socialistworker.org as cited on 23/06/2015) 
117 Varden H (2012) ‘A feminist Kantian conception of the right to bodily integrity: The cases for 
abortion and homosexuality’ in Crasnow S, Superson A (eds) Out of the shadows: Analytical feminist 
contribution to traditional philosophy, Oxford University Press, pp 39-47 
118 Thomson JJ (1971)  ‘A defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1), pp 47-66 
119 Thomson JJ (1971)  ‘A defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1), pp 47-66 
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body?  Are you obliged to allow them to stay connected to you?  The scenario unfolds in that 
the dependent violinist eventually starts to cause damage to the body of the woman he is 
connected to and if he continues to be attached to her she will die.  Does she have the right to 
save her own life by disconnecting him even though this will result in an innocent person’s 
death?  This is where the self-defence argument comes into play and is the analogy to a pregnant 
woman’s life being threatened by continuing her pregnancy.  Thomson argues that it is 
permissible to save one’s own life by killing someone else, if necessary and despite their 
innocence.   
 
I agree with Thomson in that the self-defence argument does support the woman’s right to end 
a pregnancy but this is only in the situation where her life is threatened.  It does not assist the 
argument regarding a woman ending her pregnancy due to unfavourable social circumstances 
or due to serious fetal abnormality.  Thomson does go on to discuss situations where the life of 
the mother is not threatened.  Glover120 refers to this as the priority argument and Thomson also 
reduces the severity of the violinist’s dependence by making this for only one hour.  She 
concludes that whilst it may not be the kindest act to unplug the violinist in this new scenario, 
the violinist does not have any right to the use of the woman’s body and therefore it is not unjust 
for her to refuse to continue to support him, just as the fetus has no right to her body either. 
 
Ultimately, my view that abortion is permissible under certain circumstances is supported by 
Thomson.  In terms of the acceptability of late termination this would include a threat to the 
mother’s life (self-defence) and severe fetal abnormality which would lead to a life of pain and 
suffering and harm to the interests of the fetus and parents.  The example that Thomson uses to 
support her conclusion is that it would be acceptable, and indeed indecent not to, to allow a 
pregnancy to be terminated in the case of a fourteen year old girl having been raped.  What 
would not be appropriate is for a woman, in her seventh month of pregnancy, to decide that 
                                                 
120 Glover J (1977) Causing death and saving lives, Penguin Books, p 132 
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being pregnant is no longer convenient to her.  In the latter case the woman has accepted 
responsibility for the fetus by having already reached her final trimester having presumably 
found out about her pregnancy much earlier.  She has now reached the stage where terminating 
a pregnancy of a normal fetus cannot be justified on this basis alone as it has higher moral status 
at this stage in pregnancy and deserves protection.  Much greater justification is needed to allow 
termination of the pregnancy to take place at this stage, such as a risk to the life of the mother 
or the identification of a serious abnormality in the fetus, which is likely to cause future harm 
to the person born and relevant others with full moral status.  If the mother no longer wants to 
have a child, having progressed this far through the pregnancy, other options are available to 
her such as adoption.   
 
Warren,121 considering Thomson, accepts that abortion may be acceptable in the case of rape, 
but has concerns about Thomson’s arguments where a pregnancy happens as a consequence of 
the woman’s carelessness or where the woman has intentionally become pregnant and then 
changes her mind.  This would then suggest that the woman has assumed responsibility for the 
fetus she is carrying.  However, in response to this my view is that although the woman has, 
through her own fault or actions, become pregnant and, therefore, consented to the fetus being 
in her uterus and being dependent on her, it is possible that her decision may have been different 
had she known that her pregnancy would be affected by an abnormality that would lead her to 
have a child with serious disabilities.  Warren ultimately resolves her dilemma by concluding 
that the fetus is not a person and does not have full moral status, which is a conclusion I have 
also previously reached.  
 
When Thomson published her paper in 1971 prenatal testing was not part of antenatal care and 
therefore she was not in a position to consider this in relation to a fetus with abnormalities.  In 
the situation where parents have had prenatal testing it is likely that this is a very much-wanted 
                                                 
121 Warren MA (1973)  ‘On the moral and legal status of abortion’, The Monist 57(1), pp 43-61 
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pregnancy of a woman who is engaging with antenatal care. As she is at a stage where she has 
not previously opted for a social termination one can assume that this is a much wanted child.  
It is not the concept of being pregnant and having a fetus dependent on her that is an issue here, 
but the reality of the potential child having serious disabilities which will not only affect the 
future child’s life, but that of the woman’s and other important people in her life.  In chapter 
four, I consider the impact this situation may have on the fetus and woman and the implications 
that prenatal testing has for those living with disabilities. 
 
Davis122 talks about abortion in terms of discontinuing life support.  She argues that as the fetus 
is dependent on the woman to continue to live ending this support is analogous to discontinuing 
life support in other situations, providing there are sound reasons for doing so.  Davis does not, 
however, define what she means by sound reasons and presumably, therefore, this will be a 
matter for the woman to decide and discuss with her clinician, but may include the presence of 
a fetal abnormality.  This argument could be said not to apply to those fetuses which have 
reached twenty-four weeks of gestation and are, therefore, likely to be viable should they be 
independent of the mother.  However, they will still require medical support in the form of 
mechanical ventilation, intravenous fluids and other clinical interventions to help them to stay 
alive or to minimise the disability they may suffer as a result of prematurity.  The life support 
provided by the mother, therefore, has simply been replaced by other interventions once the 
fetus is outside the womb. 
 
I rely on my previous position that the moral status of the fetus develops and progresses during 
the gestation period thus making termination of the pregnancy less acceptable as time goes by, 
with the need for greater justification the closer the fetus approaches term.  It would not be 
appropriate to discontinue a person’s life support if there was a good chance that they would 
recover once they were over the period of time that life support was required.  If the recipient 
                                                 
122 Davis N (1984)  ‘Abortion and self defense’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13(3), pp 175-207 
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of the life support was going to recover to lead a fulfilling and worthwhile life, it should be 
without question that it should be continued.  However, decisions are frequently made in 
clinical practice whereby life support, or life sustaining treatment, is not continued because 
there is no prospect of recovery.123  These are patients who are never going to recover, it being 
futile to continue with life support, or whose life will be of very poor quality.  There are other 
similar scenarios where treatment may be withheld due to the quality of life that the person is 
likely to have should they continue to survive.  For example, antibiotics may be withheld from 
a person with severe dementia and who is completely immobile and lacking capacity when they 
develop a life threatening pneumonia.  After discussion between the close family and physicians 
a decision is often made that it would be kinder not to treat them and let nature take its course.  
I mention these situations in support of termination of pregnancy when an impairment has been 
identified in the fetus which is going to result in death in-utero or during the neonatal period, 
or lead to the birth of a child who is going to be blighted by a life of immense pain and suffering.  
Terminating a pregnancy removes the life support that is being provided by the mother and 
allows the fetus, who would otherwise have died later in utero or soon after birth, or had a life 
of immense suffering, to die. 
 
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The time limitations set by the Abortion Act, if we assume that these are based on the moral 
status of the fetus, do discriminate between non-disabled and disabled fetuses.  If the fetus is 
regarded as having the same full moral status as a person who has already been born this would 
also discriminate against those already living with disabilities.  Having initially discussed the 
arguments as to what it is to have moral status I have argued in this chapter that the fetus does 
not have full moral status at any point during gestation.  The fetus, therefore, has a lower moral 
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status than a person already born. One cannot, therefore, compare killing a fetus with a 
disability to killing an adult with a disability.  
 
I have also discussed certain points during gestation that have important significance 
particularly in relation to termination of pregnancy.  Whilst a fetus at the point of viability has 
a higher moral status than one earlier in pregnancy, and a fetus at the end of the gestation period 
has a higher moral status still, viability and birth are not points where the fetus reaches full 
moral status.  This supports my overall position that prenatal testing does not discriminate 
against those living with disability. 
 
I have argued that fetal moral status develops as gestation progresses and, therefore, greater 
justification is needed in order to perform a termination later during pregnancy.  One 
justification may be a threat to the mother’s life.  A more controversial reason is the existence 
of a serious abnormality.  I have argued that this does not suggest that a disabled fetus has lower 
moral status than a ‘normal’ fetus, but that this decision is based on the harms that may occur 
to the future child and the prospective parents and others that may be directly affected.  If these 
harms cannot be overcome this may justify terminating the pregnancy.  However, this 
justification can only be achieved when healthcare professionals engage with prospective 
parents so that all parties fully understand the implications for the fetus in the context of the 
family, as opposed to considering only the clinical information about the fetus and potential 
effect the disability will have solely on them.  
 
Late terminations are not carried out without discussion between healthcare professionals and 
prospective parents and it is important to note that they account for only 1% of all 
terminations.124  The disability has to be very serious and one which will impact negatively on 
the life of the future child. However, my concern is that where an abnormality has been 
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identified, either by physical in-utero examination of the fetus or by genetic or metabolic tests, 
those who ultimately decide whether a late termination can be justified do not consider the 
implications to the wider family.  Not allowing late terminations, particularly for those 
identified as having abnormalities late in pregnancy, would mean the worst affected 
pregnancies and those with the greatest potential to cause harm to the future child and wider 
family would continue, whereas less severely affected pregnancies identified before twenty-
four weeks, could be terminated.  The clinical geneticist is not ultimately responsible for 
justifying agreement to perform a late termination, but should take an active part in discussions 
with those clinicians responsible, to ensure that the harm to the interests of all relevant parties 
is taken into account.   
 
The arguments that I have discussed in this chapter help to underpin my position in the next 
chapter, where I argue for the promotion of reproductive autonomy in that those who will be 
affected by the birth of a disabled child are best placed to make decisions about prenatal testing 
and its consequences. Many of the arguments I have made in this chapter will be further 
supported through my discussion of the concepts of disability and harm to the interests of the 
fetus and those close to it in chapter four.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Reproductive Autonomy 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will argue that autonomy, and more specifically reproductive autonomy, 
with the ability to control our own reproductive choices should be respected due to the 
importance society places on us having control over our own lives.  This chapter utilises my 
conclusions from chapter two, in that the fetus does not have full moral status equivalent to 
that of a person and, therefore, as a clinical geneticist one can begin a meaningful dialogue 
with the prospective parents having dealt with the concerns about the morality of abortion 
(which may result as a consequence of prenatal testing where the fetus has a disability).  In 
chapter four, I will then go on to discuss the nature of disability and harm, particularly in 
relation to the harm to one’s interests that can only really be evaluated by the autonomous 
individual themself.   This will lead on to chapter five, where I challenge the arguments that 
claim prenatal testing should not be permitted as it discriminates against those with 
disabilities.  I will look at the arguments in favour of and against the claims that reproductive 
autonomy makes prenatal diagnosis morally acceptable.   
 
My arguments are based on the premises that, firstly, autonomy in respect to making 
decisions regarding one’s own life is of utmost importance and, secondly, that decisions 
regarding reproduction and having children are of such profound importance to an 
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individual.1  As such, reproductive autonomy should be afforded the same degree of respect 
as autonomy concerning other decisions, for example and probably of most relevance, those 
relating to decisions regarding healthcare and medical treatment.2  I will also look at the 
concerns that are raised in relation to external pressures that are said to be applied to couples 
when considering prenatal testing, and the limitations that are placed on autonomy 
particularly in reproductive medicine due to clinicians being the final arbitrators with 
regards to late termination and the concerns that these limitations raise.  I argue, however, 
that rather than these concerns be a reason to discourage prenatal testing, they highlight the 
need for deliberative discussion between prospective parents and the healthcare team, which 
the clinical geneticist should be heavily involved with, to ensure that the autonomy of 
prospective parents is respected and that clinicians not only consider the interests of the 
fetus, but also the wider family. 
 
 
3.2  Autonomy as an overriding principle 
 
The term ‘autonomy’ is derived from the Greek word auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos 
meaning ‘law’ or ‘rule’.  Therefore ‘autonomy’ literally means ‘self-rule’. In biomedical 
ethics this is the common understanding of autonomy,3 however, on reviewing the literature 
there appears to be no consensus on the precise meaning that the word is intended to convey.  
As a consequence, literature specifically relating to autonomy tends to cite several of the 
different interpretations of the word used by philosophers.4 
 
                                            
1 Glover J (2006) Choosing Children: the ethical dilemmas of genetic intervention, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p 37 
2 It is beyond the scope of my thesis to consider the arguments in relation to genetic enhancement and 
reproductive autonomy, where parents wish to make choices to enhance the attributes of their future 
children. 
3 Varelius J (2006)  ‘The value of autonomy in medical ethics’, Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy 9, pp 377-388 
4 Dworkin G (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, pp 5-6 
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Although the founding of the concept of autonomy relates back to ancient Greek philosophy, 
Kant developed the idea of ‘moral autonomy’ with respect to having authority of one’s own 
actions.5  Kant put forward the idea that rather than people being governed by factors 
external to their control, such as emotional responses to the world or decisions made by 
others, such as by political or religious leaders or society, which he referred to as 
‘heteronomy’, we should abide by our own self-imposed laws, which he called ‘autonomy’.   
 
Kant argued that it was possible to develop a consistent moral system using reason alone, 
and that people would realise that moral laws existed which all rational beings had to obey 
in a manner which they could work out for themselves what was right or wrong through 
appeal to a consistent, necessary principle of rational thought.  He called this basic principle 
‘The Categorical Imperative’, which he intended to be the basis of rules governing our moral 
conduct, as it would provide a rational basis for determining any action-guiding rule that 
would hold true in all circumstances.  This is, for Kant, the supreme principle of morality.  
The Categorical Imperative has three different formulations which Kant believes all amount 
to the same thing.  The first formulation, often that which is most referred to, is as follows: 
 
First formulation (The Formula of Universal Law): “Act only on that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of nature].” 
 
This means that in order to determine what we should and shouldn’t do; we subject maxims 
to the Categorical Imperative by asking whether we could rationally will that the maxim be 
universal. These maxims are the principles of reason that a particular individual has for 
performing a certain action.  An example of where this might be applied to determine an 
action would be where a person asks themself ‘should I save that child who is about to run 
into the traffic?’  A universal law may then be generated from a maxim by asking whether 
                                            
5 Kant I (1996) The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, Edited 
and translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press, pp 37-39 
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all rational people should do the same in similar circumstances.  If the maxim can rationally 
be made universal (“Everyone should always try to save children from running into traffic”) 
then it imposes a moral duty on us to act according to it.  By adhering to this approach, all 
individuals in a community would provide action guiding principles in their own right rather 
than simply follow laws and this, according to Kant, means that they can be respected as 
ends in themselves.  It is important to know what the maxim is for an action as the same 
action could be done for very different reasons.  It is the intention behind the action that 
allows the only unconditional good to be identified and for a person to abide by their duty 
simply for duty’s sake.   
 
Kant described a second formulation of the Categorical Imperative which relates to treating 
others as an ‘end in itself’ and not merely as a ‘means’.  This recognises that a person’s 
inherent value does not depend on anything else that someone might consider valuable, for 
example, whether they enjoy their life or make other people’s lives better.  Instead, it means 
that we should not treat someone simply as a means to satisfying our own projects and 
desires, but must remember that they have ends or ‘goals’ of their own too.  They exist so 
they have value and are not there for the benefit of others.  Kant, however, excluded 
emotions, feelings, habits and other non-intellectual factors from the decision making 
process and relied upon our ability to determine rationally what it is to act morally, thus 
referring to this as ‘moral autonomy’.  From Kant’s perspective, therefore, moral autonomy 
included freedom and responsibility where individuals submit to self-imposed laws, rather 
than being subject to the will of another.6 
 
John Stuart Mill, however, emphasised the importance of individuality and the importance 
of emotions over reason and the development of a unique self.7  Rather than autonomy being 
                                            
6 Wolff PR (1970)  ‘In Defense of Anarchism’, New York: Harper & Row, p 14 
7 Mill SJ (1956) On Liberty, Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, (Originally 
published 1859) pp 103-105 (Gutenberg.org e-book as cited on 11/12/2013) 
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influenced by moral motivation it was seen as an expression of one’s self and allowing the 
development of an individual identity.  The possession of this autonomy brings with it 
certain moral obligations notably to respect autonomous decisions of others, which I will 
discuss further in section 3.5. 
 
Dworkin offers a theory of autonomy rather than simply specifying a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions to form a definition.8  This aims to offer a more solid specification of 
the general concept of autonomy in a way that will encompass its importance as a political, 
moral and social ideal.  Dworkin offers an account of autonomy which applies to people 
leading lives of a certain quality.  He is interested in ‘what it means to be an autonomous 
person, to have a certain capacity and exercise it’.9  Autonomous persons are motivated by 
principles, desires and goals which are their own.  Self-rule is therefore linked to the ideas 
of self-creation and self-authorship.  He goes on to talk of autonomous people as defining 
their own nature, giving meaning and coherence to their lives and taking responsibility for 
the kind of people they are.  In this way autonomous people control the formation of their 
own character, values and beliefs and then structure their lives accordingly.  Autonomy is 
an ideal of character, rather than it being a feature of acts or choices.10  He explains that he 
is not attempting to analyse the notion of autonomous acts themselves, but of what it means 
to be an autonomous person and to have a certain capacity and to exercise it.11 
 
Contemporary philosophers have also contributed to the literature with regards to what 
constitutes autonomy.  John Harris describes autonomy as follows: 
 
                                            
8 Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy, Cambridge University Press, p 7 
9 Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy, Cambridge University Press, p 20 
10 Dworkin G (1989) ‘The concept of Autonomy’ in Christman J (ed) The Inner Citadel: Essays on 
Individual Autonomy, Oxford University Press, p 26 
11 Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy, Cambridge University Press, pp 19-20 
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“Autonomy is, strictly speaking ‘self-government’, and people are said to be 
autonomous to the extent to which they are able to control their lives, and to some 
extent their destiny, by the exercise of their own faculties.”12 
 
Similarly, Raanan Gillon refers to autonomy as: 
 
“….(literally, self rule) is, in summary, the capacity to think, decide and act on the 
basis of such thought and decision freely and independently and without, as it says in 
the British passport, let or hindrance.”13       
 
My thesis pertains to women and couples who have capacity and these definitions assume 
that the subject has the mental capacity to make decisions that meet their own needs and 
interests. It is not necessary for my thesis, therefore, to discuss in any detail those who lack 
capacity to make certain decisions for themselves. These individuals will to some extent 
have decisions made on their behalf in what is hoped to be their best interests. This element 
of autonomy and decision-making is reflected in the definition provided by Beauchamp and 
Childress: 
 
“The autonomous individual freely acts in accordance with a self-chosen plan, 
analogous to the way an independent government manages its territories and sets its 
policies.  A person of diminished autonomy, by contrast, is in at least some respect 
controlled by others or incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of his or her 
desires and plans.”14 
 
                                            
12 Harris J (1991) The Value of Life: An introduction to Medical Ethics, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, p 195 
13 Gillon R (2002) Philosophical Medical Ethics, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, p 60 
14 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p58 
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This definition acknowledges that others, for example parents and other relatives, may assist 
with decision making based on what they know to be the interests of the person before they 
gained or lost capacity.  This is relevant to my thesis in as far as the fetus is not in a position 
to make decisions for itself.  Decisions that are made during pregnancy may affect the life 
of the child that is eventually born and depending on what is decided, this may limit the 
choices that person can later make for himself or herself.  
 
What these definitions do not mention, however, is that decisions are influenced by the 
expectation that they are made within the law.  A person can obviously autonomously choose 
to act in an illegal way, but they must be prepared to accept the consequences of this. 
Dworkin describes higher-order autonomous desires to obey the law so that decisions are 
restricted to those that are legal, and therefore don’t violate one’s autonomy. This is also 
why people can take a principled stance against what they view as unjust laws by not 
adhering to them.15 
 
Patients can refuse to have treatment should they so wish even if it is felt not to be in their 
best interests, providing they have the mental capacity to do so.16  This is exactly what Mill 
claimed about autonomy stating ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’.17,18 This may 
arise, for example, when a competent adult who is a Jehovah’s witness declines potentially 
lifesaving blood products.  In this case the patient does not refuse medication due to a wish 
to die but due to their religious convictions.  They may consent to other methods of treatment 
that are available, accepting that these might not be as effective.  This differs from a patient 
                                            
15 Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy, Cambridge University Press, pp 19- 20 
16 General Medical Council (2013) Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice: Patients who refuse     
treatment, GMC: London, paragraph 24 
17 Mill SJ (1956) On Liberty, Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, (Originally 
published 1859) pp 103-105 (Gutenberg.org e-book as cited on 1 February 2016) 
18 Arneson RJ (1980) ‘Mill versus Paternalism’, Ethics 90(4), pp 470-489 
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with a life limiting or severe illness, who refuses treatment knowing this may shorten or end 
their life. This places doctors in a very difficult position but ultimately we allow patients to 
make these decisions due to the importance that we place on a patient’s autonomy and their 
right to make decisions for themselves.19 
 
 
3.3  Personal Autonomy 
 
Personal autonomy can be regarded as the decision-making process which is purely internal 
to the individual and particular to them.  Personal autonomy does not follow any particular 
set of established values or principles but is consistent with the individual’s own values.  
Personal autonomy should allow meaningful choices to be made by the individual without 
influence from others, or more relevantly without any limitations, such as inadequate 
understanding or knowledge.20   Decisions about reproduction, including prenatal testing, 
are very personal decisions and it is for those individuals who are affected to make 
reproductive decisions as they know better than anyone what serves their own interests. 
 
The ability to make autonomous decisions is an important aspect of a person’s life regardless 
of the impact that decision may have, or regardless of how that decision is perceived by 
others.21  The ability to make one’s own choices is important because it is only that 
individual who can make the right decision for themself at that time.  For example, a highly 
intellectual person with ambition and drive would not find life particularly fulfilling or 
rewarding if a career was chosen for them which did not reflect their intellectual needs.  This 
could have a profound effect on their life, well-being and interests.  It is, therefore, important 
                                            
19 General Medical Council (2008) Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together, GMC: 
London, paragraph 43 
20 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p58 
21 Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819 
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to recognise that different individuals have very different needs, and if these needs are not 
recognised and fulfilled it could cause harm to their interests and have a detrimental effect 
on the quality of their whole life. This principle could apply to almost any aspect of a 
person’s life, with choices being made by others having lasting and detrimental 
consequences.  This would include placing restrictions on a person’s ability to make 
reproductive decisions, including the decision whether or not to utilise prenatal testing.  This 
highlights the importance of constructive dialogue taking place during the prenatal process 
between the clinical geneticist and prospective parents so that they can make their own 
choices.  In addition to this, other healthcare professionals involved in the process must also 
take into account the interests of all of those who will be directly affected by any decisions 
that are made. 
 
On recognising that people are autonomous individuals and are best placed to consider what 
action is most appropriate for their own needs to be met, it is important that they are involved 
in the decision-making processes which affect them and that they have enough information 
to make informed decisions.  Not providing sufficient and appropriate information may 
result in a person making the wrong or an inferior choice, which is not ultimately in their 
best interests or does not serve their needs adequately.  This could have just as much a 
detrimental effect as not being in a position to make one’s own choices in the first place.  A 
person’s ability to consent to something, therefore, depends upon what information they are 
given and their understanding of it. 
 
For example, assume a person buys a new car and seeks expert advice in order to buy the 
safest car available to adequately protect their family.  The salesman is aware of three cars 
with varying degrees of safety features.  The best is also the most expensive and the salesman 
makes a judgement that the customer would not want to pay the price for that particular 
vehicle and therefore informs him only of the two cheaper models.  The customer chooses 
the safest and most expensive out of the two.  He is not concerned with cost but with 
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providing his family the safest vehicle he can.  Sadly, the vehicle he has bought is involved 
in an accident and his family are all killed leaving him as the sole survivor.  Had he bought 
the most expensive vehicle, about which the salesman chose not to inform him, his family 
would have been spared.  Had the customer been aware of this car he would have happily 
borne the additional expense in order to save his family. However, he could only make his 
decision based on the information he had been provided with by the salesman and this 
ultimately meant that he did not make the decision that was right for him, with devastating 
consequences that will affect the rest of his life from that moment.  The point is that not only 
is it for the individual to decide whether or not they make a particular decision, and whether 
this is the right one for them, but it is also essential that the individual has the right 
information so that they can make a valid choice. As explained in section 1.3 of chapter one, 
I have limited the scope of my thesis in that my arguments only apply where there is certainty 
as to the presence of disability when prenatal testing is carried out, but have acknowledged 
the difficulty that can arise where ‘soft markers’ and variants of unknown significance are 
identified during antenatal testing and genome sequencing.  The above analogy will of 
course only work when considering prenatal testing where the diagnosis is certain, and 
enough information can be provided about the prognosis for the future child and the 
disability that may ensue.  
 
Informed consent in clinical practice is generally held to be the key to respecting a patient’s 
autonomy,22 and the General Medical Council provide extensive guidance to doctors to 
ensure that, wherever possible, patients are involved in the decisions that are made about 
their care.23  Good practice dictates that patients (or parents in the case of children) should 
be provided with appropriate information to enable them to make a decision about their care 
                                            
22 O’Neil O (2003) ‘Some limits of informed consent’ Journal of Medical Ethics 29, pp 4-7 
23 General Medical Council (2008) Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together, GMC: 
London, paragraphs 7-27 
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and any decisions should be free of coercion.  Walker24 talks of two elements to consent, 
one in relation to information that needs to be provided, and another in relation to 
information that also needs to be understood.  He argues that the expectation that all 
information given to a patient is also understood by them, rather than merely disclosed to 
them, makes the taking of consent overly onerous for healthcare professionals.  He argues 
that there is some information that is needed in order for a person to make the decision as to 
whether they are going to consent (C1), for example, to a medical procedure being 
performed on them, and then other information that is needed in order for a person to make 
an informed choice (C2) about whether or not to consent.  Walker states that the obligation 
to ensure a patient understands the information only applies in the case of C1.  The patient 
needs to understand what procedure is being carried out and what this will entail.  If the 
patient does not understand what they are consenting to any consent that they do give will 
be defective.  As part of the information provided to the patient in C1, it would seem 
appropriate to ensure that the patient is aware of the risks of the procedure.  In the case of 
prenatal testing the patient will need to understand and appreciate the possibility of an 
unfavourable result and what this may mean to them and their future child.  
 
Walker argues that it is not always wrong to do something to someone without their consent 
if they are to benefit from it.  Establishing a benefit may be relatively straightforward in the 
case of a surgical procedure that will save the life of the patient or enhance their quality of 
life.  However, whether or not something is of benefit to a patient is subjective and this is 
even more so when considering a person or couple who are contemplating prenatal testing.  
Some couples may receive an unfavourable result in a way that makes them feel empowered 
to take some control, whereas others may prefer not to have this information about their 
pregnancy and deal with any consequences if and when the need arises.  For this reason 
informed consent is particularly important in prenatal testing because whether or not the 
                                            
24 Walker T (2012) ‘Informed consent and the Requirement to Ensure Understanding’ Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 29(1), pp 50-62 
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individual benefits from it cannot be presumed.  Making such a decision on behalf of a 
patient, no matter how well intentioned, could harm their interests and have implications for 
the decisions they would then have to make in the future. 
 
Clinicians are under an obligation to disclose adequate amounts of information to patients, 
although there is no consensus as what an adequate amount is.25  Manson and O’Neil argue 
that informed consent requires clinicians to disclose as much information as possible to 
patients as this allows them to make self-governed decisions about their care.26  However, it 
is questionable as to whether an autonomous decision can be made when a person is 
provided with as much information as possible.27  Providing people with too much 
information may overwhelm them and make it difficult for them to process and comprehend, 
thus undermining their ability to make an autonomous decision.28  This highlights the 
importance of clinicians involved in prenatal care engaging with prospective parents so that 
appropriate amounts of information are given to them in a form that they can understand, 
and so that they have the opportunity to ask questions in order to address their specific 
concerns in relation to how they personally will be affected by the consequences of having 
a disabled child. 
 
 
3.4  Social and relational autonomy 
 
I have talked about moral autonomy, which refers to a person’s ability to formulate and follow 
moral laws, and personal autonomy which deals with a person’s ability to make self-governed 
                                            
25  Lomelino PJ (2015) Community, Autonomy and Informed Consent, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, p 98 
26  Manson NC, O’Neill O (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, Cambridge University 
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27 Manson NC, O’Neill O (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, Cambridge University 
Press, pp 36-37 
28 Mossman J (2014) ‘How much information is too much for patients?’ Journal of Risk Research, 
Nov 18, pp 1-4  
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choices as to the way they act so that it contributes to their overall well-being.  However, these 
concepts of autonomy may not truly reflect what happens in clinical practice, particularly for 
the clinical geneticist where the patient, as well as being an individual, is also a prospective 
parent and possibly already a parent to other children, in addition to having other family 
members such as a partner, with which she interacts.  Not only this, she is also part of a society 
and possibly a particular religion or culture.  One purpose of my thesis is that it aims not only 
to consider the clinical features and prognosis of a fetus that is affected by an abnormality 
which may lead to a disability, but also the effect this will have in the context of the wider 
family.  In acknowledging this it is important to also recognise that this may influence the 
decisions that the pregnant patient is likely to make. 
 
Walter and Ross refer to the ‘in-control agent’ model of autonomy which assumes that a 
patient will avoid the influence of others or emotional persuasion during decision-making.29  
In this case the role of the clinician is viewed as an expert whose role it is to provide 
information to allow individual patients to make their own healthcare decisions. 
 
An alternative model, however, is that of relational autonomy which acknowledges the role 
of others in the decision-making process, including the clinician.  This model involves 
engaging with the patient’s emotional experiences.30  Rather than accepting that choices are 
based on individual autonomy it views the person making the decision as a relational being 
that is part of and influenced by other interconnected relationships and, therefore, their values 
and interests also depend on their social environment.31  This relational view doesn’t see us 
as autonomous individuals like those referred to in the in-control model but as heirs to those 
who have formed us or cared for us, with personalities being formed by relationships to 
                                            
29  Walter JK, Ross LF (2014) ‘Relational Autonomy: Moving beyond the limits of isolated 
individualism’ Pediatrics 133(1), pp 16-23 
30 Walter JK, Ross LF (2014) ‘Relational Autonomy: Moving beyond the limits of isolated 
individualism’ Pediatrics 133(1), pp 16-23 
31 Mackenzie C, Stoljar N (eds) (2000) Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspective on autonomy, 
agency, and the social self, Oxford University Press, p 4 
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others.32  This model regards an individual’s interest and beliefs as things that are constantly 
changing due to their relationships with others as well as their traditions and even history.33  
It is important for clinicians involved in the care of pregnant women to recognise this because 
as well as influencing the woman’s decisions, it may also influence the way in which 
information is given and the kind of choices that are available to the patient. In the prenatal 
setting it is not uncommon for women to include their partners and other family members in 
their decision making and this model of autonomy does not conflict with the patient making 
an autonomous decision.  They are not abdicating their autonomy by the fact that they are 
asking for advice and opinion from others.34   
 
There are those, however, who express concern about relational autonomy in that women 
accept prenatal screening or testing because it is something that is promoted by the society 
that they live in. For example, Vassy argues that prenatal screening has been developed by 
the medical profession for its own purposes, rather than the demand for it by women.35  She 
argues that women are tested without much regard for informed consent and screening 
becomes normalised as part of routine antenatal care and, therefore, this screening is not 
supported by the value of autonomy.36  As mentioned in chapter one, my thesis is limited to 
prenatal diagnostic testing rather than standard antenatal screening, however, this does 
highlight how a woman’s relationship with the society in which she lives may impact on her 
decisions and limit her autonomy.  It also emphasises the importance of engagement between 
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clinicians and prospective parents to ensure that both parties think carefully about the 
decisions they make and the consequences these may have. 
 
Relational autonomy recognises that emotional responses are just as important as rational 
ones.  When considering relational autonomy in the context of prenatal diagnosis, as well as 
clinicians providing factual information about the clinical condition of the fetus and the 
prognosis parents should expect, they should ensure that couples engage in emotional 
dialogue about the implications their future child’s disability may have on not only the child, 
but on them and other family members.  Couples should be encouraged to look beyond the 
clinical information that they receive and acknowledge the emotional aspects of the decisions 
that they make.  Interestingly, where a child is not going to reach adulthood and therefore will 
never become an autonomous adult, Walter and Ross suggest that it may be appropriate for a 
child’s interests to be given less importance when their decisions conflict with that of the 
interests of the family as a whole.37  What is also important, however, is that clinicians also 
take into account the emotional impact decisions have on a family particularly when it is the 
clinicians who are currently the ones ultimately having to justify whether a late termination 
of pregnancy due to disability can take place.  Taking into account only the clinical facts and 
prognosis for the future child may place limits on those justifications.   
 
 
  3.5  Respecting autonomy 
 
  It is widely accepted, therefore, that respect for autonomy is a vital principle in medical 
ethics38 and it is generally accepted that one ought to respect and not interfere with 
autonomous decisions. There are compelling ethical reasons why respect of autonomy is of 
                                            
37 Walter JK, Ross LF (2014) ‘Relational Autonomy: Moving beyond the limits of isolated 
individualism’ Pediatrics 133(1), pp 16-23 
38 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p57 
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such importance.39,40,41 Respecting autonomy in the healthcare arena allows patients to make 
their own decisions regarding the treatment or management they should receive.  It allows 
them to decline treatment.  Autonomy is such an important principle in biomedical ethics 
due to the recognition that competent people want to be able to live their own lives as they 
see fit and not have decisions made for them by others, no matter how well meaning they 
may be. 
 
Gillon42 goes as far as to say that autonomy is of such importance that respect for it should 
outweigh the importance of the three other principles in this particular approach to medical 
ethics, namely beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. He argues that autonomy is 
morally very precious and should not only be respected but actively encouraged.43  Gillon 
argues that beneficence and non-maleficence both require respect for autonomy because 
what are benefits and harms vary from person to person as well as between cultures.  It is 
therefore for the individual to decide for themselves what will promote or harm their own 
interests and reflects the need for them to make their own autonomous choices.  This may 
happen, for example, where a patient chooses not to have treatment for a condition that 
others, including their family and healthcare professionals, may feel is in their best interests.  
 
Holm also outlines some of the reasons why respect for autonomy is important:    
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“1. The first line of argument sees autonomy as the basis for moral standing, and 
thereby the necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for the ascription of 
right.  […] A common form of this argument states that we have a basic 
interest in shaping our own life, and that being autonomous and having our 
autonomy respected are necessary conditions for being able to fulfil this 
interest. 
 
2. The second line of argument is basically consequentialist […]  Autonomy is 
here seen as a good thing, either in and of itself […] or more frequently 
because being autonomous promotes the creation of good things in the life of 
the person in question.  Autonomy is thus valuable primarily as a means to 
the creation of that which is intrinsically valuable (preference satisfaction, 
pleasure etc). 
 
3. The third line of argument proceeds from the premise that we are all moral 
strangers.  Each person has his own way of life and own moral principles.  
Persons have no right to impose their way of life on others, and have no right 
to limit the expression of other people’s way of living as long as it is not 
harmful to anybody.  We cannot say whether autonomy is itself valuable 
(because that would be to adopt the view of one specific moral community), 
but we have to respect the choices of others as a procedural constraint.”44 
 
In the first point, Holm supports the view that being able to make our own decisions enables 
us to protect our interests.  With regard to reproduction these interests may include having 
a child without a disability and the consequences this may have for the child itself, the 
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parents and siblings.  These interests can be harmed if our autonomy is not respected.  I will 
consider the concept of harm in Chapter 4 (sections 4.2). 
 
The general availability of prenatal testing may be regarded as reassuring for prospective 
parents, particularly those who have a known risk of having a child with a severely disabling 
condition.  The fact that they can have testing and, therefore, have a choice as to whether 
they have a child who is affected by the condition increases their choices and puts them in 
a better position to have the family they desire.  Just like the reassurance of knowing that 
there are treatments for medical conditions the availability of prenatal testing can promote 
an overall good for prospective parents.  This is reflected in Holm’s second line of argument.   
 
Holm’s final point is particularly important.  It acknowledges that not all individuals share 
the same desires, beliefs and interests and, therefore, it is not acceptable to force others to 
make choices that are not appropriate for them.  We do not all aspire to the same outcomes 
for our lives and our moral beliefs are not the same.  It is the difference in these moral beliefs 
that give rise to the debate about prenatal testing and abortion and Holm’s third point reflects 
the fact that prospective parents do have different views on pregnancy, antenatal 
intervention, delivery and parenthood, including the type of children they wish to raise.  This 
latter point will be the subject of chapter four, when considering the implications of having 
a child with a disability.  It is important to recognise that some parents will deal well with 
the prospect of having a severely disabled child and will cope admirably with the 
consequences of this.  Others, however, will know from their own personal experiences that 
the effect on the value of their own life (whether that be due to the direct effect of having a 
disabled child or whether it be due to them having to indirectly experience the pain and 
suffering of their child and the affect their disability will have on them) of having a disabled 
child will be such that they will not want to begin or continue an affected pregnancy if no 
intervention to prevent or reduce the effects of the impairment can be offered.   
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  Whilst it is generally accepted in healthcare that a competent patient’s autonomy should be 
respected,45,46 is this always the case?   
 
 
3.5.1  Paternalism  
 
I discuss paternalism in this section because where an abnormality is found late in gestation 
additional justification is needed to terminate the pregnancy.  A couple may decide that they 
do not want to carry on their pregnancy but ultimately this decision will be made by 
clinicians involved in the termination process.  Currently this decision is based on the degree 
of disability and the prognosis for the future child with very little or no consideration given 
to the fetus in the context of and to the wider family.  Where prospective parents decide they 
want to terminate a pregnancy late in gestation the medical professionals who ultimately 
have to justify the procedure may overrule this.  More consideration should be given to the 
autonomous wishes of the parents and where their reasons for opting for this outcome relate 
to the harm that having a disabled child may cause to their interests, this should be taken 
into account alongside the clinical implications of the disability identified in the fetus.  
 
One influential definition of paternalism is that it 
 
‘..is the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or actions by 
another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the goal of 
benefiting or avoiding harm to the person whose preferences or actions are 
overridden.’47 
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There are those who argue against autonomy and consider the acceptability of paternalistic 
intervention.48  Paternalism, therefore, is the interference of an individual’s (such as a 
patient’s) decision making by a third party (for example a doctor) and is motivated by that 
third party thinking they know what is best for the patient and in an attempt to avoid them 
any harm.  Paternalism arises in many aspects of our lives, for example, the mandatory 
wearing of seatbelts by the enacting of legislation.  I am going to concentrate my discussion 
on paternalism specifically within the healthcare field.  Doctors may make decisions which 
are paternalistic in order to spare patients or relatives feelings, for example, by minimising 
the suffering that a loved one may have suffered before they died.  When obtaining consent 
from a patient for treatment the doctor may restrict a patient’s decision by only providing 
information about one particular treatment over others, because the doctor has a preference 
for this or feels the patient would be better off having that treatment.  Doctors generally are 
in a position of having greater knowledge when they speak to patients and, therefore, there 
is a potential for patients to be influenced by the information they are given.  Even if a 
patient specifically asks, there is no guarantee that the doctor will give them additional 
information and as they may not fully understand the technicalities of what they are being 
told a patient’s decision may not be truly autonomous.   
 
Throughout the history of medical ethics beneficence and non-maleficence have been 
important ethical principles both of which provide a basis on which paternalism can be 
justified.49  In the past paternalism was prominent in healthcare with doctors having an 
attitude of knowing what was best for their patients and patients deferring to the superior 
knowledge of their physician.50  This led to the information given to patients about their own 
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49 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p179 
50 Henderson LJ (1935) ‘Physician and Patient as a Social System’, New England Journal of 
Medicine 212, pp 819-823 
 88 
health being limited to what the doctor thought they ought to know and the avoidance of 
providing them with information that the doctor felt would be harmful.  Although 
paternalism is not generally regarded as best practice in medicine now there are different 
accounts of paternalism, some of which may be more acceptable than others.  Feinberg 
talked of strong and weak paternalism (later referred to as hard and soft).51  Weak 
paternalism arises when the doctor interferes with a person’s decision making on the basis 
of beneficence or non-maleficence and to protect the person from themself.  Feinberg 
referred to a patient’s ‘non-autonomous actions’52 due to the patient not being adequately 
informed.  This might arise where a patient is severely depressed preventing rational thought 
and decision-making.53  This occurs therefore where the patient’s mental capacity is affected 
in some way and the doctor acts in what they believe are in the patient’s best interests.  This 
type of paternalism is generally accepted in medical decision-making and this is now 
enshrined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005,54 and even some opponents of paternalism do 
not object to this.55  Feinberg argues that what we think of as ‘weak paternalism’ is not really 
paternalism at all.56  The subject is not in a position to weigh up the information and make 
an appropriate decision for himself and, therefore, the decision is taken out of his hands but 
is made in his best interests.   
 
Strong paternalism arises where the doctor intervenes in the patient’s decision-making 
despite the fact that the patient is competent to make his own voluntary and autonomous 
decisions, although these may not accord with the doctor’s version of what is sensible and 
rational.57  In these cases the doctor may choose to limit the amount of information given to 
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the patient in order to influence their decisions or even override the patient’s choice.  It is 
strong paternalism which creates the most controversy as this involves overriding the 
choices of a competent person’s autonomous decisions, bearing in mind that they should be 
in a position to know what is best for them and best able to take into account all of their own 
circumstances and values.  In the prenatal setting this may occur where a woman wants to 
end her pregnancy due to a disability but the doctors who ultimately make the decision as 
to whether this is justified disagree. 
 
There may be situations where a doctor acts paternalistically toward a patient in what they 
believe to be in their best interests and this may be justified even though the patient is 
competent.58  A doctor may decide not to give all of the information they have about a ‘bad 
news’ diagnosis to a patient, preferring to provide this piece-meal in order to help the patient 
come to terms with the news.  Similarly, telling a patient who has been badly injured at the 
scene of an accident and unlikely to survive that help is on its way and everything will be 
all right may be seen as the kindest thing to do under the circumstances, rather than telling 
them they will die.  There are likely to be many scenarios where doctors do act 
paternalistically towards patients because the doctor has made the decision that this is best 
for them.  I agree that this approach can be appropriate under certain circumstances but 
should a competent patient specifically ask searching questions or ask for more information 
they should not be denied this, as this may prevent them from making an autonomous 
decision or may limit decisions they make later. 
 
There has to be a balance between the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-
maleficence when communicating with patients and seeking their consent.  If a patient does 
not have the competence to make a particular decision for themself at the time it needs to be 
made it is appropriate for those with knowledge of their illness and the available treatment, 
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and knowledge of the patient (such as carers and close relatives), to make decisions on their 
behalf in what is believed to be their best interests.  
 
There are also situations where a patient may specifically request a particular treatment 
which their doctor will refuse.  The patient is competent and can understand the risks of 
undergoing this particular treatment and the reasons for the doctor not recommending it or 
specifically advising that they do not have it, but wishes to continue regardless.  This may 
occur where a doctor does not believe that the patient will receive any benefit and the 
treatment is futile or may even cause the patient more harm.  Rather than this being active 
paternalism which occurs where a patient prefers not to have a particular intervention, this 
is referred to as passive paternalism.59  The doctor has made a decision not to allow the 
patient to receive the treatment they want based on what they believe is in the best interests 
of the patient.  This may be a procedure which is known to be high risk and where a second 
opinion from a colleague is likely to yield the same opinion.  It is well known and accepted 
that doctors have a professional and moral obligation to act in their patient’s best interests, 
they do not, however, have a professional obligation to comply with a patient’s specific 
wishes if the treatment they are requesting is out with normal medical practice.60 Denying a 
patient treatment for this reason can also be justified on consequentialist grounds and 
consideration that needs to be given benefit to the population generally.  If a form of 
treatment is futile and will not be of any benefit to the patient, or may even cause further 
harm to the patient, there is not only the personal cost of this but also other costs.  Resources 
are used in providing the treatment including hospital resources and funds and the time of 
the medical practitioners and supporting staff involved, in addition to addressing any 
complications that arise as a result of the treatment.  The time and money spent on this futile 
treatment could have been better spent caring for other patients whose treatment is 
                                            
59 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p191 
60 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University 
Press, p191 
 91 
appropriate and beneficial to them.  Respect for autonomy does not mean always giving 
someone what they want.  There may be limits to this, for example, should there be risk of 
harm to a third party.  Freedom and respect do not always imply a positive duty to act, even 
if they do not always imply a negative duty not to interfere. 
 
 
3.6   Reproductive autonomy 
 
Decisions that individuals and couples make in relation to reproduction are particularly 
important.  These decisions affect not only the individuals concerned but also their future 
and present children.  The consequences of these reproductive decisions last throughout their 
lifetime and have a major impact on their interests.  It is for this reason that autonomy in 
relation to reproductive decisions is of particular significance and why the role of the clinical 
geneticist in supporting prospective parents is so important.   
 
Beginning a family is a decision that has fundamental importance and is one of the most 
important and significant decisions an individual can make, with far reaching consequences. 
Even before consideration is made in relation to the new life that will be brought into the 
world there is the decision as to when to start a family and with whom, as well as the 
pregnancy to contend with and the limitations this might place on a woman and her partner.  
In addition to this is antenatal care and decisions in relation to information that the couple 
might want to obtain during the pregnancy, decisions about the mode and location of the 
birth and how many children to have.  This is only the tip of the iceberg as the decisions that 
are ultimately made will then impact on virtually every aspect of the ongoing lives of the 
parents, siblings and future child.  As well as these considerations of course is the decision 
whether or not to have prenatal testing and the consequences that this may lead to. 
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Purdy describes reproductive autonomy as: 
 
“…the power to decide when, if at all, to have children; also, many – but not all – of 
the choices relevant to reproduction.”61 
 
Purdy does not tell us what choices relevant to reproduction fall within the scope of this 
description of reproductive autonomy.  Similarly, Robertson, although using the term 
‘procreative liberty’, refers to this as ‘freedom in activities and choices related to procreation’ 
and recognises that this does not specify which activities are relevant.62 I, therefore, prefer the 
term ‘reproductive freedom’ where reference is specifically made to individuals taking 
advantage of prenatal techniques if they wish.63  The moral basis of this is autonomy and self-
determination,64 believing that an individual’s decision to employ genetic information to assist 
with reproductive decisions should not be interfered with, where preventing individuals from 
obtaining information relevant to them would be limiting their reproductive freedom.65 
Buchanan et al argue that reproductive freedom should include the choice of what kind of 
children to have, but acknowledge that this is one of the most controversial components of 
this freedom and will no doubt become more so as the knowledge of human genetics increases 
along with improved genetic and medical techniques.66 
  
Reproduction and issues surrounding it are clearly and without argument very sensitive and 
emotive and it is generally accepted that it is up to the individual or couple to make their own 
                                            
61 Purdy L (2006) ‘Women’s reproductive autonomy: medicalisation and beyond’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 32, pp 287-291 
62  Robertson JA (1986) ‘Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New 
Reproduction’, Southern California Law Review 59, p 955 
63 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 210 
64 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 214 
65 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 208 
66 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 209 
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decisions with respect to starting a family.  It is acknowledged that reproductive freedom 
makes an important contribution to an individual’s well-being and their welfare.67  The 
decision whether or not to have a family has a major impact on not only the individual’s life, 
but also on the lives of those close to them.  As such, reproductive decisions should be 
afforded the same degree of autonomy as other decisions which have such a significant impact 
on a person’s life, with competent individuals being the best judges of what reproductive 
choices will best promote their happiness.68 
 
However, as I have discussed in section 3.2, the extent to which people can make autonomous 
choices can be limited.  This may be, for example, where third parties may be harmed or 
where acts would be outside the law.  Reproductive autonomy is no exception.  An 
individual’s moral view will influence their decision and legal limitations may restrict the 
decision they are able to make taking into account their statutory obligations (set out in the 
Abortion Act69 and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act).70  Reproductive autonomy is 
therefore restricted by current legislation but it is important to note that it is also limited by 
the actions and views of clinicians looking after the mother and fetus.  Prospective mothers 
can choose to have prenatal testing but whether or not they can terminate a pregnancy late in 
gestation due to fetal abnormality depends on the agreement of the doctors looking after her 
and her fetus, who not only have to abide by the law but who may also have their own moral 
views about the appropriateness of termination for that particular fetus.  This is something I 
will explore further in chapter six. 
 
One argument against the view that reproductive choice is of such significance is that 
respecting an individual’s autonomy, for example, when they choose not to have lifesaving 
                                            
67 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 214 
68 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2001) From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, 
Cambridge University Press.  p 219 
69 Abortion Act 1967, HMSO: London 
70 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990, HMSO: London 
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surgery, is that it will only be their own life and interests that could be potentially lost or 
damaged.71  Affording the same degree of respect to autonomous decisions for reproductive 
reasons may result in the loss of life, not of the individual making the decision, but of the 
fetus they are carrying and the future person they will become. However, allowing competent 
adults to make autonomous decisions regarding the way in which they live their lives does 
affect the lives of others and can have a detrimental effect on another person’s quality of life 
and may, therefore, also harm the interests of others.  Despite this autonomy of the individual 
still prevails.  If a person chooses to smoke they detrimentally affect their own health.  This 
will in turn have a detrimental effect on the quality of life of their loved ones who may be 
dependent on them and will also witness their suffering and possible demise, not to mention 
the effects of passive smoking on their own health.  Similarly, if a person chooses not to accept 
lifesaving or life changing treatment this will not only impact on their own quality of life but 
also on that of others dependant on them or close to them.  In this way, therefore, allowing 
competent adults to make autonomous decisions is comparable to those wishing to make such 
decisions about their reproductive status and should be treated in exactly the same way, both 
deserving of the same degree of respect. 
 
 
3.7 Autonomy and prenatal testing 
 
Priaulx discusses the impact of the genetic revolution on reproduction and the impact this 
has had on parenthood.72  Prospective parents are now not only in a position to consider how 
many children they wish to have but also what kind of children to have.  Whilst this could 
form the basis of a discussion on genetic enhancement and choosing what ‘normal’ 
                                            
71 Beauchamp TL & Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethic (5th ed),Oxford University 
Press, p 126 
72 Priaulx N (2007) ‘Beyond health and disability: Rethinking the ‘foetal abnormality’ ground in 
abortion law’ in Horsey K, Biggs H (eds) Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing 
Regulation, London & New York, Routledge Cavendish, pp 205-229 
 95 
characteristics a parent would wish their child to have, I will discuss it only in the context 
of choosing not to have a child with a severe disabling condition for which testing is 
available, either by prenatal genetic diagnosis or other antenatal tests such as ultrasound 
scanning.  As Priaulx points out, there are those who argue that this is promoted by the 
avoidance of paying out extensive costs in caring for those with disabilities and others who 
argue that it confirms a public hostility to those with disabilities.73  I will discuss the latter 
issue in chapter five. 
 
Glover discusses the decisions that parents can make to promote the chances of having a 
healthy child.  This may involve choosing a partner known not to carry the same recessive 
gene mutation, such as Thalassaemia, or choosing not to smoke in pregnancy.74  It is normal 
practice in some populations for individuals to have genetic screening for conditions that 
are prevalent in their community before they find a suitable partner to marry and start a 
family with, in order to minimise the risk of having a child with an autosomal recessive 
condition.  One example of this would be screening for Tays Sachs disease carriers in the 
Ashkenazi Jewish population.   
 
It is to be presumed that the child whose mother does not smoke will be grateful for this and 
for the fact that they have not suffered as a consequence of her actions during pregnancy.  
However, this relates to action that prevents the disability from developing rather than 
eliminating disability that is already present.  Whilst it is presumably preferable to be born 
without a disability, and hence decisions to act in such a way before or during pregnancy 
which prevents the development of a disability is to be encouraged, it does not necessarily 
follow that it is preferable to not be born at all rather than be born with a disability.  This 
again is an issue I will consider in chapter four.  The arguments against prenatal testing, 
                                            
73 Barnes C, Mercer G, Shakespeare T (1999) Exploring Disability, Oxford: Polity Press, p 122 
74 Glover J (2006) Choosing children: the ethical dilemmas of genetic intervention, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p42 
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therefore, are not related to the prevention of disability per se, but in terminating a pregnancy 
and preventing the continued development of the fetus because of its disability or 
abnormality.  
 
It would appear, therefore, to be acceptable, and is indeed encouraged, to prevent disability 
proactively, for example, by taking folic acid during the first trimester of pregnancy and 
leading a healthy life style and by the use of seat belts in cars.  As I go on to argue in chapter 
five, this does not lead to criticism regarding discrimination against those with disabilities 
and it does not lead to claims that in acting to prevent such disabilities society will withdraw 
support for those already living with disabilities. The purpose of proactively preventing 
disability once a pregnancy has started prevents harm to individuals.  Prenatal testing based 
on reproductive autonomy and consideration of those individuals directly involved does not 
disparage those other individuals who are already living with disability or reduce their value 
in society.    
 
Whilst reproductive decisions may ultimately result in a termination of a pregnancy affected 
by a severely disabling condition and the end of the life of the fetus, the decisions 
surrounding reproductive autonomy have such a profound effect on the life of not only the 
individual carrying the fetus but other members of their family, that they should receive as 
much respect as decisions made in relation to other matters which have serious 
consequences, such as treatment decisions.  It is important, however, to clarify that whilst I 
have stated that autonomous decisions in relation to reproduction should be respected due 
to the innate importance of such decisions and also due to the familial consequences, this 
does not justify killing another human being, for example, a severely disabled individual 
whose existence also has consequences for his or her family.  Termination of pregnancy, 
particularly in the later stages of gestation, does require moral justification, however, this 
justification is less demanding than that for a living human being with full moral status.  I 
have discussed my arguments in relation to the moral status of the fetus in chapter two, and 
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how this is lower than that of a human being who has been born.  Termination of pregnancy 
is not a morally negligible decision and my arguments about the importance of reproductive 
autonomy provide sufficient moral justification. 
 
From the point of view of prenatal diagnosis, those who are seeking it often have first-hand 
knowledge of the condition for which they require testing.  They may have had a child 
previously who was affected and are, therefore, fully aware of the implications this may 
have for themselves, their other children and family members and for the future child.  They 
will be in the best position to decide whether or not they are able to bring to life a person 
with such a condition and to be able to cope with all of the implications this would hold for 
them.  They may have an awareness of the degree of suffering which the child may endure 
due to their previous experiences.  Just as young children cannot make autonomous 
decisions about issues of significant importance for themselves the fetus cannot make 
decisions and, therefore, in both cases decisions are made on their behalf.  However, that 
decision will not only be influenced by what is felt to be in the interests of the fetus but also 
the effect that having a severely disabled child will have on the mother, father and other 
members of the family will be taken into account. These decisions are likely to be influenced 
by the parent’s ability to care for a child with a significant disability and also the effect on 
the lives of other children, as their quality of life will also be affected.  Non-maleficence is 
an important principle here with respect to preventing harm to those already born (the 
family) but for the fetus the disability is already present and so continuing the pregnancy 
does not cause that particular harm, as that already exists.  From the point of view of the 
fetus it is a case of doing what is thought to be best for it and acting in a beneficial way, 
even though this may result in the future child never coming to exist.75  Allowing those 
                                            
75 I acknowledge that Derek Parfit refers to the non-identify problem where he raises the question 
about the ability to identify the specific individual that would be the recipient of the harm. He 
argues that being born cannot harm a person with a disability, as their only other option is non-
existence.  I have not considered his arguments as my thesis focuses on potential harm in the 
context of the wider family, not just to the person who will be born with the disability.  I argue that 
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individuals affected to make such decisions allows account to be taken of different people’s 
views and abilities.  Some parents may be much better placed emotionally, mentally, 
financially or otherwise to be able to manage and care for a child with a severe disability 
and find it a hugely positive and rewarding experience.  Sadly, others may not and, therefore, 
only those individuals who will be directly affected can make an appropriate decision.  All 
of this needs to be taken into account by the clinicians supporting these families and not just 
the implications the disability will have for the future child. 
 
The decision to terminate such a pregnancy, therefore, may not be based solely on the fact 
that the resulting child will be disabled in itself but more the additional financial, practical 
and emotional consequences of this.  The majority of terminations are based on such ‘social’ 
factors; it just so happens that these factors may have more significance if the fetus is 
disabled.  Whilst financial and practical support may be available emotional support is 
difficult to provide as the needs of the individual parents and their family are so variable. 
 
For those parents who have not had first-hand experience of caring for a child with such a 
condition, or who have not witnessed the consequences of the condition, it is clearly 
important that they are provided with enough information to allow purposeful dialogue to 
take place so they can make an autonomous decision as to whether they want prenatal testing 
and if so, what they wish to do based on the results.  Useful information can be sought from 
experienced healthcare professionals who care for people with the relevant condition, from 
clinical geneticists and counsellors who can provide information about the way in which a 
condition can be inherited and also from families and carers of children who have been born 
with and possibly died from the condition in question.76  Those who suffer from a serious 
condition, but one which is compatible with life, may also be in a position to offer advice to 
                                            
it is not only the future child that clinicians should take into account when justifying decisions 
about termination of pregnancy but other relevant individuals. 
76 Asch A (1999)  ‘Prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion: a challenge to practice and policy’, 
American Journal of Public Health 89(11), pp 1649-1657 
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prospective parents about the way in which they live their lives. Paediatric specialists can 
also provide information about the clinical needs of the child and the natural history of the 
condition their child has.  This again is no different from a person making a lifesaving or 
life changing decision about a serious operation, for which they have no personal 
knowledge, but have been provided with the information from their healthcare team or from 
other patients who have suffered from similar condition.  Based on this it is recognised that 
life changing decisions should be made by the individual who is the subject of the decision 
assuming they have the capacity to do so.  Reproductive decisions have a major effect on 
people’s lives and as such are deserving of the same respect. 
 
In order for people to utilise their reproductive autonomy they need to have appropriate 
information to make a genuinely informed choice77 about the risks and benefits of prenatal 
testing and whether this is right for them.  If they chose to have it prenatal testing can provide 
them with information about the physical and mental health of the fetus.  Those prospective 
parents may be informed by their own past experiences or may need more information 
provided to them to allow them to decide what action they wish to take. 
 
The availability of prenatal testing promotes parental and reproductive autonomy by 
providing this information should prospective parents wish to receive it.  It is hoped that the 
genetic counselling and support they receive will then allow them to make their own 
decisions about the future of their pregnancy. The reproductive autonomy of prospective 
parents, with regards to late termination of pregnancy, can be limited, however, by the 
actions and decisions of the healthcare professionals involved in their care.   
 
Under the current law, where late terminations of pregnancy for a substantial risk of severe 
fetal disability are concerned, two medical practitioners must agree that the termination is 
                                            
77 Walker T (2012) ‘Informed consent and the Requirement to ensure understanding’, Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 29(1), pp 50-62 
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appropriate.  This not only needs to be in discussion with the healthcare professionals 
involved but also with the prospective parents.  I have already discussed in chapter two 
(section 2.4) that there are no strict criteria which can be applied with regards to what a 
severe disability is and, therefore, this decision comes down to the opinion of the medical 
practitioners, having taken into account the clinical and prognostic nature of the 
abnormality.  Ultimately, therefore, the mother’s reproductive autonomy is limited by the 
fact that it is not her decision as to whether a termination in the later stages of pregnancy 
can be justified.  This, therefore, is a further case of passive paternalism where a procedure 
or management option is being denied to the patient.  However, this differs in that it is not 
due to consideration of what is in the mother’s best interests but what is thought to be in the 
best interests of the fetus.  My conclusion that the fetus has lower moral status than those 
who have been born, such as the mother and other family members, is obviously very 
relevant here.  The doctors need to consider the mother’s wishes and what outcome she is 
hoping for, and also consider the harm that may occur to the future child and family if the 
pregnancy were to continue.  Just as prospective parents make decisions to avoid harm to 
their unborn baby, such as ensuring they do not smoke or expose their fetus to other harmful 
substances to ensure it is not harmed once born, the doctors consider what harm the disability 
will have on the future child.  The doctors need to satisfy themselves that the disability will 
be severe enough to result in enough pain and suffering to justify preventing the child from 
being born.  This decision, therefore, will be influenced by the doctors’ own knowledge and 
experiences and personal opinion.  There are likely to be certain conditions which affect the 
fetus which medical practitioners working in fetal medicine will accept justify late 
termination of pregnancy, such as Thanatophoric Dysplasia and Anencephaly, but there will 
also be anomalies which will be more contentious and that could potentially lead to criminal 
prosecutions of the doctors making the decision to terminate a pregnancy after twenty-four 
weeks of gestation.78  
                                            
78 The Crown Prosecution Service (2005) ‘CPS decides not to prosecute doctors following complaint 
by Rev Joanna Jepson’ (cps.gov.uk as cited on 7/07/2015) 
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3.8          A response to anti-autonomy arguments surrounding prenatal testing 
 
There are also arguments against prenatal diagnosis based on the principle of autonomy.79  
Whilst some consider the availability of prenatal testing enhances a person’s reproductive 
autonomy others argue that it puts pressure on those couples who may otherwise have 
preferred not to have had such information.80 Haker raises concerns that the availability of 
prenatal tests limits a woman’s reproductive autonomy.81  Haker argues that rather than the 
availability of prenatal tests promoting women’s reproductive autonomy by giving them the 
choice as to whether they want to have testing done, it actually puts more pressure on them to 
have the tests due to the social-ethical implications,82 and may possibly even make them feel 
regarded as being irresponsible by not doing so.83 They may feel that they are jeopardising 
the health of their child if they choose not to accept such testing.84  Any decision to utilise 
prenatal testing, therefore, may not be an autonomous choice.  Although the introduction of 
such testing was aimed at preventing the births of disabled children,85 notably by the same 
society that objected to discrimination against disabled people, there is concern that it has 
‘assumed a health-related obligation to “prevent” giving birth to a child with serious health 
                                            
79 Shakespeare T (1998)  ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability & 
Society 13, pp 665-681 
80 Shakespeare T (1998)  ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability & 
Society 13, pp 665-681 
81 Haker, H (2006) ‘Reproductive Autonomy in Light of Responsible Parenthood: with new science 
comes the need for a new ethical discourse’, Harvard Divinity Bulletin, Harvard Divinity School 
34(1) (www.bulletin.hds.harvard.edu as cited on 8/07/2015) 
82 Haker, H (2006) ‘Reproductive Autonomy in Light of Responsible Parenthood: with new science 
comes the need for a new ethical discourse’, Harvard Divinity Bulletin, Harvard Divinity School 
34(1) (www.bulletin.hds.harvard.edu as cited on 8/07/2015) 
83 Harris J (1998) Clones, genes and immortality, Oxford University Press, p 117 
84Bennett R (2001) ‘Antenatal genetic testing and the right to remain in ignorance’, Theoretical 
Medicine 22, pp 461-471  
85 Whittle MJ (1991) ‘Antenatal diagnosis of fetal abnormalities’ in Drife J, Donnai D (eds) Routine 
Fetal Anomaly Screening, London: Springer-Verlag London Limited, p35 
 102 
risks or symptoms of disability.’86  The consideration of these issues will become more 
important as new ways of providing treatment in-utero emerge.  One such condition that 
current research is likely to impact on is Down syndrome.87  Therapies being investigated aim 
to reduce the symptoms of the condition but will not eliminate it or change the chromosomal 
pattern associated with Down syndrome and would, therefore, avoid the ethical problems 
associated with germline genetic manipulation.88  It is hoped that such treatment would 
improve the quality of life of those with the condition and reduce the morbidity and mortality 
associated with it.  These outcomes appear to be consistent with in-utero treatment for other 
conditions, such as Congential Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), and also with post-natal 
treatment.  Concerns may be raised, however, if the purpose or use of this in-utero intervention 
is to ensure that a person conforms to society’s view of an ideal standard. 
 
This may potentially be true if it were the case that an abnormality could be identified that 
could be corrected before birth or if it informed the clinicians of any precautions that needed 
to be taken at birth.  However, it would not be the case if nothing could be done following the 
diagnosis being made.  If their fetus had an abnormality it would still be there whether they 
had testing or not.  Their decision not to have testing has not caused the abnormality.  It is 
argued that, in this situation, the couple’s autonomy is not protected as they make choices 
based on external pressures.89 One of those choices may be to terminate an affected 
pregnancy, which when left to their own devices they may have continued, or not had testing 
to establish its status in the first place.  However, rather than this being an argument against 
prenatal diagnosis it highlights the importance of healthcare professionals considering each 
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individual couple and the need for them to have meaningful discussions in order to make a 
decision about whether or not to have prenatal testing in the first place, and if they do, what 
options are available to them once the result is known.  It also depends on the healthcare 
professionals engaging with the prospective parents to gain an understanding of how the 
outcome of the pregnancy will affect them, within the context of the family.  This argument 
emphasises why it is important to ensure that all reproductive decisions made by a couple are 
informed throughout the prenatal process, from initial counselling to termination, if that’s 
what they choose and the clinical geneticist should be in a position to support this and 
contribute to the discussions that take place. 
 
 
Prospective parents who are known to be at risk of having an affected pregnancy can be 
referred to a clinical genetics department and be seen by a dedicated team of healthcare 
professionals, including clinical geneticists and counsellors.  Such patients will have the 
opportunity to discuss fully the nature of the condition which is affecting their pregnancy, or 
which their pregnancy is at high risk of being affected by.  The exact nature of the condition 
and its phenotypic variability can be discussed so that the couple can decide for themselves 
whether it is a condition which they could cope with.  Counselling is designed to be non-
directive90 in order that it enhances a couple’s autonomy, providing them with information 
and support to allow them to make informed decisions which will best suit them.  Whether or 
not non-directive counselling is attainable is unclear.91  Whilst directive counselling is aimed 
at influencing a patient’s behaviour, non-directive counselling tries to influence the patient’s 
thought processes before ultimately reaching a decision.92,93 During counselling the 
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availability of further tests can be discussed and the accuracy to which they may provide 
results, as well as an opportunity to discuss the options available to the prospective parents 
should an anomaly be found.  The benefit, therefore, for those who are in a position to use 
such services is that it is ultimately hoped that they are able to make a decision which best 
suits them and their particular circumstances, with support and advice from those providing 
the information.  
 
Prenatal genetic testing for those at a particular risk of a genetic condition is, therefore, a 
service which is available should a couple want this.  With non-directive counselling it is 
hoped that the couple will be able to make informed decisions about whether or not they want 
testing during pregnancy and will also be aware of what the potential outcomes could be, 
including, but not exclusively, the possibility of termination of an affected pregnancy. 
 
Clinical geneticists are also able to provide support and reassurance to prospective parents as 
prenatal diagnosis does not only provide couples with the option of identifying whether or not 
they are carrying a disabled fetus, it can also allow couples to begin a family when they may 
not have otherwise done so.  Prior to the discovery of the gene mutation causing Duchenne 
Muscular Dystrophy (DMD),94 women who knew that the gene existed in their family due to 
the presence of affected individuals, but did not know whether or not they were a carrier, 
would often choose not to have children due to the fear of having an affected son.  Others 
would embark on a pregnancy but on finding that the fetus was male would opt for a 
termination, having had first-hand experience of what it would be like to have a son with the 
condition, and having to witness a deterioration in their health from a young age to their 
premature death.  This is despite the fact that they did not know whether they did actually 
carry the gene fault, thus giving them a risk of twenty-five percent of having an affected boy 
                                            
94 DMD is an X-linked condition in which females are unaffected carriers but are at 50% risk of 
having an affected son.  It is a progressive neuromuscular condition resulting in delayed motor 
milestones and death usually by the age of twenty. 
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and a seventy-five percent chance of the fetus being unaffected.  This meant that a large 
proportion of the terminations carried out were of normal healthy boys.95   
 
The advent of prenatal testing for DMD, and similar conditions, has meant that those women 
can now be carrier tested and know exactly what their risk is.  This meant that many of the 
women who had either opted not to have children or who had had terminations of male fetuses 
could now go on to have the family they desired, either by being able to have genetic testing 
or because they knew they were not at risk.  The lack of availability of prenatal testing meant 
that a large number of pregnancies carrying normal males were terminated.  This highlights 
the fact that, taking into account a family’s personal experiences of a condition, they will take 
drastic action to prevent the birth of an affected child.  At least with the option of prenatal 
testing lives of future children can be saved, as those pregnancies that are not affected are able 
to continue. 
 
Prenatal diagnosis does not always have to result in termination of pregnancy.  The 
information gained by prenatal testing may be empowering to an expectant couple allowing 
them to prepare for the birth of their child, which will also be of benefit to the child itself.  
Preventing people who want this knowledge from gaining it could be detrimental to them as 
well as the developing child.  The uncertainty of whether or not the pregnancy is affected 
by a particular condition could place a great burden on the pregnant woman and her partner.  
This in itself could affect their relationship and family in a negative way, in addition to the 
effect it may have on the pregnancy. 
 
There are also further benefits of prospective parents engaging with clinical genetics 
services and being able to discuss how they can mitigate the risks associated with starting a 
                                            
95 Friedman Ross L (2006) ‘Research Review: Screening for conditions that do not meet the Wilson 
and Jungner criteria: The case of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy’, American Journal of Medical 
Genetics 140(A), pp 914-922 
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family.  Not testing a high risk pregnancy may mean that an assumption needs to be made 
that the pregnancy is affected by a condition and certain interventions may need to take 
place as a precaution.  This in itself could be harmful to the fetus and to the mother.  For 
example Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia is an autosomal recessive metabolic condition.  
Both parents can be unaffected carriers of the mutated gene, which is responsible for causing 
the condition, with a twenty-five percent chance of them having a child affected by the 
condition.96  Males and females can be affected, but in the case of a female fetus, due to the 
hormonal imbalances that occur, over masculinisation of the female fetus can occur during 
gestation resulting in a genetic female with ambiguous genitalia at birth.97  This is a seriously 
disabling condition not only physically but also psychologically for both child and parents.98  
This may be particularly problematic, and is the subject of debate,99,100 where a child is born 
with a 46XX karyotype but is severely masculinised at birth.  Despite having a female 
karyotype these children may be assigned male gender at birth, as ease of surgical correction 
has to be considered and there is controversy as to whether this is the correct approach to 
take.101  The child will need to undergo often multiple plastic surgery procedures and long 
term medical follow up.102  The condition can be fatal in some situations.  One way of 
reducing the damaging effects of CAH is for the mother to take Dexamethasone, a steroid, 
during early pregnancy.103  However, this treatment is not without its side effects and can 
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also cause some harm to the fetus.  The risks and benefits have to be considered and weighed 
in the balance.104 
 
Without prenatal testing the parents and their healthcare advisers have a difficult choice to 
make.  There is a twenty-five percent risk of them conceiving an affected child and a 
seventy-five percent chance of the fetus not being affected.  Should they start the 
prophylactic treatment or not?  If they do there is a chance that they could cause harm to an 
otherwise healthy fetus.  But if they do not choose to treat they risk depriving an affected 
fetus of a chance to development normally and avoid unnecessary pain and suffering once 
born. 
 
Allowing parents to consider their options and choose whether or not to have testing may 
avoid the harm of uncertainty for the couple and also the harm to the fetus.  Once the genetic 
status of the fetus is established a decision regarding treatment can be made, which is known 
to be in the best interests of that particular fetus and not based on risks and probabilities.  
Having clinicians engage with couples early, preferably before conception or at least in early 
pregnancy, to discuss their genetic risks and the risks and benefits of testing and potential 
treatment allows the couple and their pregnancy to be viewed individually, with their 
specific needs considered in isolation and hence the enhancement of their autonomy with 
respect to reproductive decision making. 
 
This example further highlights the benefits of prenatal testing and emphasises the fact that 
terminating an affected pregnancy is only one possible outcome and by no means the 
ultimate goal of testing and prenatal diagnosis.  I will discuss in chapter four (section 4.5), 
the benefits that prenatal testing can bring to the fetus, which would not otherwise have been 
available had testing not been done. 
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3.9 Equality and reproductive freedom 
 
Another basis for the importance of reproductive freedom is the principle of equality.105  
This argument relates to the fact that regardless of whether someone is male or female, they 
should have the same opportunities to live their life the way they see fit.  It is believed that 
reproductive freedom neutralises the unfair disadvantages women face in relation to 
reproduction due to their gender.  The decision whether or not to continue a pregnancy which 
is affected by a disability has an impact on both parents, although clearly the pregnancy and 
possible termination will have the greatest impact, physically and emotionally, on the 
mother.  It may appear, therefore, that the issue of inequality, with respect to gender, is not 
relevant when considering prenatal testing (as opposed to termination of pregnancy) as 
testing will determine a longer term consequence which will affect not only the mother.  
However, it is argued that the greatest impact of the birth of a disabled child, and its future 
upbringing, places most burden on the mother as it is generally the mother who will be 
responsible for the child’s upbringing.106  Whilst some care may be available it is unlikely 
that both parents of a severely disabled child will be in a position to work as the child may 
well require twenty-four hour care which is unlikely to be compatible with a position of 
employment outside the home, even when support is available.  It is argued, therefore, that 
reproductive freedom, with the opportunity to utilise prenatal testing with or without 
termination of pregnancy, provides women with the opportunity to decide whether or not 
they want to fulfil the role of carer for a severely disabled child rather than the life they may 
otherwise have chosen.  Many women of course will choose to continue with an affected 
pregnancy and accept their future role in relation to this.  Others, however, will be in a 
position to choose, just like their male counterparts. 
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Purdy refers to the ability to control our own bodies as ‘a keystone of liberal society’ and 
that just as men do, women want to be able to control what happens to and within their 
bodies.107  The provision of abortion services has allowed women to gain some control over 
their reproductive freedom and, as Bender puts it, ‘freeing themselves from male 
dominance’.108  The availability of contraception and abortion has allowed women to 
develop an identity which is separate to reproduction and has given them control over their 
lives which is similar to that of their male counterparts.  Prenatal testing has allowed women 
to gain information about their pregnancy so that they can make decisions on behalf of their 
future child taking into account how the abnormality found will impact on that child, but 
also on their own life.  Access to abortion particularly in the late stages of pregnancy is 
restricted of course with the ultimate gatekeepers being the medical professionals who 
arbitrate over whether or not a disability is serious enough.  As I have argued in chapter two, 
as the woman has higher moral status than the fetus a woman should be allowed to make the 
choices that serve her own needs, to a point.  I have also argued that as pregnancy progresses 
the moral status of the fetus increases and, therefore, there does have to be some control 
over what women are able to do under limited circumstances, such as when the pregnancy 
threatens her life or in the event of very serious fetal disability.  Purdy focuses on the 
judgements in legal cases that have resulted in a woman’s decision being overridden in the 
interests of the fetus, including giving doctors permission to perform caesarean sections on 
women who have refused to consent to this.109  I have discussed the importance of autonomy 
and how this should be respected and as Purdy describes, these types of actions are highly 
unlikely to be taken against ‘the average middle-class white man on the street’,110 or even a 
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competent woman who is not pregnant.  What is it then that creates the situation whereby a 
pregnant woman is treated differently to those women who are not pregnant, and their male 
counterparts? 
 
There is clearly the issue of moral status. Those who argue that the fetus does have full 
moral status equivalent to that of the mother will undoubtedly argue that the fetus is 
deserving of as much protection as the mother. Any action that is needed to protect the fetus, 
assuming it does not harm the mother, should therefore be permitted even if this against the 
mother’s wishes.  This may arise, for example, if there is a clinical need to deliver a baby 
by caesarean section because vaginal delivery could result in serious harm to the baby or 
even death.  There may only be minimal risk to the mother in having a caesarean section 
and therefore her refusal, at the expense of the child, may seem unreasonable. I agree that I 
too would struggle with this situation and would hope that the mother would choose the 
option that was in the best interests of her future child, however, if she has a higher moral 
status than the fetus her decision should be respected assuming she fulfils the criteria for 
having mental capacity and is competent to make such a decision.  Denying women the 
choice in these cases limits their reproductive autonomy and is a retrograde step from the 
point of view of what the feminist political agenda has been fighting for.  Under any other 
circumstances a person could not undergo a procedure that they had not consented to, such 
as surgery, because this would be counter to their autonomy even if it was felt that this 
decision was irrational or not in their best interests.  There are those who argue that in this 
situation, providing the woman’s own health is not being seriously compromised, her 
autonomy should be disregarded in order to save the fetus, as ultimately this will not cause 
any physical harm to the woman111,112.  The risk here of course is that this could create an 
adversarial relationship between the woman and fetus/future child as the woman’s 
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fundamental rights have been challenged.113 It is interesting to note that if a child is harmed, 
for example born with brain damage, due to a delay in the performance of a caesarean section 
by doctors the child’s rights will be protected by the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) 
Act 1976.  A breach in duty to the mother that results in injury to the child creates rights for 
both the mother and child.114  If, however, the child suffers harm because the mother has 
refused to consent to a caesarean section that doctors have advised, the child will not be able 
to sue the doctor because the doctor is not liable to the mother.  The Act also provides 
immunity to the mother so that the child cannot make any claim against her.  This legal 
position seems consistent with the ethical position that the mother has a higher moral status 
than the fetus and, therefore, her autonomous choices take precedence over that of the fetus 
and its well-being. 
 
In the latter scenario, the only way by which the doctor could act in the best interests of the 
fetus and future child would be to override the autonomy of the mother.  It was ruled by the 
Court of Appeal in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S115 that a caesarean section, or any 
other form of obstetric procedure, could not be performed on a woman who refused to 
consent and was competent to make her own decision.  It was ruled that pregnancy and 
labour did not impact on the importance of a patient being able to make their own healthcare 
decisions.  In those cases that have resulted in judgements that have permitted such 
procedures being carried out on pregnant women who have refused, the woman’s mental 
capacity has been called into question.116,117,118 The legal situation, therefore, is that if a 
woman has mental capacity at the time the decision needs to be made her autonomy cannot 
be overridden.  The decisions made in case law are confirmed by the Department of Health 
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which refers to decisions to refuse treatment being respected if they are made by an adult 
with capacity even if this may ‘result in the death of the person (and/or death of an unborn 
child, whatever the stage of the pregnancy)’.119 
 
As the fetus is part of the woman’s body and its future interests are therefore dependent on 
her actions how do we resolve this moral problem?  Purdy suggests comparing the 
relationship between the mother and fetus with that of the relationship between other 
relatives.  This provides us with the opportunity to compare and consider a similar scenario 
but with a relationship between a non-pregnant woman or male person and a close relative, 
such as their child.  If, for example, a child needed a kidney transplant and the only match 
was their parent (mother or father) would they be required to undergo surgery in order to 
save or improve the life of their child?  Whilst one would hope that a parent would proceed 
in order to save the life of their child, assuming there was little risk to themself, would they 
be morally obliged to do so?   There is a natural expectation that parents will do their best 
for their children and will make sacrifices for them. Parents have children generally knowing 
that this will have a significant impact on their own life, affecting their financial status, their 
career, as well as the physical and emotional effects of having a child. Whilst it is argued 
that parents are morally obliged to care for their children120 this does not necessarily mean 
that they should put themselves at risk for their children.  Whilst there may be a moral 
obligation to provide basic care such as food and shelter to one’s children, this does not 
mean that this should extend to donating a kidney to a child.  If a parent refused to do this 
their autonomy, as a competent person who has the right to make decisions for themselves, 
would not be overridden. Donating an organ could put the parent’s life at risk, for example, 
from post-operative complications such as sepsis or haemorrhage or they may have an 
adverse reaction to the anaesthetic.  If something happened to that parent not only would 
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this impact on their future but possibly on the future of others, such as other children that 
may already exist to whom the parent also has moral obligations.  There are many reasons 
why a parent may refuse to help their own child in this way and, therefore, why then should 
a pregnant woman be required to undergo an invasive procedure in order to save the life of 
her fetus?  This view is shared by others121,122 and Annas argues that the relationship between 
the mother and fetus is actually less demanding that the relationship between a mother (or 
father) and a child who has already been born in that the fetus is not yet a person and as such 
has lower moral status than the parent and the child.123  
 
I agree with Annas’ point that the fetus has lower moral status than that of the child and as 
such the mother does not owe any more duty to the fetus than she does to the child, however, 
one would hope that the mother would act is such a way as to protect her fetus as she would 
her child.  Just as we would generally expect parents to follow the advice of health 
professionals in preventing illness and disability in their child it seems reasonable to expect 
the same for their fetus, assuming this does not cause harm to the mother.  Examples may 
include refraining from smoking, taking illicit drugs and drinking alcohol during pregnancy 
or positive actions such as taking Folic Acid to reduce the risk of neural tube defects.  Other 
examples that may be more difficult to reconcile may include changing from one anti-
epileptic medication to another less effective one, which does not have teratogenic side 
effects.  This latter example may be a fine balancing act between the mother’s interests (in 
not suffering from an epileptic seizure, which may in itself harm the fetus) and the interests 
of the fetus in not developing congenital abnormalities secondary to the effects of the anti-
epileptic medication.  However, as Purdy argues if parents are not expected to undergo 
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invasive procedures against their wishes for the sake of their children then there should be 
no expectation for the mother to do so for the benefit of the fetus.124   
 
When considering equality and what is fair it is also important to consider whether or not 
denying an ‘at risk’ couple prenatal testing can be justified.  Couples who are known to be 
at risk of having a disabled child are already disadvantaged by that risk and it would appear 
unfair to deny them the opportunity to put themselves on an equal footing as other couples 
who are at a low risk of having a pregnancy affected by an abnormality. 
 
Even if one concludes that the information provided by prenatal diagnosis does enhance 
reproductive autonomy, in that it allows couples to decide whether or not to continue an 
affected pregnancy, there are still those who argue that despite this enhancement of 
autonomy prenatal diagnosis is still morally wrong.  I have addressed arguments relating to 
the moral status of the fetus in chapter two, however, the main focus of my thesis has been 
to look at the arguments relating to prenatal diagnosis and the claim that it discriminates 
against those living with disabilities, which I will discuss in chapter four and five. 
 
 
3.10  Summary and conclusions 
 
Autonomy is clearly of utmost importance in our society and with respect to healthcare, with 
autonomous adults being generally encouraged to make decisions for themselves.  These 
decisions, for various reasons, are, however, sometimes limited for example by existing 
laws, or in the case of healthcare by the cost and availability of treatment.  A person’s 
autonomy with respect to healthcare may also be restricted by the healthcare professionals 
looking after them if the care the patient is requesting is felt not to be clinically appropriate 
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or justified.  I have discussed the fact that whilst paternalism is discouraged passive 
paternalism does still play a part in the provision of modern healthcare. 
 
If a patient does not have capacity to make their own decisions we act in what we believe to 
be their best interests taking into account all of the circumstances.  When prospective parents 
make decisions about reproduction they do so taking into account the impact any decisions 
will have on their fetus, but also by considering what is in their own best interests and that 
of their other immediate family. 
 
I have argued that as decisions about reproduction are so important in how they affect a 
person’s life (the prospective parents, the future child and others with a close personal 
connection) the respect for reproductive autonomy is of particular importance.  All 
reproductive decisions, whether this be a decision to start a family or not or  when and how 
many children to have, have a profound impact even before consideration is given to 
whether or not the future child may be born with a disability.  This disability may require 
the prospective parents to consider additional care the future child may need and the need 
to take into account the wider reaching impact this may have on their own future lives.  The 
extent to which the fetus may suffer due to its condition and the treatment of it will also play 
a significant role in determining what parents may decide to do.  They can be greatly assisted 
in making these decisions by having a supportive relationship with relevant healthcare 
professionals which could start before conception or during the prenatal period. 
 
I have argued that it is because of the profound effects these decisions have on the lives of 
those involved that interference in them should be avoided as much as possible.  As with 
other decisions that we wish to make autonomously, however, and despite their profound 
effect, there are still restrictions on what prospective parents may be in a position to 
decide.  Healthcare professionals again are the final arbitrators of whether or not a couple 
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can ultimately terminate a pregnancy if an anomaly is found later during gestation and I will 
explore this in more detail in chapter six. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Harm, health, disease and disability  
 
4.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss what is meant by harm, health, disease and disability and the 
significance this has as to whether a person, or those close to them, can be harmed by being born with 
a disability and the issues surrounding existence and non-existence which this creates.  This will then 
enable me to discuss in chapter five the arguments against prenatal testing that claim it discriminates 
against those with disabilities.  In arguing against this position I conclude that the underlying reasons 
for prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy, including late terminations, should be to prevent 
harm.  The presence of an abnormality in a fetus, which is going to affect the life of the future person, 
may cause it harm.  It is not, however, only the fetus and future person it will become who may be 
harmed by the abnormality but also people who already exist, such as the prospective parents and other 
children that they may already have.  
 
Prenatal testing is performed in order to determine whether or not a fetus is likely to be born with a 
disability.  Prospective parents who receive such a finding may choose to terminate that pregnancy. 
When making this decision consideration needs to be given not only to the potential harm to the future 
child but also potential harm to the interests of the wider family.  I will therefore discuss what constitutes 
harm itself and harm to interests, but also whether a person who is going to be disabled, can be harmed 
by being born when the only other option is that of non-existence.    
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As mentioned in my introductory chapter, I am conscious that my thesis may create a negative 
impression of having a child with a disability.  This is not intentional but a reflection of the fact that 
where prenatal testing is followed by termination it is likely that the prospective parents will have 
viewed the disability in their particular child as something that will be detrimental to their interests and, 
possibly, to the interests of the wider family.   
 
When talking to prospective parents it is important for them to understand the implications that the 
condition their fetus will be affected by will have on the future child. This will include asking questions 
such as: How will it affect their health?  What limitations could it place on them and how might they 
overcome these?  It is important for prospective parents to have the opportunity to deliberate on what 
they consider to be harm, not only to the future child but to their own interests, and whether they believe 
that their future child’s health and level of disability is going to affect them all enough to consider 
terminating the pregnancy. This discussion clearly needs to be balanced and the positives of having the 
child also need to be recognised to ensure that the prospective parents make the right decision for them.  
Both prospective parents and those supporting them need to have an understanding of the concepts of 
harm, health and disability so that they can determine what it means for them. 
 
There are well rehearsed models of disability in the literature1,2 and I will discuss how these do not 
always provide adequate definitions of disability when considering the types of impairment that are 
often identified by prenatal testing, particularly those that result in severe disability and may lead to late 
terminations of pregnancy. 
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I will also discuss the definitions of health and disease and the difficulties with these definitions, 
including the Naturalist and Normativist theories of health, and how the Normativist theory takes into 
account the interests of the individual and what allows a person to lead a worthwhile life.  The 
Normativist account supports my arguments in chapter three regarding the importance of reproductive 
autonomy, and how decisions should be made by those whose interests may ultimately be harmed by 
the birth of a disabled child. 
 
4.2   Harm, health, disability and Disease 
One of the aims of my thesis is to emphasise the need to consider the fetus in the context of the family, 
as not only may the fetus be harmed by the presence of a disability but also harm may occur to the 
interests of other relevant individuals.  It is, therefore, important to consider what is meant by harm.  
Reznek considers the concept of harm from the point of view that an object is harmed if it is made worse 
off.3  This would imply that the object being harmed had a ‘good or well-being’ that could be impaired 
in the first place.  This point would be particularly relevant to prospective parents and pre-existing 
children who will already have an established life with interests of their own which could potentially 
be harmed.  From the point of view of human harm we need, therefore, to consider what it is to have 
human good or welfare.  Reznek talks of a person being harmed if they are in a worse state than they 
otherwise would have been had they not suffered the harm.4  This is not always straightforward.  In 
medicine particularly it may be necessary to expose a person to side effects of a drug thus causing them 
harm, but without this treatment their overall condition would be worse.  The person is, therefore, 
actually better off having taken it.  Not taking the drug would result in more overall harm to them.  
Reznek overcomes this problem by considering the concept of ‘some harm’.5  In this case the drug has 
made the person better off overall but has caused some harm to them.  Overall the person has benefitted.   
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Harm therefore occurs where a person is worse off than they would otherwise have been.  Whether a 
particular type of harm, or harm caused to particular interests, is sufficient to impact significantly on a 
person’s life is for them to determine.  People may accept some harms when these are balanced by 
benefits.  From the perspective of parents and pre-existing children who have interests that could be 
harmed it is important, therefore, to consider the possible harms to those interests that having a disabled 
child in the family could bring with the positive benefits to allow their overall position to be evaluated.  
This is why deliberative discussion is needed before prospective parents make reproductive discussions.  
Taking this approach may also assist medical professionals in making decisions when faced with the 
need to justify the appropriateness of late termination of pregnancy. 
 
Diagnosis and treatment of patients is closely associated with our understanding of what constitutes 
health; theories of which I will discuss in section 4.2.2.i.  Health is defined as the ‘optimum capacity of 
a person to fulfil the requirements for performing various roles and tasks within society’.6  When 
considering the principle of beneficence and non-maleficence and our prima facie duty to prevent others 
from being harmed, this arguably means that we have a duty to assist those who are unhealthy as they 
are subjected to harm by being made worse off than their optimum state of health would otherwise be.  
The importance of this in relation to prenatal testing is that identifying an abnormality that has the 
potential to cause harm in the fetus may allow us to intervene and prevent or reduce that harm.   
 
When healthcare professionals decide whether or not to offer prenatal testing, and before a couple 
decides whether or not to accept it, they will inevitably make judgements about the life they believe the  
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future child will have.  This will be based on their own personal experiences, information they receive 
and their own personal views about life and disability and, for the parents, their own aspirations. It will 
not only be the life of the future child that will be affected.  The parent’s lives and the lives of any other 
children they have are also likely to be affected in some way.  For some families this may be a positive 
experience and they may approach the news of a difference in their future child with a positive attitude 
about what this may bring.  Others, however, may think more negatively about the consequences of 
having a disabled child on their own lives and their existing children and they may feel that the negatives 
outweigh the positives.  This will depend on the way in which they believe their future child, existing 
children and they themselves will be harmed and what their personal views on disability are.  How the 
birth of a disabled child will affect them will depend on their own unique set of circumstances.  This is 
likely to be different for every couple and every family; just as what disability means to them will also 
differ depending on their own views and interests.  
 
4.2.1  Models of disability 
As mentioned above, the view as to how a disability is likely to affect the person directly or how it will 
affect those close to them may vary from one person to another.  There are models of disability which 
provide a framework for understanding the way in which people with impairments experience disability. 
They also provide a reference for society as laws, regulations and structures are developed that impact 
on the lives of disabled people. There are two main models that have influenced modern thinking about 
disability: the medical model and the social model. 
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4.2.1.i  The Medical Model of Disability 
In the medical model it is the disability that is seen as the problem. The physical or mental abnormality 
that the person has is seen to be causing their impairment and the restrictions that are placed upon them, 
rather than their environment.  In this model the person with the impairment needs to adapt to the 
surrounding circumstances, if possible, in order to remove or reduce their disability, rather than society 
needing to make any adjustments.  
 
In the late 1970s the World Health Organization (WHO) devised a new classification system for 
disability.7  
 Impairment: any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or 
function.8  
 Disability: any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an 
activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being.9  
 Handicap: a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, 
that limits or prevents the fulfilment of a role that is normal (depending on age, sex and social 
and cultural factors) for that individual.10 
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WHA29.35 of the Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly, May 1976, p 183 
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This definition suggests that disability is essentially seen as problematic and the ‘responsibility’ of the 
person with impairments and is not related to the way in which society is organised. Any social 
consequences for the disabled person are said to be due to the physical limitations they experience and 
not the fault of society.11,12 I do not accept that disability is solely the result of the biological impairment, 
as there clearly are impairments that can be overcome by society adapting and, where this does not 
happen, some losses of function can be made into disabilities, or made more disabling, due to the 
physical construct of society.13,14,15 The definitions were strongly opposed by organisations controlled 
and run by disabled people because they promoted a view that individual impairments are the 
determining factor in explaining both disability and handicap. The model was argued to give an 
impression that disability must be prevented due to the fact that disabled people are unable to function 
normally within our society.16 The World Health Organisation currently consider disability to be 
reflected by the following definition, now taking into account the impact of the environment as well as 
a person’s physical or mental impairments. 
 
 “Disability is thus not just a health problem. It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the 
interaction between features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she 
lives. Overcoming the difficulties faced by people with disabilities requires interventions to 
remove environmental and social barriers.”17 
                                                     
11 Asch A (1989) ‘Reproductive Technology and Disability’ in Cohen S & Taub N (eds) Reproductive laws for 
the 1990s, Clifton, NJ Humana Press, p 73 
12 Brisenden S (1986) ‘Independent living and the Medical Model of Disability’ Disability, Handicap and 
Society 1(2), pp 173-178 
13 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’ Journal of Medical Ethics 25, pp 
163-171 
14 Asch A (1989) ‘Reproductive Technology and Disability’ in Cohen S & Taub N (eds) Reproductive laws for 
the 1990s, Clifton, NJ Humana Press, p 73 
15 Shakespeare T, Watson N (2002) ‘The social model of disability: an outdated ideology?’ Research in Social 
Science and Disability 2, pp 9-28 
16 Asch A (1989) ‘Reproductive Technology and Disability’ in Cohen S & Taub N (eds) Reproductive laws for 
the 1990s, Clifton, NJ Humana Press, p 98 
17 World Health Organisation website (www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/ as cited on 20 June 2013) 
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Impairment may not result in disability as the loss or abnormality may not in itself affect a person 
detrimentally.  A person who is born with one kidney can function perfectly well and may not even be 
aware of this anatomical anomaly until they are investigated for a completely unrelated matter.  
Impairments alone therefore are not always significant.  What is ‘within the range considered normal 
for a human being’ (see definition of disability above) is not defined and could mean different things to 
different people and to different couples.  The medical model does not provide an adequate or useful 
definition of disability when considering the benefits and disadvantages of prenatal testing.  A person 
may be considered disabled by others as they may be unable to do the things that others can do, but 
from their own personal point of view any difference about them is insignificant and does not have any 
major detrimental impact on their life.  
 
The medical model is problematic in that it does not take into account the personal experiences of those 
with an impairment who may not consider themselves to be disabled, even where the medical model 
defines them as such.  Scully argues that consideration needs to be given to experience and 
perspective.18  This supports my view that a difference in the fetus should not solely be evaluated in 
clinical terms but also based on the impact it will have on the future child and family, which may not 
necessarily be negative.  There is a danger that in looking only to the clinical facts in terms of the 
physical and intellectual characteristics, the needs of each individual are not taken into account.19  The 
medical model also does not differentiate between those who have acquired their disability later on in 
life, such as through accident or illness, from those with congenital impairments resulting in disability 
from birth.20  Where a disability is present from birth it can form an important part of that person’s 
identity and if that disability were taken away they would no longer be that person.21  This is particularly 
                                                     
18 Scully JL (2004) ‘What is a disease?’ EBMO reports 5(7), pp 650-653 
19 Brisenden S (1986) ‘Independent living and the Medical Model of Disability’ Disability, Handicap and 
Society 1(2), pp 173-178 
20 Scully JL, Rippberger C, Rehmann-Sutter C (2004) ‘Non-professionals’ evaluations of gene therapy ethics’ 
Social Science & Medicine 58, pp 1415-1425 
21 Scully JL (2004) ‘What is a disease?’ EBMO reports 5(7), pp 650-653 
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noticeable in those who are deaf and part of a ‘Deaf culture’.22  Proponents of this Deaf culture view 
that being deaf is not a disability but a culture, highlighting the fact that what constitutes an abnormality 
or harm is not always obvious.   
 
Expectations of prospective parents as to what impairments may result in disability or handicap are 
likely to be influenced by what they have achieved in their own lives and what they hope to achieve 
from having a family.  Educational achievement, for example, may be extremely important to a 
prospective parent who is very academic themselves, and to find that her pregnancy is affected by a 
neurological or genetic condition that is going to result in her child having severe learning difficulties 
might be devastating for them.  Another person, however, may not be troubled particularly by this 
providing the child is physically well and not experiencing any significant pain or suffering. This is one 
reason why good quality genetic counselling is necessary to ensure that prospective parents fully 
understand the potential outcomes for their future child if an anomaly is identified, so that their 
expectations can be addressed with the possibility of their fears being allayed and the many advantages 
the child will bring being highlighted and ensuring that they are aware of the type of support that can 
be provided. This also highlights the need for healthcare professionals involved in the care of these 
women to take into account not only the effects the anomaly will have on the future child, but also on 
the interests of those people directly involved and what potential harm they feel it could cause to them. 
 
 
 
                                                     
22 Stern SJ, Amos KS, Murrelle L, Welch KO, Nance WE, Pandya A (2002) ‘Attitudes of deaf and hard of 
hearing subjects towards genetic testing and prenatal diagnosis of hearing loss’ Journal of Medical Genetics 39, 
pp 449-453 
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4.2.1.ii  The Social Model of Disability 
The difficulties that the medical model has in establishing whether or not a particular physiological or 
mental condition has any negative or undesirable impact on someone’s life has led to the development 
of the social model of disability which distinguishes between impairment and the disabled experience.23 
The Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation (UPIAS) was an early disability rights 
organisation in the United Kingdom which helped to create this social model and make a distinction 
between impairment and disability.24  In this model the barriers that exist within society and the way in 
which society is organised cause disability, with those affected being denied the same access to their 
society as non-disabled people.25 This model reflects the view that society discriminates against people 
with impairments, where, according to the WHO definition, impairment is ‘any loss or abnormality of 
psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function’,26 and excludes them from 
involvement and participation.  However, one could argue that it is not only psychological, 
physiological or anatomical reasons that may give rise to impairment but also other causes, such as a 
person’s financial position which may prevent them from participating in certain activities that they 
may have an interest in.  With this in mind one could therefore be disabled not only by impairment as 
it is currently defined, but also by other factors that may be regarded as a disadvantage.  
 
Oliver also describes a social model of disability27 stating that it is not the impairment an individual 
suffers which has an impact, but the influence society has on their impairments which prevent them 
from living their life in the same way a person without such physical or intellectual differences would.  
                                                     
23 Scully JL (2004) ‘What is a disease?’ EBMO reports 5(7), pp 650-653 
24 Shakespeare T (2013) ‘The social model of disability’ in LJ Davis (ed) The disability studies reader,  
Routledge: New York & London (2013), p 214 
25 Zola IK (1979) ‘Healthism and disabling medicalization’ in Lee P, Brown N & Red I (eds) The Nation’s 
health, San Francisco, California, Boyd and Fraser, pp 101-110 
26 World Health Organisation (1976) ‘International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps: A 
manual of classification relating to the consequences of disease’ Published in accordance with resolution 
WHA29.35 of the Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly, May 1976, p 47 
27 Oliver M (1991) ‘The Politics of Disablement’, International Journal of Rehabilitation Research 14, pp 185-
186 
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This model also reflects the Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) definition of 
disability views. 
 
‘Disability is the disadvantage or restriction caused by a contemporary social organisation 
which takes no or little account of people who have [physical] impairments and thus excludes 
them from the mainstream of social activities.’28 
 
By this definition disability is a result of environmental and social factors as opposed to the physical 
impairments that exist.  Research carried out by Scully in relation to congenital abnormalities (and 
therefore present from birth) showed that a person’s impairment formed an important part of their 
identity and that the problems they faced were not always intrinsic to the condition but due to the 
reluctance of society to adapt (for example, Scully uses the example of installing light switches lower 
down to take into account people with shorter stature).29 According to the social model disabled people 
are people with impairments who are disabled by barriers in society.  However, I do not accept that this 
is the case with all disability and that there are some conditions which would result in limitations and 
cause suffering no matter what the social setting was.30   I will consider later (section 4.3) those 
impairments that are so severe that they are not amenable to social intervention, for example, those that 
result in profound learning difficulties or severely limited survival.  This problem highlights the 
inadequacies of the social model and how it does not consider individuals with the most severe 
impairments, those of whom are often the subject of late termination of pregnancy. 
 
                                                     
28 UPIAS (1975) ‘The UPIAS and The Disability Alliance discuss fundamental principles of disability’ Being a 
summary of the discussion held on 22nd November, 1975 and containing a commentary from each organization,  
(disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk as cited on 8 August 2015)) 
29 Scully JL (2004) ‘What is a disease?’ EBMO reports 5(7), pp 650-653 
30 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’ Journal of Medical Ethics 25, pp 
163-171 
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The contentious nature of disability is reflected in these descriptions and debate that continues.  As 
people are individuals they will have their own view on what they regard as a disability or impairment 
and this will depend on their own interests and the harm that may result to those interests as a 
consequence of the impairment or disability.  A person who does not enjoy sport may not be bothered 
by their moderate asthma whereas a keen athlete may find his limited respiratory function disabling, 
placing limits on what he is able to achieve.  Whether or not a physical or mental abnormality or disease, 
therefore, causes disability depends on the view of the individual and for those who are not yet born 
may depend on the view of their prospective parents who may or may not have experience of the 
condition their fetus is affected by.  The decision, therefore, as to whether an abnormality will be 
significant enough to warrant prenatal testing, or indeed termination of an affected pregnancy, should 
be dictated by those who are going to be affected by it personally.  This supports my arguments in 
chapter three where I discuss the importance of enhancing reproductive autonomy.   
 
Those who have personal experience of a condition, or who have had a previously affected child or 
family member, will obviously be well placed to fully understand the implications such a diagnosis will 
have for them and their future child.  It is essential for those with no prior experience of a disabling 
condition to be provided with the necessary information they need to be able to make an autonomous 
decision about prenatal testing and its consequences.  This will avoid decisions being made based on 
negative assumptions about a disabling condition. It should not be for those with disabilities or their 
advocates to decide when prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy should be allowed, nor should 
it be for the healthcare professionals to decide alone, particularly in the case of late terminations.  It is 
only those who will be directly affected who can truly know what impact having a disabled child will 
have and the harm this may cause to their interests.  Whilst the life of the future child should always be 
an important consideration in making these decisions, it should not be the only consideration.  The 
interests of those who are already born, and who have full moral status, should also play an important 
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part in the decision-making process, and the clinical geneticist may be well placed to ensure that this 
happens, as I will discuss in chapter six. 
 
4.2.2  Health 
As previously mentioned, when considering prenatal findings of abnormality whether this is physical, 
mental or biochemical, it is important to consider the impact this will have on the family in addition to 
the future individual.  Health and disease have a significant impact on our well-being generally and I 
will consider the harm that may arise from a condition that results in a serious disability and the affect 
this may have on that person’s interests, in addition to the interests of its parents and wider family.  In 
doing so I will consider the different accounts of health that have been put forward.    This is important 
to my discussion on reproductive autonomy as it highlights how the identification of a disability in-
utero, and the prospect of having a disabled child, may affect the lives of other autonomous people with 
their own interests. 
 
Generally the actions and interventions taken by healthcare professionals are aimed at promoting health 
and normal functioning.  In addition, doctors have a professional ethical duty to promote patient care 
and to act in the patient’s best interest.31  What is in a person’s best interests, however, can be open to 
debate and will depend on the individual circumstances and this reflects why autonomy is so important.   
I have discussed autonomy briefly in chapter one (section 1.4), and considered this further in chapter 
three (section 3.2) and specifically in relation to reproductive autonomy (section 3.6).  This reflects the 
importance of allowing those with the capacity to decide for themselves what actions may or may not 
be in their own best interests, whether or not this accords with the view of those caring for them.32  
When making decisions about whether or not to offer prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy the 
                                                     
31 General Medical Council (2013)  ‘Good Medical Practice’, GMC: London 
32 General Medical Council (2008)  ‘Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together’, GMC: London 
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health of the future individual is considered and also what harm they are likely to experience as a result 
of their disability.  Just as with defining disability, there are problems with attempting to provide a 
definitive account of what ‘health’ is.  It is also likely to mean different things to different people in a 
similar way that disability does.  For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) definition of 
health is: 
 
‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity’ (WHO Constitution 1946) 
 
This definition is very broad and does not define the meaning of disease or infirmity, or for that matter, 
social well-being.  At the time this definition was introduced it was felt to be ground breaking, 
overcoming the previous negative definitions of health as being the absence of disease.33  This definition 
of health was felt to benefit from the inclusion of physical, mental and social domains.  However, if this 
definition is to be applied to all individuals one would find that very few people could be regarded as 
truly healthy.  The word ‘complete’ in the definition would suggest that even minor ailments constitute 
a lack of health and even a minor physical abnormality could render someone impaired, despite this 
having very little impact on their day to day life or well-being.  As a result of this the definition has 
subsequently faced criticism but has never been adapted.34   
 
Most people have some physical or mental difference about them, no matter how minor, that would 
exclude them from being healthy in terms of this definition.  A person with asthma or diabetes can lead 
a fully independent life, and provided they are compliant with the appropriate treatment and have a 
                                                     
33 Huber M (2011) ‘How should we define health?’, British Medical Journal 343, d 4163 (www.bmj.com as cited 
on 7 June 2013) 
34 Larson JS (1999) ‘The conceptualization of health’, Medical Care Research & Review 56, pp 123-136 
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‘healthy lifestyle’ they may not be bothered by their condition at all.    The current WHO definition 
could result in the threshold as to who could be described as disabled being lowered and it could 
encourage medical intervention or screening of ‘conditions’ that in reality are not of any real 
significance.  With an increasingly aging population and better treatments allowing those who may once 
have not survived live longer, there will be more and more people who fall foul of this definition.   
 
A further consideration with regards to this definition is that with health comes social well-being.  A 
person can be physically and mentally healthy but may be in a difficult social situation.  For example, 
they may have good physical health but be financially insecure or in an abusive relationship. They may 
have a lonely existence which may then have a negative impact on their interaction with society.  
Similarly, a person with a medical condition can still have social well-being and a good support network 
despite their illness.  Social well-being may be influenced by unemployment rather than an illness and, 
therefore, arguably ‘unemployment’ would be a health problem resulting in the risk of living in poverty 
or feeling excluded from society and one’s peers.  As well as considering the physical and mental health 
of the future person the fetus will become it is also important to consider these other factors which are 
likely to be influenced by the prospective parents and the type of life the future child will be born into. 
 
Due to the criticism that the WHO definition has faced others have put forward their own theory of 
what health is.  Bircher has described health as ‘a dynamic state of well-being characterised by a 
physical and mental potential, which satisfies the demands of life commensurate with age, culture and 
personal responsibility.’35  For the purposes of my thesis this definition has its advantages as it takes 
into account other variables as well as the physical and mental components of health.  These other 
variables may be influenced by an individual’s own belief systems, aspirations and interests and, 
                                                     
35 Bircher J (2005) ‘Towards a dynamic definition of health and disease’, Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy 8, pp 335-341 
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therefore, what one person may consider to impair their health, another may not.  These differences in 
perceptions of health highlight the importance of encouraging deliberation and autonomous decision-
making and support the arguments I made in relation to reproductive autonomy in chapter three.   
 
It is important to consider these concepts of health and disease when considering the ethical issues that 
accompany decisions made by healthcare professionals and parents when contemplating the use of 
prenatal testing.  The concepts have a profound effect on medical practice and the formation of health 
care policy, including the provision of prenatal testing and screening.  Whether or not a condition is 
considered to be a disease will affect whether or not funding is available for treatment or screening and 
whether preventative measures are taken to limit the condition or reduce its effects, as healthcare 
services aim to keep people close to normal functioning and preserve their ability to participate in 
society.36  With respect to prenatal testing, what one person may consider being a disease for which 
they would want testing, another person may not.  Different people will have different perceptions of 
what harm a condition may cause and this in turn is likely to influence their reproductive decisions.  It 
is for these reasons that when making decisions about offering prenatal testing and subsequent abortion 
healthcare professionals engage with the prospective parents throughout the entire process, particularly 
where late termination of pregnancy is being considered.  Consideration needs to be made as to what 
health means to them and how the existence of a disability is going to impact on the future child’s life 
within the parameters of that particular family.  The impact it is going to have on the health and well-
being of the parents and pre-existing children needs to be considered, taking their own personal 
circumstances into account. 
 
 
                                                     
36 Daniels N (2001) ‘Justice, Health and Healthcare’, The American Journal of bioethics 1(2), pp 2-16 
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4.2.2.i  Theories of health 
Debate about the concept of disease has led to the idea of health being a natural concept or alternatively 
a normative concept concerning the role of values.  These theories of health include Naturalists37 who 
believe that whether or not a person is healthy depends upon biological or physiological factors and 
then those who argue that health is a ‘normative’ or ‘evaluative’ issue.38  In the latter case health and 
disease are regarded as concepts of ‘welfare’ or ‘well-being’.  
 
Normativists consider health and disease to be at least partly socially constructed and value laden.39  If 
a person is ill they conclude that they have a condition that is harmful to them and they define disease 
in terms of harm.  This theory is important when considering prenatal testing as it takes into account 
what will enable us to lead a good or worthwhile life.  It considers a person’s interests and how someone 
can be made worse off by having these interests impaired.40  This means that rather than a disease or 
abnormality itself being considered harmful it takes into account how that disease or abnormality may 
affect the individual concerned.  Being colour blind may be considered to cause harm to a person by 
preventing them from fulfilling their ambition of becoming a pilot, thus harming their interests, whereas 
it may be of no consequence to another person whose inability to distinguish between certain colours 
does not cause them any disadvantage.  This then allows consideration to be made of the effect that a 
condition has on the subject, rather than assuming something is harmful because it prevents completely 
normal functioning.  It takes into account whether that functioning really matters to the subject.   As 
Reznek puts it ‘Harm only consists in the malfunction of systems worth having, or the frustration of 
worthwhile pleasures, or the frustration of worthwhile desires’.41  This is important when we consider 
                                                     
37  Boorse C (1975) ‘On the distinction between disease and illness’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 5, pp 49-68 
38 Engelhardt H T Jr (1975) ‘The concepts of health and disease’ in Engelhardt Jr HT, SF Spicker (eds) Evaluation 
and Explanation in Biomedical Sciences, Dordrecht: D Reidel, pp 125-141 
39 Hamilton RP (2010) ‘The concept of health: beyond normativism and naturalism’, Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 16(2), PP 323-329 
40 Van Hooft S (1997) ‘Disease and subjectivity’ in JM Humber, RF Almeder (eds) Biomedical Ethics Review: 
What is disease?, Springer Science + Business Media LLC, New York, p 295 
41 Reznek L (1987) The Nature of disease, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London and New York, p 152 
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prenatal testing.  Consideration needs to be made as to how that individual future child will be affected 
by that particular impairment and potential disability.  Whilst the specific abnormality and the disability 
that it is known to cause would need to be taken into account (which may be based on the lives of those 
living with such disability) emphasis needs to be placed on the circumstances of the individual and how 
it will affect them specifically.  However, whilst healthcare professionals give consideration to the 
future child it is also important to consider the impact of the disability on the prospective parents and 
other close family members.  The existence of this child will inevitably impact on their interests too, 
with the potential to cause them harm.  If the interests of the fetus, who does not yet have full moral 
status, are to be considered then so too should the interests of those already in existence, who do have 
full moral status. 
 
Naturalists view the concepts of health and disease as being objective and value free rather than being 
socially constructed.42  For example, a Naturalist would argue that whether an organ was diseased or 
healthy is an objective opinion, for example, made by a doctor.  Whether or not this diseased state is of 
value is a completely separate matter.43  Boorse has written extensively on this issue and defends the 
Naturalist position, emphasising the importance of function.44,45,46,47 Boorse discusses the more 
biological theory of health, where health is a scientific concept rather than a moral one.  In this theory 
health equals the absence of disease and disease is any condition that causes an organism, or part of it, 
to function below ‘normal’.48  This takes into account the age and gender of a species when considering 
what normal function is, but limiting this theory is the fact that it only considers normal function in 
relation to individual survival and reproduction.  This would mean that a person who could not have 
                                                     
42 Kovacs J (1998) ‘The concept of health and disease’, Medicine, Health care and Philosophy 1, pp 31-39 
43 Ruse M (1997) ‘Defining disease: The question of sexual orientation’ in Humber JM, Almeder RF (eds) What 
is disease?, Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, New York, 1997,  p 147 
44 Boorse C (1987) ‘Concepts of health’ in Van De Veer D, Regan T (eds) Health Care Ethics:  An introduction, 
Philadelphia, pp 359-393 
45 Boorse C (1976) ‘What a theory of mental health should be’, Journal of the theory of social behavior 6(1), pp 
61-84 
46 Boorse C (1977)  ‘Health as a theoretical concept’, Philosophy and Science 44(4), pp 542-573 
47 Boorse C (1975) ‘On the distinction between disease and illness’, Philosophy and public affairs 5(1), pp 49-68 
48 Boorse C (1975) ‘On the distinction between disease and illness’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 5(1), pp 49-68 
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children for some biological reason would be regarded as having a disease.49  If that person, however, 
had never wanted children and, therefore, the biological reason for their infertility was irrelevant it is 
then difficult to conclude that this has harmed them.  In fact a person may never be aware of this 
biological dysfunction if they never tried to have children and therefore would never be regarded as 
unhealthy. 
 
As well as considering what it is to be healthy it is also important to consider what constitutes disability 
and whether this results in harm.  From a Normativist point of view this would depend on whether the 
interests of that person had been impaired by the condition that results in the disability.  With regards 
to prenatal testing and the decisions about the fetus that may follow, I agree with this theory as it takes 
into account how the physical abnormality found within the fetus may affect its future interests, and 
also how it may affect the current and future interests of those directly affected who have full moral 
status.  It doesn’t assume that impairment will inevitably result in a disability or harm. 
 
It is clear that different approaches can offer very different accounts of health and disease and it is 
important to establish which one is most pertinent to my argument that prenatal testing does not 
discriminate against those with disabilities. I have agreed with Reznek’s view of harm and the 
Normativist theory of health in that harm occurs when the interests of an individual are interfered with, 
and harm is therefore at least partly subjective.  A condition that is classified as a disease due to, for 
example, loss of the functioning of an organ, body system or a metabolic pathway may not necessarily 
result in harm to the individual.  It would very much depend on how the disease process affected that 
individual’s interests and desires and this would therefore be different for different people.  Arguably 
the difficulty faced, however, is that with regard to prenatal testing it is a future person that is being 
                                                     
49 The WHO has recently classified infertility as a disability according to their website www.who.int Infertility 
definitions and terminology (as cited on 28 October 2016) and reported in the Daily Express ‘Failure to find a 
sexual partner is now a DISABILITY says World Health Organisation’ 24 October 2016 
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considered and, therefore, one which has limited interests.  When parents make decisions about their 
unborn child they do not know what specific interests that child will have and how their congenital 
abnormality may affect them personally, or whether it will cause them harm.  It is necessary, therefore, 
to make decisions on behalf of the fetus and this is similar to the way in which parents make decisions 
on behalf of young children who do not have the capacity to make decisions for themselves.  There are, 
however, interests that generally all human beings share.  We have an interest not to be in pain or to be 
suffering and we have an interest in perceiving and experiencing pleasure. An abnormality that 
interferes with these interests therefore may be one that parents would opt to have testing for so that the 
harm to these interests can be avoided.  This may either be by termination of the affected pregnancy, 
thus preventing that child’s existence at all, or if possible, by treating the condition in-utero or 
immediately after birth. 
 
As prenatal testing results in the provision of information about a future person I would like now to 
address the issue of harm in relation to whether or not a future person, who is found to have an 
impairment once prenatal testing has been performed, can be harmed by being brought into existence.  
On the face of it, it would appear that the answer would be in the affirmative depending on the severity 
of the abnormality found.  If the pregnancy continues and one assumes that the impairment will cause 
significant pain and suffering the future person would be harmed by being born.  This intuitive response 
reflects the views of Harris50 and Savulescu51 who argue that there is a moral obligation to bring to 
existence the best children we possibly can.  They do this from society’s perspective and from the point 
of view the negative effect having a disability has on the world generally.  Harris also talks of ‘the 
wrong of bringing avoidable suffering into the world’.52  However, one needs to consider that this person 
                                                     
50 Harris J (1985) The value of life: An introduction to medical ethics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp 
146-149 
51 Savulescu J (2001) ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why we should select the best children’, Bioethics 15 (5/6), pp 
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52 Harris J (1998) Clones, Genes and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution, Oxford University Press, 
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was never going to be born without a disability.  The options for this person were to be born with a 
disability or not to be born at all.   
 
The question, therefore, is whether the future person is better off being born with the disability as 
opposed to not being born or coming into existence at all.53  This may depend on the severity of the 
disability but may apply to other fetuses that have no disability.  A child with a significant mental or 
physical impairment could be born into a loving supportive environment and be given all that he or she 
should need in the form of emotional and welfare support.  Despite the disability the child will be 
offered the best life that it is possible for them to have.  On the other hand, a child with no such disability 
could be born following an unwanted pregnancy into a life of poverty and abuse and feel that their life 
is so terrible as to be not worth living.  This person has arguably been worse off than the loved and 
nourished child with a disability.  It is for these reasons that it is necessary to not only consider the 
physical or mental disability that may result from the abnormalities found in the fetus, but to also 
consider the wider implications and the circumstances in which the future child will be born.  This 
information also needs to be sought by healthcare professionals when considering whether or not 
prenatal testing and, more significantly, termination of pregnancy should be made available on the basis 
of fetal abnormality.  Fetuses with the same abnormality, but born into different circumstances, may 
have very different experiences, as may their families whose interests also need to be taken into account. 
 
As there is a potential for prospective parents to request a termination of pregnancy due to the discovery 
of a fetal anomaly consideration needs to be made as to how this anomaly is going to cause harm.  This 
is harm not only to the future child but also to those who will be directly affected by it, such as the 
parents and pre-existing children.  The disability or physical anomaly should not necessarily be 
considered in isolation with regards to the fetus alone or based only on how the anomaly has impacted 
                                                     
53 Parfit D (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, p 356 
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on similarly affected individuals, as experiences vary between different people and different families.  
In view of the fact that harm can be caused to others decisions are better made based on how they will 
affect all of the subjects involved, taking into account their views, needs, interests and their own 
personal circumstances and how these may be harmed.  
 
4.3  When death or non-existence may be a preferable option 
In this section I only consider the impact of a disability on the future person when deciding whether or 
not prenatal testing and termination are justifiable and leave aside the impact on other family members.  
In considering the future person only we need to think about how the disability is going to affect them 
and whether or not its effects will result in a life that is so blighted by pain and suffering that it would 
be better not to have continued. This is something that those healthcare professionals working in fetal 
management consider when discussing the appropriateness of offering testing and more importantly 
when making the difficult decision as to whether they will sanction a late termination of pregnancy 
based on fetal abnormality.54 
 
Buchanan et al describe a life that is not worth living as one which is not just worse than the lives of 
most other people, or a life with substantial burdens, but from the perspective of the person whose life 
it is so burdensome and without any benefits to compensate for this as to make death a preferable 
option.55  How this is qualified in reality is very difficult.56  Having a disability does not necessarily 
mean that a person’s life will not be worth living and what worth a life has is very subjective and will 
                                                     
54 Royal College of Obstetrics & Gynaecology (2010) Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnormality in 
England and Wales: Report of a working party, London: RGOG, pp 8-10 
55 Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D (2000), From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice, Cambridge 
University Press, p 224 
56
 There are certain examples of extreme disorders and diseases that are often referred to in the literature, such 
as Tay Sachs disease, where the short and terrible life of the individual would be so bad as to make the concept 
of a life worth living meaningless in such a context. I acknowledge that there may be some very extreme cases 
but that many other cases will be much more difficult to judge.  
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not only relate to a person’s physical or mental well-being but also financial and emotional well-being, 
amongst other things.  Many people with disabilities have very rewarding and fulfilling lives 
contributing much to society and in some cases much more than their non-disabled counterparts.  
Positive accounts from those living with disabilities reinforce the arguments put forward by those 
representing disabled people that oppose prenatal testing as devaluing the lives of people with 
disabilities. These accounts are very persuasive and rightly raise the question as to whether or not the 
presence of disability is a good enough reason to seek out abnormalities in the antenatal period, with 
the possibility of ending a pregnancy which is shown to have some form of mental or physical 
difference.  These accounts, however, may not be representative.  Some of those whose opinions and 
views are put forward in support of the disability argument are those who have positive life 
experiences57 and, therefore, whilst important, these views may have only limited value.  This is an 
issue which I discuss in more detail in chapter five (section 5.3) in arguing that prenatal testing does 
not discriminate against those with disabilities.  The other concern is that positive life experiences that 
are put forward by those who have the intellectual capacity to do so.  Those with disabilities who argue 
against prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy are therefore a selective group, and what we often 
do not have the benefit of is the views of those who do not survive long enough, or those who do not 
have the necessary mental capacity, to put their views forward. For these individuals the only views we 
are able to obtain are those of the people who care for them, such as the healthcare professionals, parents 
and other family members.  Healthcare professionals may be able to provide objective information and 
clinical evidence to inform decisions about whether or not a life may be worthwhile.  Parents on the 
other hand, and those close to the disabled person, are better placed to give subjective views and hence 
judgements on the quality of life of their loved one and, importantly, how it has also affected their own 
life and interests and what harm they may have come to as a result of having a severely disabled member 
of their family. 
 
                                                     
57 Wilkinson M (2009) Defying disability: The lives and legacies of nine disabled leaders, London: Kingsley, pp 
79-98 
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Feinberg58 acknowledges that there are those people in adult life who, due to their personal 
circumstances, feel that they would be better off dead.  In doing so they are not suggesting that ‘non-
existence’ is another option along with true existence as a living person but that not to exist is preferable 
to the life they are experiencing.59  Similarly, there may be situations where views may be expressed 
that a neonate, by reason of its severely anomalous congenital mental or physical condition, would be 
better off not having been born.  Non-existence is felt to be preferable to the life the person is going to 
have if they are born, and in these cases any medical treatment may be withheld.   
 
The fact that there are people, however, who are willing to end their lives or argue that they should 
never have been born due to the physical effects a medical condition may have on them, provides 
evidence to support the fact that sometimes life can be so unbearable that it is better not to exist.  Those 
who are able to end their own lives make this decision themselves based on the harm their condition is 
causing to their own interests.  However, decisions to discontinue the life of a fetus and prevent the 
existence of the future child can only be authorised by third parties.  In order to ensure that these 
decisions are made appropriately all parties need to be sufficiently informed about the potential harms 
or benefits that continuing the pregnancy may have for the future child and those with full moral status 
who already exist and will be personally affected.60  These need to be deliberative discussions which 
focus not only on the clinical findings and difficulties that may subsequently arise but also the positive 
aspects of having this child.  The prospective parents need to have an opportunity to properly consider 
what life would be like in view of the disability, not only from the perspective of the healthcare 
professionals but also from those with such a disability and those who have cared for them or grown up 
                                                     
58 Feinberg J (1992) Freedom and fulfilment, Princeton University Press, p 17 
59 Feinberg J (1987)  ‘Wrongful life and the counterfactual element in harming’, Social Philosophy and Policy 
4(1), pp 145-178 
60 A more controversial view is that of David Benatar.  In response to Feinberg, Benatar argues that to consider 
whether or not a life is worth starting, in other words a future life, is very different to considering whether a life 
is worth continuing or not, that is a present life.  Benatar’s problem with this is that judgements are being made 
about a future life based on the standards of a present life.  As Benatar points out the threshold for both can be 
very different. 
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with them, and whose interests may also have been affected either negatively or, just as importantly, 
positively.   
 
If a congenital abnormality is identified in pregnancy, whether or not it is compatible with life or even 
a life that despite the abnormality has value, parents may choose to have that pregnancy terminated.  
However, an adult with that same abnormality, for example an absent limb, is unlikely to feel that 
ceasing to exist would be preferable to continuing their life without their limb.  It is likely, depending 
on the circumstances, that they have got on with life reasonably well despite this.  This takes us back to 
the subject of the moral status of the fetus which I considered in chapter 2 (section 2.3), and the fact 
that one cannot compare ending the life of a fetus with that of an adult, who has full moral status.  
 
Some argue that after delivery a person has full moral status,61 in addition to full legal worth.  Euthanasia 
is not legally permitted in the UK.  Prior to birth, however, debate continues as to when the conceptus, 
embryo or fetus becomes a moral agent; arguments that I will not repeat here.62,63 There is an 
acknowledgement in the Abortion Act that thresholds should be different depending on development or 
gestation of the fetus.  According to the Act congenital abnormalities that are not deemed to be severe 
enough (although severity is not defined by the Act) in the opinion of two medical professionals cannot 
be used as a reason to terminate a pregnancy after twenty-four weeks of gestation.  An absent limb, for 
example, is unlikely to fall into this category of allowing a late abortion, whereas a condition that 
resulted in severe mental handicap or a severe life limiting condition such as Thanatophoric Dysplasia64 
would.  The justification for a late termination of a pregnancy for those conditions that are deemed to 
                                                     
61 Finnis J (2013) ‘Capacity, harm and experience in the life of persons as equals’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
39(5), pp 281-283 
62 Jones D (2001) ‘A theologian’s brief: on the place of the human embryo within the Christian tradition and the 
theological principles for evaluating its moral status’, Ethics & Medicine 17(3), pp 143-153 
63 Jensen D ‘Birth, meaningful viability and abortion’, Journal of Medical Ethics 41, pp 460-463 
64 Thanatophoric Dysplasia is a form of severe dwarfism resulting from a gene defect.  The rib cage is so badly 
affected that the lungs cannot develop in-utero.  The vast majority of affected pregnancies result in death in-utero.  
In others death generally occurs at or very soon after birth. 
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be severe enough is based on information and judgements made largely by medical professionals who 
have clinical knowledge of such conditions.   There are, therefore, those abnormalities that are not felt 
to justify preventing the future person from existing, just as there are those conditions that do not justify 
an existing person with a present life from wanting it to cease.  What healthcare professionals do not 
tend to take into account is the impact that specific abnormality or condition will have on the future 
child when born into the circumstances that it will find itself, or the impact on other close family 
members.  As I will discuss in chapter six my concern is that rather than considering that individual 
future child it is the specific abnormality or abnormalities and the disabling condition that it may lead 
to, and what is known about this clinically, that informs the decision as to whether a termination on the 
basis of severe disability should be allowed.   
 
For those adult individuals who feel that their life is not worth living65 death may be preferable to 
existing due to their own personal circumstances.  The fetus cannot consider this option itself and, 
therefore, this is done on its behalf based on the life they are expected to have. There are those who, all 
things considered, would prefer not to exist at all as evidenced by the fact that euthanasia is available 
in some countries and is used by those who no longer wish to live.  These individuals provide evidence 
to support the view that non-existence can in fact be preferable to living if the view is that the life that 
exists is not worth living and death is a preferable option. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
65 Feinberg J (1987)  ‘Wrongful life and the counterfactual element in harming’, Social Philosophy and Policy 
4(1), pp 145-178 
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4.4 Other reasons to support prenatal testing –  
minimising disability after birth 
Although termination of pregnancy is one outcome following prenatal testing it is not the only outcome. 
Prenatal testing can bring benefits to the prospective child and their family, whose interests may also 
be affected, by preventing or limiting disability.  This can occur without terminating the life of the fetus 
just as medical interventions after birth can assist those already living with disability, and thus both may 
improve the lives of disabled people.  Prenatal testing in this context therefore does not discriminate 
against those living with disabilities, just as treatment after birth is not considered to be discriminatory.66   
 
Opposition to prenatal testing is due to the possibility of termination of pregnancy being a consequence 
of finding a congenital abnormality, thus preventing a disabled person being born.  Those representing 
disabled people argue that reproductive selection to terminate future children with abnormalities sets 
an agenda for devaluing those with disabilities, particularly if this is due to a condition that is not 
amenable to treatment.67  Prenatal testing itself, however, can provide information that may result in 
other outcomes that may be of benefit not only to the parents but the future child themselves. Had 
prenatal testing not taken place in these cases a child would have been born with a disability that could 
otherwise have been limited or avoided altogether. Without prenatal testing, therefore, as well as the 
child being denied the opportunity of being born without an abnormality, or at least a less severe one, 
by being denied the benefits which in-utero treatment can bring, avoidance of harm to the interests of 
the wider family would also have been prevented.  In this section I will consider what benefits prenatal 
testing can provide in terms of avoiding or minimising disability in the future person. I argue that 
prospective parents should not be denied the opportunity to gain information about their pregnancy that 
                                                     
66 I acknowledge that there is debate over the use of Cochlear implants in Deaf people who do not regard 
deafness as a disability and not something that needs to be treated.   
67 Saxton M (2013) ‘Disability Rights and Selective Abortion’ in David LJ (ed) The Disability Studies Reader, 
Routledge, pp 87-90 
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can in turn deny them the opportunity to prevent congenital anomalies from harming the future child 
and from making autonomous decisions in relation to reproduction.   
 
Prenatal testing can avoid or limit disability where an abnormality is identified in a developing fetus for 
which it may be possible to treat in-utero and consequently result in a healthy baby with little or no 
residual disability.  Alternatively, testing could provide vital information to allow the birth to take place 
in an appropriate obstetric or surgical environment so that treatment can be provided at birth to minimise 
any immediate or ongoing risk to the child.  Diagnosis of a diaphragmatic hernia,68 for example, picked 
up on antenatal scan could allow appropriate specialised resuscitation to be given at birth rather than 
standard resuscitation techniques that could be potentially be harmful to a neonate with this particular 
type of abnormality.  A metabolic condition diagnosed antenatally by genetic or metabolic testing could 
be treated immediately after birth to prevent significant neurological damage or the pregnant woman 
could amend her diet during the pregnancy to minimise the effects of the condition on the fetus.  
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia is a recessive genetic condition which results in ambiguous genitalia 
and in a male fetus can cause a life threatening electrolyte disturbance and dehydration if not detected 
early.  Identifying this condition during pregnancy provides the woman with the opportunity to take 
steroids resulting in a significantly reduced possibility of the phenotype developing.  These examples 
support the use of prenatal testing in the best interests of the fetus and future person and the additional 
benefit of avoiding costly ongoing treatment that would be necessary had any of these conditions been 
present after delivery.    
 
Giving parents the opportunity to have prenatal testing under these types of circumstances not only 
protects the interests of the fetus but also the interests of the parents and other family members.  
Intervention may be possible that prevents or reduces harm to the fetus by reducing the impact of the 
                                                     
68 Diaphragmatic hernia occurs where the diaphragm does not development properly allowing the abdominal 
contents to herniate into the thorax thus preventing normal lung expansion at birth.  Normal resuscitation 
techniques are ineffective putting the neonate at risk of anoxia and neurological damage. 
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disability on their future life and by reducing or preventing pain and suffering that they may otherwise 
have experienced. The parents and wider family experience less harm in that their own interests have 
been preserved.  The parents will not have to face the emotional distress and financial burdens of raising 
a disabled child (or experiencing its shortened survival) and the lives of other children in the family will 
not be impacted upon by having a sibling with a disability.   
 
Following prenatal testing and intervention the same person will be born who would have been if this 
had not taken place.  Prenatal testing in these circumstances, as opposed to it being followed by abortion, 
will result in the birth of a person whose personal identity remains unchanged.  Rather than comparing 
life with non-existence we are comparing life with a disability, in the absence of prenatal testing, and a 
life without disability after prenatal testing and when appropriate intervention has taken place.  Harm 
has been reduced or avoided and as a consequence the same individual has benefitted from prenatal 
testing being performed. 
 
Whilst this highlights the potential benefits of prenatal testing inevitably not all prospective parents are 
going to be in a position where the abnormality identified in their pregnancy is amenable to treatment.  
Some are going to be faced with the fact that the abnormality that has been found cannot be treated and 
if the condition is compatible with an ongoing pregnancy their child will be born with an impairment 
which may or may not result in disability.  Again, genetic counselling and input from other healthcare 
professionals or families of affected children may have some influence on what the parents may decide. 
The decision to terminate that pregnancy is only one option.   
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Prenatal diagnosis of a condition may benefit the future child in other ways.  A child with a 
chromosomal abnormality, for example Kleinfelter’s syndrome,69 can have a much better outcome if it 
is identified in the antenatal period rather than as an adult when it is often diagnosed incidentally during 
investigations for infertility.  If a child is known to have this chromosomal change intervention can be 
taken early from an educational point of view to allow them to reach their full potential.  Testosterone 
therapy can begin at a prescribed time to allow appropriate development of male secondary sexual 
characteristics and aid fertility.70  Similarly, in another sex chromosome abnormality, 47XYY 
syndrome, a male has an additional Y chromosome.  There is empirical evidence to show that men with 
this additional chromosome have behavioural and intellectual difficulties.71  If this is detected in-utero 
allowance can be made with regard to the child’s behaviour and support given to the family and child 
to minimise this and improve behaviour and educational attainment.  This is another example of prenatal 
testing providing an opportunity to improve the quality of life of a child who, without it, would have 
been unaware of why they had been faced with the challenges that they had in life, and therefore 
promoting their interests.  
 
Even where treatment is not available being aware of an abnormality in the child before birth will also 
allow expectant parents and other family members, such as siblings, to prepare themselves emotionally, 
practically and financially for the arrival of a child who may have special requirements.  Similarly, if 
the fetus is diagnosed with a life limiting condition in-utero, rather than the time spent immediately 
after the birth being marred by intrusive and painful investigations in an attempt to establish why the 
neonate is unwell, it can be used more appropriately to allow the family to spend quality time with the 
                                                     
69 Kleinfelter’s syndrome is caused by an additional X chromosome in a male fetus (47XXY).  Males born with 
this condition have low levels of testosterone and fertility problems.  They may also suffer from osteoporosis and 
have some mild learning difficulties. 
70 Lanfranco F, Kamischke A, Zitzmann M, Nieschlag E (2004)  ‘Kleinfelter’s syndrome’, The Lancet 364 (9430), 
pp 273-283 
71 Baker D, Telfer MA, Richardson CE, Clark GR (1970)  ‘Chromosome errors in men with antisocial behavior: 
Comparison of selected men with Kleinfelter’s syndrome and XYY chromosome patterns’, The Journal of the 
American Medical Association 214(5), pp 869-878   
  
147 
child and possibly take the child home to die in a dignified way, preventing a clinical death in hospital.72  
This type of scenario is one that is not taken into account by the social model of disability or by those 
opposing prenatal testing.    No amount of social or environmental change could avoid this outcome.  If 
testing does not take place the child will not survive but may have been exposed to medical interventions 
that are ultimately futile.  The child may have suffered as a result of this and have been harmed, despite 
the best intentions of those caring for them.  No doubt the parents and wider family would also have 
suffered emotionally.  No benefit will have been gained and resources that could have been used more 
appropriately by others have been wasted. 
 
Not having had prenatal testing under these circumstances would not cause the harm (the impairment) 
from occurring but it would not have allowed the harm to be at least minimised. Although the positive 
aspects of prenatal testing are therefore clear from the point of view of the treatment options and benefits 
it can bring, this does not address the concerns raised by those representing disabled people.  Prenatal 
testing, as well as bringing the benefits I have described, does in other cases lead to termination of 
pregnancy and therefore the arguments relating to discrimination still exist.  Representatives of disabled 
people could argue that prenatal testing could be permissible but only if it did not lead to abortion.  It 
seems implausible to enact such a policy and may be rebuttable as an ethical position in itself.  It is 
difficult to see how a policy, which may promote prenatal testing so that treatable conditions can be 
identified, can also limit parental choice for those pregnancies where an untreatable condition is 
diagnosed.  I have argued in chapter two that the fetus does not have full moral status and, therefore, 
terminating a pregnancy cannot be compared with ending the life of a person with a disability.  I have 
also argued for the overwhelming importance of reproductive autonomy in chapter three.  Taking both 
of these arguments into account in addition to the harms that can be caused to others, such as the 
                                                     
72 Testing in the neonatal period could have been performed, such as Whole Genome Sequencing, to establish a 
reason why the child had been born with an abnormality but this would not have allowed the parents or doctors 
to be prepared before the birth.  Prior to the neonatal result being available the baby may have been subject to 
intensive medical intervention before a diagnosis was established.  In circumstances where such treatment is 
futile and this information is known before birth, this intervention can be avoided in the immediate postnatal 
period and the family can be left to spend quality time with their child. 
  
148 
prospective parents, and potential benefits prenatal testing can bring, I argue that prenatal testing is 
ethically preferable even if it does lead to some terminations and their concomitant potential for 
disability groups to argue that this is discriminatory.  I will discuss the concerns about the discriminatory 
nature of prenatal testing further in chapter five. 
 
4.5  Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I have discussed the models of disability and have identified that these models do not 
offer assistance when considering disability and prenatal testing.  The medical model does not take 
into account those who have impairments but are not affected in any significant way by them or 
those who have an impairment or loss of functioning that can easily be overcome providing society 
responds to their needs.  The social model, which is advocated by those with disabilities, does not 
take into account those people who are so severely affected by their impairments that any amount of 
social modification cannot remove or diminish their disability. 
 
I have discussed the complex issue of harm and whether or not an affected fetus can be harmed by 
being brought into existence.  I have agreed with the Normativist view with regards to harm in that 
it is at least partly subjective. Harm should be considered with respect to the implications it has on 
a person’s interests, rather than the physical or mental abnormality itself which may be of no, or 
very little, significance.  I have concluded that whilst a fetus with a congenital abnormality could 
only ever either not exist or exist with a disability (the third option of living without disability not 
being available) there are circumstances where the life of the future child may be so affected by pain 
and suffering that termination of that pregnancy and, therefore, non-existence may be preferable.  In 
taking these issues into account it is important to reflect back on the relevance of reproductive 
autonomy and allowing those whose interests are going to be affected by the birth of a disabled child 
to take precedence. 
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There is often the assumption that prenatal testing will inevitably lead to abortion.  I have provided clear 
examples where this can be avoided and where, in fact, prenatal testing can bring advantages and 
benefits to the fetus and family.  This may be by treating the condition prior to or immediately after 
birth or by allowing conditions to be identified so that behaviour toward the future child and adult can 
be modified so that the consequences of the condition are reduced.  Prenatal testing with the 
identification of a genetic condition gives parents the opportunity to gain information from those who 
are in a position of knowledge and able to help them decide whether they personally can cope with what 
the future holds.  In addition to my arguments about reproductive autonomy in chapter three, I have 
discussed why it is the parents and those who would be close to the affected child if it were born who 
are best placed to make decisions after prenatal testing has taken place.  I have discussed the 
implications of disability with respect to harm to the interests of the fetus and other third parties and 
how this can only be truly determined by those directly affected, supporting my arguments for 
reproductive autonomy.  In order to ensure that these interests are considered during the decision-
making process, particularly by the doctors whose role it is to establish the justification for late 
termination, it is important for constructive dialogue to take place between all parties, including the 
prospective parents.  As the clinical geneticist is involved with the prospective parents from an early 
stage in the process they will be well placed to establish a supportive relationship with them and be in 
a position to put their views forward during discussions about fetal management.  I will discuss this 
further in chapter six.  In the chapter that follows I will review the representations that are made by, and 
on behalf of, those living with disabilities and the concerns that they have that prenatal testing, where 
it is followed by selective termination, is discriminatory and the implications this may have for disabled 
people.  I will use my arguments in relation to the moral status of the fetus in chapter two and 
reproductive autonomy in chapter three to support my view that prenatal testing does not promote 
discriminatory attitudes towards disabled people or disability. 
 
 
  
150 
Chapter 5 
 
Responding to disability discrimination arguments 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In July 2013 abortion on the grounds of disability was subject to a parliamentary inquiry.  The 
report that followed stated that ‘The vast majority of those who gave written evidence believe that 
allowing abortion up to birth on the grounds of disability is discriminatory’.1  The inquiry heard 
views and opinions from a number of groups including healthcare professionals, disability support 
groups, parents of disabled children and those who had been through the experience of prenatal 
testing.  Therefore clinical geneticists, as well as satisfying themselves that abortion is not morally 
wrong, also need to satisfy themselves that abortion on the basis of fetal abnormality is not 
discriminating against those with disabilities. 
 
In chapter two, I discussed the arguments around the moral status of the fetus, particularly in 
relation to discrimination towards the disabled fetus and the fact that abortion on the basis of 
disability is permitted up to birth if this is felt to be serious enough.  There are those who argue that 
ending the life of a fetus due to it being affected by an anomaly that is likely to cause disability 
discriminates against those already living with disabilities.2  However, I argued that the fetus does 
not have full moral status whereas a person living with a disability does and, therefore, terminating 
the life of any fetus, whether disabled or not, cannot be compared to ending the life of a person who 
is already in existence.   
                                                     
1 Parliamentary Inquiry into Abortion on the Grounds of Disability (2013)  (www.abortionanddisability.org 
as cited on 17 September 2015) 
2 Gillott J (2001) ‘Screening for disability: a eugenic pursuit?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 27, pp ii21-ii23 
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I also discussed the argument that the fetus itself (regardless of whether it has the same moral status 
as a living person), if disabled is discriminated against as compared to a non-disabled fetus, due to 
the fact that termination of a pregnancy affected by a severe abnormality can take place up to birth, 
whereas termination of a pregnancy where no condition has been identified in the fetus cannot take 
place beyond twenty-four weeks.3  Relevant legislation therefore uses the point of viability of the 
fetus (24 weeks) as a limiting factor for terminating a pregnancy where the fetus is not affected by 
a serious congenital condition.  In chapter two, I identified the inherent problems with this 
legislation with respect to the implications it has for being discriminatory against those with 
disabilities.  As well as their own ethical views and considerations, specialists in fetal management 
will rely on the legislation to influence and inform their decision-making when considering whether 
or not a late termination of pregnancy on the basis of severe disability is justifiable.  It is important 
for specialists to make their decision not only in response to the legislation, but also to be able to 
justify their decision morally and ethically.  Not being able to do so may make them vulnerable to 
the criticisms of those representing disabled people.  My arguments in support of prenatal testing, 
particularly where it leads to late termination of pregnancy, reinforce the fact that doctors working 
in this area need to carefully consider the decisions they are making and ensuring that prospective 
parents feature heavily in the process. 
 
On the face of it late termination of pregnancy due to severe disability does suggest that a disabled 
fetus has less worth, as its life can be ended at any point during gestation, whereas the non-disabled 
fetus is protected once it reaches twenty-four weeks.  This arguably expresses discriminatory 
attitudes towards disability.  However, in response to this I argued in chapter two (section 2.3) that 
the decision to terminate the pregnancy of a disabled fetus is not based on this fetus having a lower 
moral status to that of an non-disabled fetus but is based on the predicted quality of life the future 
                                                     
3 Abortion Act (1967), HMSO: London, section 1(d) 
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child may have and the harm it, and those directly affected by it, may suffer.  This led to my 
discussion in chapter three about the need for those who would be directly affected by the birth of 
the disabled child to make decisions for themselves and for their reproductive autonomy to be 
respected.  I have discussed the concepts of harm toward the future child and to those who are 
directly affected by its birth in chapter four (section 4.2.2i).   
 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on those disability rights arguments which object to prenatal 
testing and selective termination of pregnancy on the grounds that it discriminates against those 
people with disabilities.4 Here, discrimination is said to occur when one group of people (non-
disabled), assume what the life of another group (disabled) must be like and assume that if their 
lives are not like theirs, they are disadvantaged in some way.5  Discrimination can also be regarded 
as making judgements about people purely based on a particular group they are a member of which 
is seen as inferior by society,6 and where people are denied equal opportunities.7 
 
I agree with these definitions in that assumptions are often made about the way in which impairment 
affects a person’s life.  There is a danger of non-disabled people comparing their own lives with 
that of a disabled person and assuming it is less worthwhile than their own because there are 
inevitably things that a disabled person may not be able to do, despite modifications to society.  
However, this in itself should not devalue a person or suggest that their life has lower value.  People 
adapt to the situation they are in and may compensate in different ways.  If someone has never been 
able to walk and has learnt to adapt to this, they may not feel that their life would necessarily be 
                                                     
4 Buchanan A (1996) ‘Choosing who will be disabled: genetic intervention and morality of inclusion’  
Social Philosophy and Policy 13(2), pp 18-46 
5 Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and Rights: Eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability and 
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
6 Campbell T, Heginbotham C (1991) Mental illness: prejudice, discrimination and the law, Dartmouth 
Publishing Co Ltd, pp 3-29 
7 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’ Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 163-171 
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any better if they did have the use of their legs.  Only that individual is in a position to comment on 
the quality and value of their own life.   
 
However, as I have mentioned in chapter 4 (section 4.2.2.i) there are some aspects of life that we 
can generally expect people to want and value, such as happiness and the avoidance of pain and 
suffering.  Brock refers to ‘human functions that are necessary for, or at least valuable in, the pursuit 
of nearly all relatively full and complete human life plans’.8  There are some severely disabling 
conditions which inevitably impact on these aspects and, therefore, a non-disabled person may be 
just as well placed to have a view on this.  The point is that general assumptions should not be made 
about the type of life a person will have if they are born with an impairment.  Where this involves 
decisions about a future person adequate deliberation and discussion should take place between the 
prospective parents, whose interests will also be impacted by the existence of the future child, and 
the healthcare professionals with knowledge of the impairment and the disability it may cause, and 
the impact this will have on the life of the future child.  Those who have first-hand knowledge of 
the impairment and potential disability in question should inform these discussions, where possible. 
 
My position is that prenatal diagnosis does not in itself discriminate against individuals who have 
been born with or live with any form of physical or mental disability.  Those who rely on the 
argument that prenatal testing discriminates against those with disabilities believe that performing 
procedures during pregnancy in order to identify abnormalities makes a negative judgement about 
the future life with a disability and suggests that life will not be worth living.9  However, as I will 
discuss, the claim that prenatal testing assumes that the lives of those with disabilities are of less 
value than a non-disabled person or that their lives are not worth living cannot be supported by the 
                                                     
8 Brock D (1993) ‘Quality of life measures in health care and medical ethics’ in Sen A, Nussbaum M (eds) 
The Quality of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 127 
9 Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and Rights: Eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability and 
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
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disability arguments. I will provide argument and evidence to show that rather than devalue the 
lives of those individuals, prenatal testing offers vital information which may be in the interests of 
the fetus and future person, as well as promoting parental reproductive autonomy, with the potential 
of preventing harm, not only to the fetus but also the wider family. 
 
5.2 The Disability Critique and the effects of discrimination 
Arguments put forward by those representing disabled people in relation to prenatal testing appear 
to make the assumption that it will lead to termination of that pregnancy if an anomaly is found.  
However, it is important to note that this is not the only outcome and I have previously discussed 
in chapter four (section 4.4) what potential benefits prenatal testing can bring in the form of in-
utero or immediate postnatal treatment and that termination is not the only outcome, or purpose, of 
testing.  That said, those representing disability groups do have some strong arguments against 
prenatal testing where it is followed by selective abortion.  I will be addressing the major arguments 
in turn in the following sections and conclude that prenatal testing does not discriminate against 
those with disabilities but promotes reproductive autonomy and aims to prevent harm to the 
interests of the future individual and their wider family. 
 
 
5.2.1 Advances in genetic and genomic medicine 
Those representing disabled people who raise their concerns about prenatal diagnosis do so for a 
number of reasons.  One major concern is that the extensive work that has been carried out in 
genetics in order to sequence the human genome, whilst increasing the number of genetic mutations 
that can now be identified, has not enjoyed the same success when it has come to gene therapy.10  
This means that whilst an increasing number of disabling conditions can be picked up, they cannot 
                                                     
10 Shakespeare T (1995) ‘Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people’, Critical Social Policy 
44(5), pp 22-35 
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all be treated.  In these cases the information provided by prenatal testing is likely to be used by 
healthcare professionals and prospective parents to inform decisions about whether or not to 
continue an affected pregnancy.  These advances in genomic medicine have led Stempsey to refer 
to the ‘geneticiziation’ of diagnosing disability, where disability is explained in terms of gene action 
rather than focusing on other factors that cause or contribute it.11  This is despite the fact that only 
about ten per cent of disabilities are caused by defective genes, with the majority of disabilities 
being caused by trauma, aging and illness.12   
 
As technology advances further it will allow multiple disorders to be tested simultaneously, cheaply 
and quickly.13  This will allow women to be tested earlier in pregnancy and for a wider range of 
disabling conditions.  These tests are likely to be based on non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) on 
maternal blood,14 rather than by invasive tests on the fetus which could put a normal pregnancy at 
risk,15 and may therefore be more attractive to prospective mothers.  
 
It is understandable that this adds to the concerns of those opposed to prenatal testing due to 
discrimination. Their concern is that the expansion of testing during pregnancy, and the fact that 
these will prevent the birth of a disabled baby, will be seen as a positive one, fuelling the negative 
attitudes towards those with disabilities.16  However, it should be noted that at this stage NIPT is 
intended only for those who are known to be at higher risk following current primary screening and 
                                                     
11 Stempsey WE (2006) ‘The geneticization of diagnostics’  Medicine, Health care and Philosophy  9, pp 
193-200 
12 Scully JL (2008) ‘Disability and genetics in the era of genomic medicine’ Nature Reviews Genetics 9, pp 
797-802 
13 Freshwater S (2013) ‘Fetal genome screening could prove tragic: unborn children will soon have their 
genes mapped.  Without proper guidance for parents, the test could prove calamitous’, Scientific American 
308(2), (www.scientificamerican.com as cited on 15 October 2015)  
14 Note that the UK National Screening Committee, in January 2016, recommended an ‘evaluative 
implementation’ of such testing in order to assess what impact this would have for the NHS antenatal 
screening programme (www.legacy.screening.nhs.uk cited on 11 November 2016) 
15 Seeds JW (2004) ‘Diagnostic mid trimester amniocentesis. How safe?’, American Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology 191(2), pp 607-615 
16 Lippman A (1991) ‘Prenatal genetic testing and screening: Constructing needs and reinforcing 
inequities’, American Journal of Law and Medicine 17(1-2), pp 15-50 
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NIPT is not diagnostic.  Invasive tests would still be required in order to obtain a definitive 
diagnosis.17  One benefit of NIPT is that it is hoped that it will ultimately reduce the number of 
women being offered invasive tests which carry a small risk of miscarriage.  
 
Genetic and genomic medicine provides information about the biological status of the developing 
fetus and promises to offer an increasing number of ways in which it can help to diagnose, cure or 
prevent disability.18  This increasing information will inevitably be used to improve the availability 
of prenatal diagnosis for an increasing number of genetic conditions.  One concern that arises in 
relation to prenatal testing and selective abortion is that it reinforces the medical model of 
disability19 in that it is the physical abnormality which presents the problems experienced by 
disabled people, and not the fault of society.  These arguments are centred upon the fact that 
specifically selecting a pregnancy for termination based on the presence of a disability sends out a 
negative message about the lives of disabled people.  As there is increasing investment in genetic 
research it is important to understand these reservations and try to reassure the disabled community 
that these advances will help to contribute to a better understanding of disability.20  I will now 
consider what the concerns are with respect to the implications of raising discriminatory attitudes 
may be towards disabled people. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 UK National Screening Committee (2016) ‘UK NSC non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT) 
recommendation’ phescreening.blog.gov.uk (www.legacy.screening.nhs.uk as cited on 11 November 2016) 
18 Scully JL (2008) ‘Disability and genetics in the era of genomic medicine’ Nature Reviews Genetics 9, pp 
797-802 
19 Saxton M (2000) ‘Why members of the Disability Community oppose prenatal diagnosis and selective 
abortion’ in Parens E, Asch A (eds) Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, Georgetown University 
Press/Washington DC, pp 148-149 
20 Scully JL (2008) ‘Disability and genetics in the era of genomic medicine’ Nature Reviews Genetics 9, pp 
797-802 
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5.2.1.i  Reducing the number of disabled people in society 
 
One consequence of discrimination that concerns the disabled community is that prenatal testing 
and selective abortion is aimed at reducing the number of disabled people who live in society.21 
This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that the success of some screening programmes, like 
that for Cystic Fibrosis (CF), is measured by the reduction of the incidence of the condition in the 
population.22 Prenatal testing will inevitably result in some children who would have lived with 
disabilities not being born and as a consequence this will have the effect of reducing the number of 
individuals born with disabling conditions.23 CF is not a condition that is routinely tested for in 
pregnancy, although newborns are screened soon after birth to allow early diagnosis and 
treatment.24  Those who do have testing in pregnancy are likely to have sought this out due to 
knowledge of their particular risk (they may, for example, be known carriers of the condition) and 
possibly knowledge of the impact of caring for a child with this condition.  To reassure those who 
believe that genetic testing is comparable to eugenic activities of the past,25 only those pregnancies 
that are tested and found to be homozygous26 for the defective gene, and therefore will develop the 
condition, are subject to termination, if that is what the prospective parents decide.  Those found to 
be heterozygous 27  carriers, and therefore have only one copy of the defective gene, are not 
terminated. This means that the gene mutation is not likely to be eradicated from society.  The 
purpose, therefore, is not to attempt to eliminate the CF mutation completely, but to give 
prospective parents the choice as to whether they want to continue their pregnancy, knowing their 
                                                     
21 Houghton H (1994) ‘Does prenatal diagnosis discriminate against the disabled?’ in McKie J (ed) Ethical 
issues in prenatal diagnosis and termination of pregnancy, Melbourne: Centre for Human Bioethics, pp 97-
102 
22 Beaudet A L (1990)  ‘Invited editorial: carrier screening for cystic fibrosis’, American Journal of Human 
Genetics 47, pp 603-605 
23 Ettorre E (2000)  ‘Reproductive genetics, gender and the body: ‘Please Doctor, may I have a normal 
baby?’’, Sociology 34(3), pp 403-420 
24 Wilcken B, Brown ARD, Urwin R, Brown DA (1983) ‘Cystic Fibrosis screening by dried blood spot 
trypsin assay: Results in 75,000 newborn infants’, The Journal of Pediatrics 102(3), pp 383-387 
25 Hubbard R (1986) ‘Eugenics and prenatal testing’ International Journal of Health Services 16, pp 227-
242 
26 A person who is homozygous for a gene mutation has two copies of the faulty gene and will therefore be 
affected by Cystic Fibrosis 
27 A person who is heterozygous for a gene mutation has one normal copy and one faulty copy of the gene.  
This means they are a carrier of Cystic Fibrosis but are not affected by the condition themselves. 
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child will have the condition and this decision should only be made after the couple have benefited 
from having had counselling.  As genetic technology has improved a number of different mutations 
for CF have been identified and therefore it may be possible to give parents more information about 
how their child will be affected by the condition.  Different mutations cause different clinical 
phenotypes with some being more severe than others.28  This advance in technology, therefore, 
could potentially result in some pregnancies that would previously have been terminated continuing 
as parents are reassured that the particular mutation in their fetus is not one of those causing severe 
symptoms.   This suggests, therefore, that advances in genetic testing for prenatal diagnosis may 
actually reduce the number of terminations in some circumstances. 
   
Down syndrome is a condition that people often associate with standard antenatal screening tests 
during pregnancy, which are offered to all women (as mentioned in chapter one).  The success of 
the introduction of screening for Down syndrome was measured by the decrease in the number of 
births of children with the condition.29 This obviously lends support to the argument of those 
representing those with disabilities that prenatal testing is designed to reduce the incidence of 
disability in society.  Prenatal testing for Down syndrome is particularly controversial for other 
reasons.30  It is a very variable condition with respect to physical and mental disability and is often 
associated with a good quality of life.31 This variability cannot necessarily be predicted simply 
based on a genetic test that identifies the extra chromosome 21.   
 
                                                     
28 Koch C, Cuppens H, Rainisio M et al (2001) ‘European Epidemiologic registry of Cystic Fibrosis 
(ERCF): Comparisons of major disease manifestations between patients with different classes of mutations, 
Pediatric Pulmonology 31(1), pp 1-12 
29 Whittle MJ (1991) ‘Antenatal diagnosis of fetal abnormalities’ in Drife J, Donnai D (eds) Routine Fetal 
Anomaly Screening, London, Springer-Verlag London Limited, p 45-47 
30 Reynolds TM (2003) ‘Down’s syndrome screening is unethical: views of today’s research ethics 
committees’, Journal of Clinical Pathology 56, pp 268-270 
31 Reynolds TM (2003) ‘Down’s syndrome screening is unethical: views of today’s research ethics 
committees’, Journal of Clinical Pathology 56, pp 268-270 
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In order for women to make informed and autonomous choices about whether or not to accept 
screening for Down syndrome they need to understand what the test can achieve and its limitations.  
Ultrasound scans may identify other medical problems associated with it such as brain 
malformations, congenital heart defects or bowel abnormalities and give an indication as to the 
extent of care the future child may need.  It is these additional features of the condition that may 
influence a healthcare professional’s decision as to whether a late termination of pregnancy can 
take place based on a diagnosis of Down syndrome, but it is also important for prospective parents 
to also have this type of prognostic information as early as possible.  I will discuss the implications 
of this further with regard to parental expectations in section 5.2.3.    
 
Although there is concern that prenatal testing and selective termination of pregnancy will reduce 
the incidence of disability in society,32,33 it is important to note that congenital disease is not the 
only cause of disability.34  The majority of disabilities are due to a combination of those acquired 
through accident or due to medical conditions that develop later in life as well as other conditions 
such as cancer, dementia and lung disease.35,36 The age of the population is increasing and with this 
comes more morbidity and consequentially an increase in the number of people living with 
disability and the increased requirement for more social support and adaptation of society. There 
have been changes in the law to reflect this with the introduction of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 and the Equality Act 2010.  Prenatal testing will not have any impact on these aetiologies 
and, therefore, any argument that prenatal testing will have a negative effect on the number of 
disabled people as a whole in society, by reducing their number, is weakened.  With increased 
                                                     
32 Blumberg L (1994) ‘Eugenics v Reproductive Choice’, The Disability Rag and Resource, (January – 
February), p 15 
33 King DS (1999) ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ‘new’ eugenics’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 176-182 
34 Saxon SV, Etten MJ & Perkins EA (2010) Physical change and aging: A guide for the helping 
professionals (5th ed) Springer Publishing Company, p 263 
35 Saxon SV, Etten MJ & Perkins EA (2010) Physical change and aging: A guide for the helping 
professionals (5th ed), Springer Publishing Company, p 264 
36 Scully JL (2008) ‘Disability and genetics in the era of genomic medicine’ Nature Reviews Genetics 9, pp 
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survival rates for certain conditions and age acquired disability there will always be a need for 
society to adapt to the needs of disabled people.  This point does not of course address the argument 
that prenatal testing and subsequent termination of pregnancy is discriminatory towards individuals 
with the condition by which the fetus is affected, or the suggestion by those opposing prenatal 
testing and abortion that it devalues the lives of disabled people.37  These arguments are often made 
by those living with disabilities who therefore have first-hand knowledge of the impact disabling 
conditions may have.  However, as I will argue in section 5.3, whilst their arguments may be valid 
others, such as carers, parents and siblings of severely disabled people, may be better placed to 
offer a strong case in some circumstances as to whether such devaluing is taking place through 
testing. 
 
5.2.1.ii  Reinforcing hostile social attitudes 
There has been significant progress in Western society with respect to attitudes towards people with 
disabilities and this has been enhanced by legislation rightly giving disabled people equal rights38 
and prohibiting discrimination.39   One criticism of prenatal diagnosis is that it will jeopardise this 
progress and change social attitudes towards disability.40   
 
With the advent of prenatal testing came a choice for prospective parents as to whether they wanted 
to bring a disabled child into the world.  Prior to this having a disabled child was not something 
parents could avoid or necessarily predict, unless there was already a family history of disabling 
genetic condition.  Now that various forms of prenatal testing are available to couples they do 
generally have a choice and may even be seen as irresponsible if they decide not to terminate an 
                                                     
37 Shakespeare T (1995) ‘Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people’, Critical Social Policy  15, 
pp 22-35 
38 Equality Act 2010, HMSO: London 
39 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, HMSO: London 
40 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 163-171 
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affected pregnancy.41  One argument that follows this is that disabled people, particularly those 
with impairments that could have been detected antenatally, are seen as ‘accidents’ and something 
that could have been avoided, resulting in a change in social attitudes and increased 
discrimination.42 Gillam, for example, refers to stigmatisation against those with disabilities and 
the risk that they could be seen as a burden on society and may become marginalised.43  Asch 
reinforces the view that prenatal testing and selective termination give an impression that disability 
is so terrible that the birth of such individuals should be avoided, a message that we would not 
deliberately want to give to those who have such disabilities.44 
 
One cannot deny the feelings of those with disabilities that find the provision of prenatal diagnosis 
and selective termination demoralising or offensive.  However, even those representing disabled 
people believe it is possible to be able to contemplate prenatal diagnosis without reaching the 
conclusion that disability is painful and burdensome for all of those affected by it.45  Prospective 
parents who make the decision to terminate an affected pregnancy should do so for their own 
personal reasons (assuming that this does not include reasons of prejudice) once they have had the 
opportunity to weigh up all of the benefits and potential disadvantages of having a disabled child.  
These deliberations should include the clinical features of the disability, but this should not be the 
only consideration.  They need to consider the impact the disability will have on the future child in 
terms of, for example, function and the extent of pain and suffering, but they should also be given 
an opportunity to fully consider what the impact will be on their own interests and those of other 
members of the family, such as the future child’s siblings.  When considering a termination in this 
way they are not making judgements about the lives of those with the same disability, as it is very 
                                                     
41 Wertz DC, Fletcher JC (1993) ‘Feminist criticism of prenatal diagnosis: a response’, Clinical Obstetrics 
& Gynaecology 36(3), pp 541-547  
42 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 163-171 
43 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 163-171 
44 Asch A (1989) ‘Can aborting “imperfect” children be immoral?” in Arras JD, Rhoden NK (eds) Ethical 
issues in modern medicine.  Mayfield Publishing Co, p 319 
45 Kaplan D (1988) ‘Disability rights perspectives on reproductive technologies and public policy’ in Cohen 
C, Taub N (eds) Reproductive laws for the 1990s.  Humana Press, pp 241-247 
  
162 
unlikely that they will be comparing like with like when all of the circumstances are taken into 
account.  In addition to emphasising the need for the prospective parents to weigh up all of the 
issues, it also emphasises the importance of the clinicians involved, especially where late 
termination needs to be justified, weighing up these same factors.  The risk of discrimination should 
not result in objections to prenatal diagnosis but should promote the need for communication with 
disabled people and to ensure that social attitudes continue to improve.  As Gillam states, any moral 
disadvantages of discrimination need to be assessed against the advantages of prenatal testing, 
where one such advantage is individual reproductive autonomy (which I have discussed in chapter 
three).46 
 
 
5.2.2 Does prenatal testing devalue disabled people? 
The Expressivist argument47 against prenatal testing states that it is wrong to select out disease and 
disability because it sends out a negative message about disabled people and the value of their lives 
and particularly about those people who have the specific disability that is being selected against.48  
Proponents of this position claim that selection against such genetic impairments is 
discriminatory.49   
 
Those living with disabilities argue that a judgement is made about their life which suggests that it 
is not worth living and, as a result, prenatal testing is performed in order to prevent the existence 
of an individual with an impairment who will become disabled.50  This argument, however, also 
has the tendency to create a negative impression of the prospective parents and makes assumptions 
                                                     
46 Gillam L (1999) ‘Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled’,  Journal of Medical Ethics 
25, pp 163-171 
47 Buchanan A (1996) ‘Choosing who will be disabled: Genetic intervention and the morality of inclusion’, 
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about people who opt for prenatal testing. It does not take into account that individual’s own 
personal circumstances or individual reasons for having testing.  It is unreasonable to assume that 
because a person has testing, possibly followed by a termination, that this is suggesting that the life 
of a person who is affected by the condition has no value.   
 
If a couple terminated a pregnancy for social reasons, for example, due to the fact that their 
relationship had ended, this decision, whilst it may be frowned upon by some, would not be seen 
to send out a message that the lives of children from single-parent families are valueless or in any 
way not worth living.  The decision was based on not wanting to bring that particular child at that 
time into that specific set of circumstances, and not due to a wider assumption about children with 
estranged parents.  In the same way, deciding to end a pregnancy where impairment exists in that 
particular fetus does not make assumptions about the lives of others with that same impairment.  In 
fact this particular couple may have very good personal reasons for not wanting to have this child 
now that they are no longer together.  This decision would be based on their own autonomous 
choice and the parent’s own personal circumstances and not based on any discriminatory attitude 
toward others in a similar position.  The point is that it is important to recognise that reproductive 
decisions run deeper than simply deciding that they do not want a particular pregnancy to continue.  
In the same way, a decision to terminate a pregnancy, for example with Achondroplasia (dwarfism), 
does not make any comment about a person already born with Achondroplasia, or about their 
parents who may or may not have decided to have prenatal testing themselves and are likely to have 
different interests from other parents in the same position.   
 
The problem, however, is that although technically no message other than that in support of parental 
choice should be given, the very fact that policies and legislation are in place to control the reasons 
and time limits by which termination of pregnancy can take place seem to endorse discriminatory 
views.  I have discussed the problems with current abortion legislation in chapter two and the 
concern that this could be seen to discriminate against those with disabilities. A termination of 
pregnancy of a normal fetus cannot take place according to the Abortion Act, assuming it is not 
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threatening the life of the mother, after twenty-four weeks gestation but the termination of a fetus 
with a serious abnormality can.  I have argued in chapter two, however, the reasons why this 
distinction is important when considering late terminations. Allowing late terminations of 
pregnancy where a serious abnormality exists can be justified on the basis of avoiding harm that 
would have otherwise been caused to that future person and their wider family if the pregnancy 
were to continue, and is not based on an assumption about those living with a disability in general. 
 
 
There are other steps prospective parents can take to prevent or at least reduce the risk of having a 
child with certain types of impairments.  Folic acid, for example, is known to significantly reduce 
the incidence of neural tube defects, such as spina bifida and anencephaly in fetuses, particularly 
those who are at high risk due to a genetic predisposition.51  Whilst there is a big difference between 
preventing disability by treating the causes as opposed to preventing disability by terminating a 
pregnancy, and hence preventing the existence of that particular individual with a disability, the 
overall outcome is that a disability has been avoided.  This does not, however, send out a message 
that people with the conditions that this intervention is designed to prevent have any less worth or 
value than anyone else.   
 
 
Wilkinson similarly challenges the Expressivist Argument by looking at the circumstances of the 
message that is being both sent and received.52  Wilkinson talks of the imperfections of human 
communication and how the message from the sender (the person offering/choosing prenatal 
testing) and the recipient (the person with a disability) often diverge.  Glover also talks of the 
importance of sending out a clear message, that decisions about prenatal testing are not because of 
                                                     
51 Oakley GP Jr (2008) ‘Elimination of folic acid-preventable neural tube defects’, American Journal of 
Preventative Medicine 35(6), pp 606-607 
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a negative or ‘ugly’ attitude toward those with disabilities.53  Similar to the example of the use of 
Folic Acid, Glover also compares the use of prenatal testing to avoid disability with other medical 
programmes.54  In his example he talks of defeating cancer, not out of our lack of respect for people 
who have and live with cancer, but with our desire to prevent what effect cancer has on people.   
However, whereas eliminating disability is seen by some as discriminatory treatment for other 
‘conditions’ is seen as a positive step and in fact causes public outcry if people are denied treatments 
that may cure them.55 Glover argues that if communication were improved and based on the fact 
that prenatal testing is not making any value judgements about the disabled, the Expressivist 
Objection is obsolete.56  
 
Choosing to offer and receive prenatal testing is about providing prospective parents with the option 
to make very personal choices and is not in any way an expression of negativity towards those with 
disabilities. The counter argument to this would be that whilst treating people for cancer and other 
illnesses with the hope of providing a cure may eliminate the disease in that person who continues 
to exist, prenatal testing might only be able to prevent disability by termination of an affected 
pregnancy and thus prevent the existence of a future person. I have, however, discussed in chapter 
4 (section 4.4) that in-utero or postnatal treatment following prenatal testing can result in disability 
being reduced or avoided in the person who is ultimately born. 
 
Those representing disabled people are concerned that selecting out disability sends the message 
that the world would be a better place if those with disabilities did not exist.  Wilkinson evaluates 
this view, making the point that selecting against an embryo (or fetus in the case of prenatal testing) 
with a particular condition does not extrapolate to meaning that it would also be acceptable to 
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murder a person who is already living with that same condition.57,58  When we select against 
disability in preference for an embryo or fetus without the disability we are choosing to create a 
child which is expected to have a better quality of life.  The decision is not suggesting that a person 
with the same condition does not themselves have a worthwhile life and nor should it devalue their 
existence.  The fact is that when parents decide to start a family they generally want to have a child 
with the best possible quality of life.  
 
In chapter three, I argued for the importance of reproductive autonomy due to the personal nature 
of decisions around reproduction.  These arguments were supported by my discussion about harm 
in chapter four.  What the Expressivist Argument does not consider is the harm to the interests of 
other directly affected third parties, such as the prospective mother.  Gillam acknowledges that 
justification for termination that takes into account the best interests of the mother-to-be does not 
involve any direct quality of life assessment of the disabled child, and she regards this justification 
as most defensible because it relies on the same factors that are referred to when abortion is justified 
in other contexts, one of those factors being autonomy.59  However, it could be argued that the 
promotion of prenatal testing also sends out a negative message about the lives that the parents and 
siblings of a disabled person must also have.  Whilst those with disabilities who argue against 
prenatal testing may be in a position to comment on how it affects their lives, they are not in a 
position to comment on how it affects the lives of others.  The harm to the interests of other third 
parties can only really be assessed by those third parties themselves.  It is of course important that 
they are provided with information to help them assess the impact of having a disabled child, but 
ultimately they are the only ones who can really evaluate what their future may be like and how 
their interests may be affected.  Again, this supports the arguments I have made in chapter three 
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with respect to promoting reproductive autonomy and also emphasises the need for harm to the 
interests of third parties to be taken into consideration by clinicians who find themselves in the 
position of having to justify a late termination of pregnancy. 
 
When we consider how a disability might affect an individual we try to put ourselves in their 
position and imagine what life would be like.  One theoretical way of doing this is to evaluate their 
‘Quality of life’ (QOL).60  This could include the fetus in relation to prenatal testing and screening 
for disabilities where the quality of the predicted life is evaluated and compared to a minimum 
quality, below which prospective parents would choose to terminate the pregnancy.61   Similarly, 
these evaluations are likely to influence clinicians who are required to justify late abortions.  These 
analyses are used to inform decisions about distribution of healthcare resources and in informing 
the development of health policy. 62  For the purposes of my thesis, however, I am only focusing on 
the use of QOL assessments in as much as they influence decisions about the provision of prenatal 
testing and the arguments that this is discriminatory against those with disabilities in that it is 
making judgement about their lives.  One important point to make is that this QOL assessment for 
the purposes of selective abortion assumes that the fetus in not equivalent to a person.  This means 
that killing a fetus which is predicted to have a low quality of life is not the same as suggesting it 
would be permissible to kill a person living with disabilities who may be assessed as having a low 
quality of life.63 
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Criticisms of the QOL assessments relate to the fact that they involve an observer’s view of what 
kind of life is worth living,64 and this view may not have been open to challenge.65  This is relevant 
to my thesis in that others make evaluations with respect to the QOL a fetus is expected to have if 
it is born with an impairment that is likely to cause disability.  Mackenzie and Scully rightly 
question whether it is feasible for people without impairments to make judgements about the quality 
of life of someone with impairment.66  This is also something I will consider further in section 5.3 
with respect to people living with disabilities making judgements about the lives of future 
individuals with impairments. 
 
Mackenzie and Scully argue that health professionals who make these judgements are unlikely to 
have an adequate understanding of the lives of people with disabilities and those with the disability 
are likely to be underrepresented when healthcare decisions are made.67  There is also the problem 
of what level of importance is placed on different aspects of a person’s life.  A person who has 
never had a particular biological function is less likely to miss it, as compared to a person who had 
it at birth and for a significant portion of their life but then loses it, or at least imagines what it 
would be like to do so.  It does appear that there are certain questions about QOL that can only be 
answered by a similarly affected individual.  Shakespeare acknowledges that every impairment, 
and also every family and every life, is different and, therefore, states that it is dangerous to 
generalise about the experience of impairment.68  However, based on this one could also argue that 
it is difficult to see how a person with a disability can evaluate the quality of life of parents of a 
disabled child, whose QOL should also be taken into account when reproductive decisions are 
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made.  This may be a general problem when making QOL decisions when there is a difference in 
the experiences and understanding of those making the judgements and we may not require a perfect 
understanding in order to make a reasonable determination.  However, it is important to consider 
the individual set of circumstances that any parent finds themselves in that means they, and only 
they, are in a position to make an adequate judgement as to the overall impact of QOL.  The parents 
are the only ones able to make the fullest and, therefore, most important judgement about QOL 
issues in these circumstances. 
 
Gillam also notes that terminating certain pregnancies is justified on the basis of the QOL the future 
child is predicted to have, taking into account the effects of the disability and by comparing it with 
the QOL of a possible future non-disabled child.69  In making this assessment one person makes a 
judgement about how life will be affected by a certain disability, from that person’s point of view.  
Where the positives and negatives are weighed in the balance a decision may ultimately be made 
that a termination can be justified in the best interests of the future child.  What these QOL 
assessments do not tend to take into account is the QOL in the context of the wider family and how 
the disability may affect the interests of others.   
 
Those representing disabled people argue that these evaluations are misinformed and make 
judgements about the quality of their lives that are unduly negative.  However, as well as the QOL 
of the disabled individual, that of the prospective parents and other close family members also need 
to be considered.  The people in the best position to make these decisions are those who are going 
to be directly affected by the birth of the child following balanced discussions to support their 
decisions, which would benefit from the inclusion of views from disabled people.  It is only those 
who are going to be directly affected who are able to make an overall judgement as opposed to 
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those who may only be able to consider specific aspects of QOL judgements.  Similarly, clinicians 
making decisions about late termination of pregnancy should not only consider the QOL of the 
future child but also other relevant third parties, taking into account their personal views and the 
potential harm that may be caused to their interests.  In view of the relationship that prospective 
parents have with the clinical geneticist, they would be well placed to act as an advocate for 
prospective parents who may find it difficult to express their views at such a difficult time. 
 
Gillam also makes the point that making these QOL judgements does not equate to a moral 
judgement about that person and as such it is not discriminatory.70  We consider the quality of a 
person’s life in a number of different situations, particularly in healthcare.  Gillam refers to the 
patient with cancer who is in intractable pain.  Just because a person’s QOL is lowered by illness 
does not lower their moral worth.71  We still have moral obligations to them, particularly with 
respect to addressing the pain they are suffering.  Similarly, a patient with dementia resulting in 
physical and intellectual impairment may have a lower quality of life than someone who is active 
and capacious but this does not mean we should withdraw care or treat them badly.  As I have 
discussed in chapter two (section 2.2.4) when considering the moral status of the fetus, humans 
who may lack various capacities are still morally significant and we continue to have obligations 
towards them.  Assessing their QOL has not been carried out with the intention or result of making 
a judgement about their moral worth.  In assessing the affects an impairment may have on a future 
individual’s interests, and that of their wider family, we are not making any negative moral 
judgement about those who live with disabilities.   
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5.2.3 Does prenatal testing influence parental expectations? 
 
A further argument put forward by those representing disability groups is the Parental Attitude 
Argument.72  No distinction appears to be made as to whether the objections about testing in 
pregnancy relates to standard antenatal screening or diagnostic prenatal testing or the types of 
conditions that are tested for.  I assume that the argument relates to any testing that is capable of 
identifying a difference in the fetus that is likely to be regarded as abnormal and causing what 
would be regarded as a disability according to the medical model.  This argument suggests that 
parent’s expectations of what their child should be like are unrealistic.  It suggests that parents want 
some form of guarantee that their child will be perfect.73  
 
According to Asch prenatal testing creates a first and incomplete impression of the future child and 
this includes the decision never to learn about what the entire future person may be like after birth.74  
She refers to prenatal diagnosis as being “morally problematic” and “misinformed” in relation to 
disability.75  Asch talks of ‘specific individual characteristics’76 that are allowed to overpower any 
other positive qualities the fetus or future child may have.  
 
Concerns are raised that wanted pregnancies are being ended following prenatal testing due to 
something being learned about that particular child.77  However, it is too simplistic to say that the 
decision is based on information gained only about that child.  A prospective parent’s decision to 
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terminate may be based on experience of the condition by which the child is affected and the impact 
this may have on them both.  Indeed, the initial decision to have prenatal testing in the first place 
may be based on a couple’s previous experience of a particular condition. The decision, therefore, 
is based on previously known information about the abnormality and not about that particular child.  
The information may be from health professionals experienced in caring for people with the 
condition. In the case of couples who are referred to clinical genetics services for testing of very 
specific conditions, it is information gained first hand from possibly having had a previously 
affected child who may have experienced much pain and suffering, or a sibling who was similarly 
affected, that will inform their decisions.  For prospective parents who do not have first-hand 
experience it is also possible for them to speak to a person who has the condition themselves or 
parents with an affected child.  It may also be that one of the parents has the condition themselves 
if it is dominantly inherited and compatible with life and fertility is not affected. 
 
The Parental Attitude Argument seems to make a general assumption that most parents would not 
want a disabled child as it would impact on what their idea of being a parent is all about.    What 
the argument does not take into account is the personal reasons that a couple may have for choosing 
not to have a disabled child.  Rather than only considering the impact it may have on them 
personally, they may be considering what they believe to be in the best interests of the future child 
or other members of the family, such as pre-existing children.  They may already have, or have had, 
a child with the same condition and therefore have first-hand experience of the condition and its 
impact on the child.  It may be the child’s interests that they are considering when they choose to 
have prenatal testing, rather than just being concerned about their own interests or ideals.   
 
I have limited my thesis to prenatal testing where a risk is known, however, I acknowledge that 
with regards to standard antenatal screening, where there is no prior risk to a pregnancy, Asch’s 
arguments are more difficult to refute and there is evidence that some women do take up the offer 
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of standard antenatal screening due to concerns about having a ‘socially unfit’ child.78  Those 
parents who have first-hand knowledge and experience of having a disabled child, however, might 
be better placed to make reproductive decisions based on the impact the disability may have on the 
child and the wider family.  What Asch’s arguments highlight is the importance of ensuring that 
deliberative discussions take place between the prospective parents and clinicians to allow all 
aspects of having a disabled child with the given abnormality to be considered. Focus should not 
only be on the clinical and physical aspects of the impairment that has been identified but also on 
the support and treatment that may be available to the family and future child, and the positive 
aspects that having that child will bring.  This is particularly important for those couples who do 
not have previous experience of having a child with the condition.  Whilst I am advocating that the 
doctors ultimately making the decision about late terminations consider the impact on the wider 
family, and not just the clinical features of the disability, prospective parents also need to be given 
the opportunity to consider the positive aspects having this child will have on the wider family and 
again discouraged from focusing solely on the clinical and physical difference. 
 
As I will discuss in more detail in section 5.3, whilst there are those who live with disabilities who 
are able to express their views there are other disabled individuals who, due to the severity of their 
impairment, are not able to express how they feel about life with disabilities and whether or not 
they feel that their lives are worth living.  It would seem that the only people who are best placed 
to comment on their behalf are those who are most closely associated with them, for example, their 
family or their carers.  Those making these comments, for example, the parents of children who 
have such severe disabilities, will no doubt love and care for their child as a parent of any other 
child would.  Their child is already born and therefore prenatal testing is not an issue or a 
consideration for them.  Their comments can be made purely on the basis of what they feel about 
their child’s life and the quality of it, which will be influenced by many things including the positive 
experiences the child may have and also the pain and suffering and need for medical intervention.  
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These parents, in the absence of the child being able to do this themselves, are best placed to weigh 
up the positives and negatives in that child’s life to decide whether their particular circumstances 
would accord with those arguments put forward by the members of disability groups. 
 
Healthcare generally is an area where a society’s attitude to the quality of life is clearly expressed.  
Gillot argues that decisions made in the sphere of healthcare can demonstrate the value that we 
place on one another’s lives,79 however, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it is not a judgement 
we are making about the moral value or worth of a person, but what quality their life has and this 
is what we base healthcare decisions on.   Decisions are made with respect to withholding and 
withdrawing treatment from terminally ill patients and from those in a PVS, these decisions being 
influenced by the quality of life those individuals are expected to achieve,80 not because we believe 
they have any less moral worth.  Prenatal genetic diagnosis is another important area from this point 
of view.  Lives can be regarded as valuable in a variety of ways.  With respect to the arguments 
against prenatal testing I am considering not an extrinsic value of another’s life measured in terms 
of benefits to others or to society, but a value which is intrinsic to the individual in question and 
independent of others’ need for or view of that individual.  This value indicates the existence of 
moral status, which has previously been considered in chapter two (section 2.2.4). When we 
consider the quality of a person’s life to be negatively affected by a disability, it does not follow 
that we devalue them in any way or suggest they are morally inferior. 
 
If it is accepted that women may choose not to have babies for social reasons, such as the effect it 
may have on their career or due to their financial situation, it must be accepted that some women 
may also not wish to have babies with impairments, which may be due to the fact that these children 
will have more complex needs in relation to both their care and cost of upbringing.81  Nelson also 
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acknowledges that a person’s reasons for choosing to utilise prenatal testing and ending pregnancies 
is varied.82  A prospective parent may doubt their own ability to care for and bring up children with 
impairments. They may not be prepared to accept the challenges this brings.  As Nelson points out 
based on these feelings some choose not to have children at all.   
 
Those living with disabilities argue that a judgement is made about their life which suggests that it 
is not worth living and as a result, prenatal testing is performed in order to prevent the existence of 
an individual with an impairment who will become disabled.83  This argument, however, is made 
by disabled people who are in a position to raise such concerns and who do have a life that is clearly 
worthwhile.  They would not be putting these arguments forward otherwise.  Those who offer, and 
those who choose, prenatal diagnosis are not making their decisions based on the lives of those 
with a similar condition within society, they are making the decision based on what they believe to 
be the future for the individual fetus in question, and based on the parent’s and family’s own 
personal needs and circumstances.  These decisions are not to be taken lightly and require 
appropriate counselling to ensure that they are made following consideration of the best interests 
of all relevant parties.   
 
The arguments that prenatal testing discriminates against those living with disabilities because it 
makes judgements about their lives and devalues their worth arises when one group (non-disabled) 
fail to appreciate that the other group (disabled) have lives that are as rewarding and fulfilling as 
their own.84  I have talked about prenatal screening for Down syndrome and the fact that in my 
experience prospective parents don’t always have the benefit of genetic counselling and decisions 
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may be made based on, often outdated, assumptions as to what the life of the disabled child will be 
like.  As those representing disabled people say, this may be based on misinformation about what 
they can achieve in their lives, despite their disability.85  As far as chromosomal abnormalities are 
concerned Down syndrome is one of the most common86 and the one that most people will have 
some awareness of.  Obstetricians and midwives may feel more comfortable about telling a 
prospective mother that her fetus is affected by Down syndrome without the need to refer to a 
specialist genetics centre for counselling, as they would for other chromosomal abnormalities with 
which they are less familiar. Prospective parents themselves may feel that they know what Down 
syndrome is and therefore do not need to discuss their situation with anyone other than the antenatal 
team looking after them. Sadly, the knowledge they believe they have may be based on negative 
stereotypes and biased information about having a child with the condition. Screening for Down 
syndrome began in an era when higher morbidity and mortality arose from it and therefore life 
expectancy was shorter with fewer opportunities for relieving some of the clinical problems 
associated with it, and there was less support for those living with disabilities.87  Times have now 
changed and conditions such as Down syndrome may have less of a negative impact on the person 
affected and their family as they once had.  I agree that in these circumstances there is a danger that 
these women will make decisions that are not as fully informed as they could be or based on 
outdated views and information.  Assumptions will be made about what a child with Down 
syndrome will be like and what impact it will have on the parents and other pre-existing children.88  
There is a danger that these women will follow a path that, with more informative and non-directive 
counselling, they may not have followed. This emphasises the need for prospective parents to have 
balanced information, and in the case of Down syndrome information about its variability, so that 
they can make an informed decision about their pregnancy that best suits them.  Reproductive 
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autonomy is not being respected where a couple is told that there fetus is affected by a particular 
condition without being given appropriate information about how the condition is affecting their 
particular fetus and the postnatal support that is available and throughout the person’s life.  There 
may be some pregnancies affected by Down syndrome that have been terminated that could 
otherwise have been spared had the prospective parents been furnished with a balanced view about 
their future child’s prognosis, rather than simply giving them a diagnosis.  This adds further support 
to the arguments about reproductive autonomy that I put forward in chapter three, and the need for 
constructive dialogue between healthcare professionals and the prospective parents. 
 
There is a danger, therefore, that these assumptions and misinformation may result in judgements 
being made about the life the future child may have which are unfounded, particularly if they focus 
only on the disability and not on the complete circumstances that the future child will find 
themselves in.  Not only do the clinical aspects of the condition need to be considered (the medical 
model of disability) but also the social aspects and how the future child and their family can be best 
helped to overcome any difficulties.  Having taken all of this into account the views of the 
prospective parents and how their lives will be affected also need to be considered.  Because there 
is so much to consider, a lot of which is very personal to the couple involved, it is important that 
those who are going to be affected are involved in the decision making process as much as possible.  
As I will discuss in chapter six, there are limitations, however, placed on prospective parents where 
late termination of pregnancy is being considered as the decision as to whether such a termination 
can be justified lies with the clinicians who will perform the procedure, and not with the prospective 
parents. 
 
There are some physical and mental disabilities that no amount of adaptation in society will allow 
a person to function in the same capacity as a non-disabled individual.  Some disabilities can be 
compensated for, for example, a person suffering from visual or hearing impairment may feel no 
less disadvantaged than a person with fully functioning hearing and vision as they can learn new 
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methods of communication and stimulation so that life can be enjoyed to the same extent.  However, 
a person with quadriplegia cannot do many of the physical activities that a non-disabled person can 
do, despite the best efforts of society and the community.  That said, this does not prevent them 
from living a fulfilling life.  That person may be able to do many things another non-disabled person 
might not.  They may have, for example, superior intelligence or other abilities that are not hindered 
in any way by their physical disability.89  There are clearly differing degrees of disability and, 
therefore, the ability of society to accommodate those with impairments is limited by the severity 
of the original physical disability from which the individual suffers and in some circumstances no 
amount of adaptation will allow a person with a disability or disabilities to do everything that a 
non-disabled person can do.   
 
It is this lack of ability by society to be able to help some disabled people overcome their 
impairment that may be taken into account by some prospective parents and clinicians when 
contemplating whether or not to continue a pregnancy.  It is likely that this situation will arise where 
impairment is very severe (either physically or mentally) and may be associated with significant 
pain and suffering.  I discussed the moral status of the fetus in chapter two, and how this develops 
gradually over time. In view of this, greater justification for terminating a pregnancy is needed as 
gestation progresses.  Where late terminations are concerned such justification is likely to be 
influenced by the level of support and adaptation society can offer where a disability is so severe 
that pleasurable experiences are outweighed by pain and suffering, despite appropriate medical 
intervention. 
 
When information is given to prospective parents when an abnormality has been identified 
antenatally it is this spectrum of disability which needs to be discussed so that parents are fully 
aware of the impact the abnormality will have on the life of their future child and them and their 
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family.  What a particular family can cope with will vary and, therefore, each case must be treated 
individually so that an autonomous decision can be made by the couple concerned.  The decision 
made by a family may be influenced by their own values, ability to cope, pre-existing family and 
support structure and their financial situation.  It is therefore important for the impact of anomalies 
to be understood and how these may impair a person’s life and their interests, as I have discussed 
in chapter four (section 4.2.2i).  The perspective of people living with such disabilities is invaluable 
in this sense and often parents are encouraged to talk to and get advice from those living with the 
same condition, their parents and the healthcare professionals who care for them and see the range 
of severity a specific condition can have. It is for this reason that charitable organisations such as 
Contact a Family90 and other support groups for specific conditions, which are often genetic, have 
been created. 
 
Some people with a disabling condition may themselves choose to have prenatal testing as they 
wish to avoid having a child with the condition they have suffered from personally.  They may seek 
genetic counselling in order to understand what reproductive options are open to them, allowing 
them some control over the type of child they will have.91  Similarly, some people with a specific 
anomaly may not abort a pregnancy affected by the same condition but may abort a pregnancy 
affected by something else which they feel would affect the child’s life in a way that makes 
termination of pregnancy preferable.92  Some parents who already have a child with a condition 
that could be tested choose not to have testing in a subsequent pregnancy as the condition itself has 
become irrelevant.93  They may feel that having such a test, with a view to terminating an affected 
pregnancy, would send out a negative message to the child they already have.  Others, however, in 
the same situation, who value and support their existing child, would choose to have a test to avoid 
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having another child with the same condition.94  This shows that the decisions that are made are 
very personal and emphasises the importance of allowing couples control over the outcome. 
 
Those who rely on the Parental Attitude Argument to oppose prenatal testing, therefore, do so partly 
because they believe parents base their decisions on misinformation.95  Rather than support the 
opposing arguments this promotes the need for reproductive autonomy and the need for prospective 
parents to be well informed about the condition their pregnancy is affected by.  Parents should not 
be in a position where they are making important life changing decisions based on misinformation 
and stereotypes.  They should be given the opportunity to speak to others who are or have been 
affected by the same condition so that they can consider what the implications will be for their 
future interests, and the future interests of their fetus.  This argument, therefore, lends support to 
my arguments for the promotion of reproductive autonomy and the need to consider what harm 
may occur to the interests of the fetus and others that will be directly affected. 
 
   5.3  Are those with disabilities providing a representative voice? 
 It is without doubt that many people with various disabilities do have rewarding and successful 
lives, many more so that some of their non-disabled counterparts.  This can be confirmed by those 
who talk on behalf of disabled people, and are disabled themselves, and those who as a 
consequence of this evidence and opinion claim that prenatal testing and subsequent termination 
of pregnancy infers a judgement has been made about their quality of life. Empirical data has been 
collected in order to show that those living with disabilities can and do have valuable lives.96,97 
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This I do not dispute, however, there are those who are not able to represent themselves or others 
with disabilities due to the severity of the impairments that they have. 
 
A study by Wacker et al98 sought the opinions of 180 ‘multihandicapped adults’. These views 
were obtained by questionnaire that took into account aspects of the subject’s life, such as, social 
situation, living circumstances, physical status, education, vocational training and employment.  
Most reported that they were satisfied with their life outcomes and very satisfied with their social 
activities.  The variable which was reported to most strongly relate to life outcome and satisfaction 
was functional status. Another study supporting this is one that involved adolescents rather than 
adult subjects.  This study also concluded that ‘adolescents with long-term illness or disabilities 
experience well-being when they are allowed to prepare for living a normal life integrated in 
society.’99 
 
This type of data is invaluable, particularly for determining which aspects of a disabled person’s 
life can be improved if necessary and also as evidence to prospective parents of a disabled child 
that life with disability can be very rewarding. It does not take into account, however, those who 
have such severe disabilities that it prevents them from participating in this type of research and 
analysis.  This may include those with severe intellectual disabilities, which may or may not be 
accompanied by physical disabilities, or those who are too young to provide any comment, or 
those who have very limited survival.  This important point is also noted by Abberley100 who 
observed that ‘there are impairments which cause suffering, pain and premature death’, and as a 
consequence these individuals cannot take part in such studies.  
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living with a long-term illness or disability’, Scandinavian Journal of Caring Science 21, pp 419-425 
100 Abberley P (1987) ‘The concept of oppression and the development of a social theory of disability’, 
Disability, Handicap and Society 2, pp 5-19 
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Hubbard argues against the suggestion that all disabled people should be grouped together ‘as 
though all disabilities were the same and always devastating and as though all people who have 
one were alike’.101  This is a valuable point to make and again highlights the importance of 
deliberative discussions between prospective parents and clinicians to ensure that decisions are 
made based on the particular difference in their future child and how it may affect them and their 
family personally and not based on a general view of the disability in question.   
 
With regards to Hubbard’s comments, those who argue against prenatal testing are doing exactly 
what he argues against but with the converse view that they can speak on behalf of all of those 
suffering from impairment and subsequent disability.  Shakespeare, who has the genetic condition 
Achondroplasia, acknowledges that impairment is not the defining characteristic of being a person 
with disabilities in view of the fact that not everyone experiences the same degrees of illness or 
impairment.102   
 
Shakespeare also argues that disabled people are not consulted on the very matters that affect 
them.103  He is concerned that decisions made about factors that affect them are done so by 
unrepresentative parties, without referring to the ‘best experts on life as a disabled person’.104  I 
agree that those with disabilities, who are able to do so, should be consulted about matters that 
affect them, however, the problem that Shakespeare highlights is exactly what those with 
disabilities are doing to those who cannot voice their opinion due to the severity of their disability 
or due to their limited postnatal survival.  It needs to be accepted that there are disabled individuals 
who cannot speak for themselves and about whom other disabled people cannot provide a 
representative voice.  In fact it is likely that those best placed to make decisions on behalf of 
                                                     
101 Hubbard R (1997) ‘Abortion and disability: who should and who should not inhabit the world?’ in L 
Davied (ed) The Disability Studies Reader, New York, Routledge, p 74 
102  Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability &  
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
103  Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability &  
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
104 Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability &  
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
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someone with impairments who cannot speak for themselves and who are best placed to make 
any form of judgement about their life and its quality are their parents or carers.   
 
However, Shakespeare goes on to say that being a parent of a person with an impairment is 
different from being that person themselves.105  Whilst I do agree with this sentiment the same 
could be said for anyone else who makes judgements about those aforementioned individuals who 
have severe or life limiting impairments, including those disabled people who are able to voice 
an opinion.  Can anyone really stand in the shoes of another person and make true judgements 
about their life just because they too happen to be physically impaired?   
 
Shakespeare, however, argues that it is important to recognise the ‘collective voice of disabled 
people’.106  When considering issues on policy I agree that this is important for the voice to be 
representative so that the maximum number of people can benefit, however, where important 
personal decisions, such as those relating to prenatal testing are taking place, an overall voice may 
not be the most appropriate and it is the voice of those who are going to directly affected that 
needs to be considered.  Whilst it can never be ideal for another person to make decisions or 
judgements about another’s life or needs, this is often necessary in a health and welfare setting 
when patients do not have the capacity to make decisions for themselves107 and particularly so 
where those with parental responsibility make decisions for their children before they reach an 
age where they are competent to make their own decisions.108  This principle is based on the fact 
that generally parents will act in the best interests of their children109. 
 
                                                     
105  Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability &  
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
106 Shakespeare T (1998) ‘Choices and rights: eugenics, genetics and disability equality’, Disability &  
Society 13(5), pp 665-681 
107 Mental Capacity Act 2005, HMSO: London, section 4 
108 General Medical Council (2007) 0-18 years: Guidance for all doctors, GMC: London 
109 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5th ed), Oxford University Press, 
pp 102-103 
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With regards to prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy the fetus cannot make the decision 
itself as to whether it wants to exist with a disability or not exist at all.  The fetus, therefore, is in a 
similar position to those living with disabilities who do not have the mental capacity to form or 
voice their views.  This leaves the prospective parents, who will be ultimately responsible for this 
future person if they are born, to make those decisions on their behalf.  Better placed to make these 
decisions are those prospective parents who have experience of the condition in question, either 
directly from having had a previously affected child, or indirectly from knowing another affected 
family member.   
 
In addition to those whose disabilities are so severe that that cannot express their views prenatal 
testing can also identify fetuses that may have impairments which have implications for a short 
period of time due to limited survival.  Generally speaking, for this group impairments will only 
have limited effect because the condition is one of such severity that it is not compatible with long-
term survival.  Again, these neonates do not have the opportunity to experience any of the pleasures 
in life which those living with disabilities experience and who argue against prenatal testing, and it 
is not currently possible to gain any measure of this.  However, due to the nature of their illness it 
is likely that they will experience at least some pain and suffering whilst they are alive.  Those who 
argue against prenatal testing on disability grounds do so without reference to these neonates.   
 
Another group that should be considered are those who have such severe physical congenital 
impairments as to not survive pregnancy and die in-utero.  If a prospective parent is unfortunate 
enough to discover that their pregnancy is affected by a condition which will inevitably result in 
death before gestation is complete, but perhaps at a stage of pregnancy which will still require a 
natural delivery, it must be for that parent to decide whether or not the pregnancy be terminated at 
an earlier stage.  The outcome for the fetus would be the same.  Without prenatal testing providing 
this information a woman would be faced with only finding out there was a problem once she had 
gone through her pregnancy and delivery.  The outcome of this situation is the same whether or not 
prenatal testing takes place from the point of view of the fetus. When considering parental 
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autonomy and discrimination against those with disabilities it would seem that under these 
circumstances discrimination is not an issue and, therefore, whether or not prenatal testing takes 
place in this case should be based on what the pregnant woman may feel is in her best interests and 
that of her fetus. 
 
It is clearly essential that whomever is making the decisions does so with the best interests of the 
future child in mind and any decisions will generally be made by a number of parties acting 
together to further these interests, for example, parents and healthcare workers.  Supporting my 
argument that even those with disabilities cannot be completely representative, Shakespeare 
himself acknowledges the existence of disabled people who cannot speak for themselves, the 
example referred to, is those with severe intellectual impairments such as Fragile X syndrome.110  
In these circumstances, Shakespeare concedes that it may perhaps be appropriate for family and 
other advocates to contribute to any decisions made.  
 
This supports the overall arguments of my thesis in that rather than the decisions being made with 
regards to prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy being discriminatory against those with 
disabilities, they are made with the best interests of the future child within the context of its wider 
family based on individual circumstances, and not based upon the opinions of others as to how 
disability more generally may affect a person’s life. It also further emphasises the arguments in 
chapter three, supporting the importance of respecting reproductive autonomy where decisions 
are being made on behalf of a future disabled child. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
110 Fragile X is an X-linked condition carried by the mother.  If this is passed on to a male fetus it will result 
in moderate to severe intellectual impairment and behavioural problems.  Prenatal testing is available for this 
condition for those know to be at risk of transmitting this gene mutation on to their offspring. 
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  5.4  Summary and conclusions  
 
In this chapter I have reviewed arguments against prenatal testing put forward by those 
representing the interests of people with disabilities and those who oppose prenatal testing on the 
grounds that it is discriminatory.  I have discussed the importance of not regarding a fetal 
abnormality as an isolated finding but also by the impact it will have on the interests of the future 
person, the prospective parents and others who will be directly affected. 
 
I have argued against the claims that the effect of prenatal testing will be to reduce the number of 
people with disabilities in society or negatively impact on the provision of support that is offered.  
In fact, with an aging population and medical technological advances improving support to 
disabled people will be more important than ever, and rightly so. 
 
I have discussed the Expressivist and Parental Attitude Arguments and concluded that prenatal 
testing, whether or not this is followed by termination of an affected pregnancy, does not make 
judgements about the lives of those with disabilities or suggest that their lives are not worthwhile.  
The disability discrimination arguments do not take into account the many reasons that influence 
a couple as to whether they decide to have their pregnancy tested.  Not only do the physical and/or 
mental impairments of the fetus need to be considered but also the impact this has for the future 
child in terms of harm to their interests, including the experience of pain and suffering, but also 
the wider implications to the interests of others including the parents and pre-existing children. 
 
The decision to have a pregnancy tested does not say anything, negative or otherwise, about those 
living with disabilities but is a very personal decision which takes into account the desires, 
interests and circumstances of the individuals involved.  Whilst the views of people living with 
disabilities is undoubtedly important in this debate it is by no means representative particularly 
when considering those pregnancies for which late termination of pregnancy is an option.  
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Disabled people who are able to put their views forward may be no more representative of very 
severely disabled people, especially those with very severe mental impairments, than anyone else.   
 
I argue that the parents are best placed to make these decisions and that parents should be able to 
make autonomous reproductive decisions based on information that they are able to gain 
throughout the process.  Others argue that it is the disabled community who are in the best position 
to speak out against prenatal testing and abortion. The fetus is not in a position to consider its own 
future and I have argued that there is no single person alone who can categorically decide what is 
in the future child’s best interest.  Therefore, the prospective parents are in a better position than 
anyone, providing any decisions they make are based on balanced information which is relevant 
to their particular circumstances, and hence promoting the importance of reproductive autonomy. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
The promotion of reproductive autonomy in future policy 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In my previous chapters, I advocated and supported the use of prenatal testing by arguing that 
allowing such testing, with or without termination of pregnancy, promotes and respects 
reproductive autonomy.  I also argued that prenatal testing does not discriminate against those 
with disabilities and does not make judgements about the lives of people who live with 
disability.  This is also supported by my argument that the fetus does not have full moral status 
and therefore terminating the life of a disabled fetus cannot be compared to ending the life of a 
person with a disability. 
 
I have argued that it is not only the life of the future child that should be considered when 
deciding whether or not termination of pregnancy following prenatal testing is justified, but 
also the harm that could be caused to the interests of the prospective parents and other people, 
who have full moral status, that are directly affect by a disabled child’s birth. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the problems with the current decision making 
processes around prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy, particularly late in gestation, 
by fetal medicine specialists and their multidisciplinary teams, and to use my arguments to 
promote a change in the context of these discussions so that not only the potential harm to the 
fetus is considered, but also the harm to other relevant parties.  This is important because these 
individuals, as persons, have full moral status1 and should be afforded the opportunity to make 
autonomous reproductive decisions about matters which will affect them directly, and where 
                                                 
1 I discussed the concept of personhood and moral status in chapter 2 (section 2.2.4)  
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harm to their interests may occur.  This change will need to involve the prospective parents 
more in the decision-making process and more consideration of their interests, and provide 
them with an opportunity to support medical professionals in justifying their decision to allow 
a late termination of pregnancy to proceed.  As the clinical geneticist is involved in the 
prospective parent’s care from an early stage in the process, when prenatal testing is initially 
being considered, and they maintain a supportive role throughout the decision-making process, 
they would be well placed to enhance the involvement of prospective parents and, where 
necessary, act as an advocate for them. 
 
 
6.2 Fetal Management 
 
Although I have argued in support of prenatal testing, which may subsequently result in parents 
opting to terminate an affected pregnancy, in that it promotes reproductive autonomy, this does 
not correlate with what happens in reality, in my experience, when fetal medicine and other 
specialists meet to discuss the future management of such cases.  Those prospective parents 
who may wish to end a pregnancy, particularly late in gestation, may not be provided with the 
opportunity to do so.  Ultimately, two healthcare professionals need to agree that a late 
termination can be justified based on the fetus having a substantial risk of serious handicap due 
to the presence of a physical or mental abnormality if it is born.2  This decision will be based 
on clinical information but also on the subjective opinion of the doctors and may be influenced 
by their own moral views. 
 
Whilst prospective parents may have had the opportunity to take advantage of prenatal testing 
during their pregnancy this does not guarantee them ultimately being able to exercise their 
reproductive choices, as the medical professionals act as gate keepers at this late stage of 
                                                 
2 Abortion Act 1967, Section 1(d), HMSO: London 
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pregnancy.  Presumably those working within the field of fetal medicine and clinical genetics 
advocate the use of prenatal testing and are not explicitly opposed to the idea of termination of 
pregnancy.  Clinical geneticists and counsellors provide advice and information about prenatal 
testing and the potential outcomes, including termination of affected pregnancies, and it can 
therefore be reasonably assumed that they do not conscientiously object to the procedure itself 
or else they would not work in an area where it is an integral requirement.  Similarly, those 
obstetricians who work within the subspecialty of fetal medicine offer and perform 
terminations, including those up to birth.  Whilst there are some obstetricians who do not offer 
terminations, it would not be possible for those who subspecialise in fetal medicine to function 
in their role if they did not perform abortions, including those that require feticide.  However, 
if parents find out that their pregnancy is affected by a congenital abnormality later in gestation 
their choices may be limited by the judgements of these same healthcare professionals.3   
 
If information about their fetus only becomes available close to or after twenty-four weeks of 
gestation greater justification is needed to end a pregnancy. However, a decision to terminate a 
pregnancy due to a given abnormality before this point may have been permitted.  This greater 
justification is due to the current abortion legislation and will also be influenced by the 
healthcare professionals own ethical framework,4 and what they consider to be a serious enough 
abnormality. Many argue that this should be the case as the fetus is now said to be viable,5 
necessitating the need for feticide before the pregnancy is terminated.  In reality, this is more 
likely to be an issue from twenty-two weeks of gestation when feticide is generally employed 
to ensure that the fetus is born dead.6 
 
                                                 
3 In practice this will generally be after 22 weeks gestation as feticide will be required. 
4 Statham H, Solomou W, Green J (2006) ‘Later termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’ British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 113(12), pp 
1402-1411 
5 Chervenak FA, McCullough LB, Campbell S (1995) ‘Is third trimester abortion justified?’,  British 
Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 102, pp 434-435 
6 Graham RH, Robson SC, Ranking JM ‘Understanding feticide: An analytical review’, Social Sciences 
and Medicine 66(2), pp 289-300 
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Fetal medicine specialists need to work within the law and need to be able to justify agreeing 
to the termination of such a pregnancy.  There is no agreed list or criteria as to what constitutes 
an abnormality that is serious enough to justify ending a pregnancy after twenty-four weeks,7 
and, therefore, there are no clear legal definitions or clear limits on permissibility.8  This, 
therefore, depends on the judgement of the healthcare professionals involved,9 and is likely to 
be influenced by their own experiences and values. 
 
In my experience working as a clinical geneticist and with fetal medicine specialists 
pregnancies affected by abnormalities that are picked up later in gestation are discussed 
amongst healthcare professionals in fetal management meetings, generally in specialist tertiary 
hospitals.  The purpose of these meetings is to discuss the nature of the abnormality and how it 
might be managed, whether that is by some form of in-utero treatment (such as using 
nephrostomy drains in a fetus whose kidneys are shown to be obstructed) or by allowing the 
parents to end the pregnancy should they wish, assuming this is agreed to by two healthcare 
professionals.  Those attending the meeting generally include obstetricians with a special 
interest in fetal medicine, and who are likely to be the people agreeing to the abortion, signing 
the forms and performing the procedure, in addition to specialist midwives and clinical 
geneticists.  The role of the geneticist in these discussions is to provide advice and information 
on the condition or abnormality itself with regards to what is known about the condition and its 
prognosis.10  The geneticist may also have a role in confirming the diagnosis based on test 
results and physical findings picked up on fetal ultrasound scans and more specialised magnetic 
resonance imaging.  It is ultimately the fetal medicine specialists, however, who decide whether 
or not they are prepared to perform the procedure. They are legally responsible for this with the 
                                                 
7 Royal College of Obstetrics & Gynaecology (2010) Termination of pregnancy for foetal abnormality 
in England, Scotland and Wales: Report of a working party, RCOG: London 
8 Rodeck CH, Bewley S (1994) ‘Late abortion for fetal abnormality’ in Bewley S, Ward RH (eds) 
Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG Press, London, pp 262-267 
9 Lilford R (1994) ‘Decisions about severe abnormality, damage and death’ in Bewley S, Ward RH 
(eds) Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG Press, London, pp 277-284 
10 Marteau TM (2005) ‘Towards informed decisions about prenatal testing: A review’, Prenatal 
Diagnosis 15(13), pp 1215-1226 
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risk of prosecution if a termination is felt to have been performed inappropriately.11  The patient 
does of course have the option of a second opinion if the termination is refused at this stage; 
however, there is obviously no guarantee that the outcome will be different. 
 
As mentioned above, there is no professionally recognised guidance list of conditions that are 
thought to be serious enough to allow late termination of pregnancy.  One concern about 
drawing up such a list is that it would identify certain conditions and send out a negative 
message specifically about them.12  All conditions are variable regarding the extent to which 
they cause disability or suffering.  Spina bifida, for example, can range from being relatively 
mild to a seriously disabling condition13 and therefore there would be problems with having 
this referred to generally within a list.  There is concern that a proscribed list would be 
unworkable for this reason and may result in reduced patient care.14  There is also a danger that 
parents whose pregnancy is affected by a particular condition that does happen to fall within 
the agreed conditions may feel pressured to terminate their pregnancy, and may even feel 
irresponsible for not doing so.15  
 
A role of the clinical geneticist that I believe should be enhanced is that of advocate for the 
family. Having established a supportive relationship with the prospective parents the clinical 
geneticist is well placed to not only provide clinical information about the fetus, based on test 
results and knowledge of the diagnosed condition, but also represent the prospective parents in 
putting forward their views about the potential impact having a disabled child will have on their 
                                                 
11 Statham H, Solomou W, Green J (2006) ‘Later termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’ British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 113(12), pp 
1402-1411 
12 Savulescu J (2001) ‘Is current practice around late termination of pregnancy eugenic and 
discriminatory? Maternal interests and abortion’, Journal of Medical Ethics 27, pp 165-171 
13 Dennis M, Landry SH, Barnes M, Fletcher JM (2006) ‘A model of neurocognitive function in spina 
bifida over the life span’ Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 12(2), pp 285-296 
14 Statham H, Solomou W, Green J (2006) ‘Later termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’ British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 113(12), pp 
1402-1411 
15 Korenromp MJ, Page-Christiaens GCML, van den Bout J, Mulder EJH, Visser GHA (2006) ‘Is there 
pressure from society to terminate pregnancy in case of a fetal anomaly?, Prenatal Diagnosis 26(1), pp 
85-86 
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own interests, and on the interests of other children they have who may also be affected by the 
same condition.  The clinical geneticist may have supported this family through similar 
circumstances before due to previously affected pregnancies or affected children, who may or 
may not still be alive.  They may be in the unique position, therefore, of knowing this family 
better than anyone else from a personal clinical perspective. The importance and nature of this 
role is something that I will develop in subsequent discussions in this chapter. 
 
 
6.3 Implications for reproductive autonomy 
 
Where parents undergo prenatal testing and are informed that their pregnancy is affected by a 
disabling condition later in gestation the freedom of their reproductive choices may be limited. 
For example, a couple who find that their fetus is affected by Achondroplasia, which for some 
reason had not been picked up earlier in gestation, may decide they want to end the pregnancy.  
In my experience this is not a condition that clinicians would consider serious enough to justify 
late termination as the future child, although of short stature and with some physical restrictions, 
would be able to function well in society and have normal intelligence.  This may appear unfair 
on the grounds that time rather than the nature of the disabling condition and future welfare of 
the child is the determining constrain upon their reproductive autonomy.  Where a mild 
abnormality is discovered earlier in pregnancy a termination is likely to be an option for the 
parents but not late in gestation where a more serious (but not severe enough) abnormality may 
be found.  A normal pregnancy can also be ended at this earlier stage.  However, if parents are 
unfortunate enough to find out there is an abnormality after twenty-two weeks the option of a 
termination cannot be guaranteed. It is important that parents are aware of this when making 
decisions about prenatal testing at this point in pregnancy.   
 
Parents should be given the opportunity to discuss the potential outcomes with a fetal medicine 
specialist in advance of testing and have an indication as to when a termination may be 
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permissible, and when it is not.  Again, the role of the clinical geneticist is pivotal in this regard 
and when discussing the option of prenatal testing for these types of conditions early referral to 
a fetal medicine specialist should be considered.  Some parents may choose not to have testing 
if a termination is not an option.  Others may still decide to go ahead knowing that any 
information testing provides may aid delivery and immediate after care.  If prospective parents 
make a decision about prenatal testing based on the premise that a termination is possible, when 
in fact it is not, this not only limits their reproductive autonomy in not allowing them to 
ultimately take the action they want, but it also means that the original decision to have had 
prenatal testing is also flawed as it was based on erroneous information.  Some prospective 
parents may have made the decision not to have prenatal testing if they could not ultimately 
decide to end their pregnancy and this, therefore, raises issues around consent and whether or 
not it was fully informed and therefore valid.  Early engagement and discussion between the 
fetal medicine specialists and clinical geneticist is essential therefore, rather than this only 
taking place once prenatal testing has been performed and a late termination has been requested 
by the parents, which then needs justification by the clinicians responsible for it. 
 
 
6.4 Difficulties in decision making and harm to others 
 
The difficulty for healthcare professionals is in deciding on what is serious enough with regards 
to a disability or abnormality to permit a late termination of pregnancy.  Whilst fetal medicine 
specialists are extremely unlikely to choose to develop their careers in this particular area of 
obstetrics if they objected to ending pregnancies for whatever reason, the decisions they make 
are likely to be influenced by their own moral views, as well as being made within the confines 
of the current abortion law.  It is natural that different people have different views and ideas as 
to what constitutes a serious disability and what they would regard as appropriate to allow a 
pregnancy at that stage to be ended.  It is difficult to see how these doctors can be truly objective 
about these decisions and not allow their own personal beliefs to influence them. There is 
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evidence of individual differences between healthcare professional’s attitudes towards 
abnormalities in addition to a shift in attitudes over time, with regards to conditions that would 
fulfil the legal criteria.16 
 
There is plenty of literature discussing the impact of termination of pregnancy on women and 
the psychological impact this has on them.17,18,19,20 It is important to remember that women and 
couples who contemplate late termination of pregnancy due to an abnormality do so as a last 
resort.  By this stage in pregnancy women will, under normal circumstances, have had their 
routine antenatal tests, including screening blood tests which predict their risk of conditions 
such as Down syndrome and other chromosomal abnormalities, and a detailed anomaly 
ultrasound scan at around twenty weeks of gestation.  All of these tests may have been 
reassuring and for some reason new concerns have arisen later, resulting in further testing.  The 
news of a problem with their fetus at this stage must be devastating and a decision to end the 
pregnancy will not be one taken lightly or without much thought and anguish.  The prospective 
parents will have been looking forward to the birth of their child and may have started to make 
preparations for its arrival.  Other children and relatives will be looking forward to the addition 
of a new member to their family.   
 
Discussions within fetal management meetings tend to focus on the congenital abnormality in 
the fetus and the disability that is likely to result as a consequence of it.  It is the clinician’s 
views on that disability and the impact it will have on the life of the future child that will 
                                                 
16 Statham H, Solomou W, Green J (2006) ‘Later termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’ British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 113(12), pp 
1402-1411 
17 Korenromp M (1992) ‘Termination of pregnancy on genetic grounds: coping with grieving’, Journal 
of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynaecology 13, pp 93-105 
18 Blumberg BD, Golbus MS, Hanson KH (1975) ‘The psychological sequelae of abortion performed 
for a genetic indication’, American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology 122, pp 299-308 
19 Korenromp M, Christiaens GCML, van den Bout J, Mulder EJH et al (2005) ‘Long-term 
psychological consequences of pregnancy termination for fetal abnormality: a cross sectional study: 
Retrospective study in women’, Prenatal Diagnosis 25, pp 253-260 
20 Davies V, Gledhill J, McFadyen A, Whitlow B, Economides D (2005) ‘Psychological outcome in 
women undergoing termination of pregnancy for ultrasound-detected fetal anomaly in the first and 
second trimesters: a pilot study’, Ultrasound Obstetrics & Gynecology 25, pp 389-392 
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influence the decisions as to whether to allow a late termination of pregnancy to be performed.  
If a fetus is found to have anencephaly or Thanatophoric dysplasia, both of which are associated 
with stillbirth or very limited postnatal survival, it is very unlikely that a late termination would 
be denied.21 However, where a condition may cause a physical abnormality but is not associated 
with limited survival or intellectual difficulties doctors may not agree to allow a late termination 
to proceed on the basis that the future person will have a reasonable life in their opinion, despite 
their physical or intellectual difficulties.  This judgement is based on the doctor’s views on the 
prognosis of the condition.  It is important to bear in mind that they themselves will not be the 
one responsible for the child for the rest of its life.  This links to my arguments in chapter four 
(section 4.2.2.i) regarding the discussion of harm caused by disability in the fetus to the interests 
of, not only the future child, but also other directly affected individuals.  As I have discussed in 
chapter two, those individuals have full moral status, whereas the fetus does not.  The harm to 
the interests of those individuals and how their lives may be affected should also be taken into 
account in addition to the direct assessment of the severity of the medical condition in the fetus. 
 
Whilst I have agreed that the fetus has moral status, which increases over the course of the 
pregnancy, it is not the same as the full moral status enjoyed by the mother. The mother has 
already been born and already has established interests, as do others close to her, such as her 
partner and other children.  I have argued that due to the increasing moral status of the 
developing fetus greater justification to terminate a pregnancy is needed as term approaches, 
however, it is not only the anomaly itself which needs to be considered but also the harm that 
may be caused to relevant others.  The decision to terminate a pregnancy, therefore, especially 
late in gestation, can only be made in conjunction with the prospective parents, who interests 
must also be considered. 
 
                                                 
21 Chervenak FA, McCullough LB, Campbell S (1995) ‘Is third trimester abortion justified?’,  British 
Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology  102, pp 434-435 
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In chapter three, with respect to reproductive autonomy, and in chapter four and five, with 
respect to disability and the potential harms it can cause, I have reiterated the point that it is not 
only the future person who is affected by the anomaly and subsequent disability, but also the 
parents and others close to and directly involved with the future person.  How a disability in 
the fetus affects those directly involved will vary from one family to another and will inevitably 
have a variable impact between different people.  This will depend on their views of that 
particular disability and also on the interests that they currently hold and the interests they hope 
to have in the future. 
 
Clinical geneticists counselling couples who find their pregnancy is affected by an abnormality 
should not only focus on the condition affecting their fetus and the physical or intellectual 
disability this will result in, but should also offer advice and potential solutions.  It is hoped that 
this may address some of the concerns they have about the impact having a disabled child will 
have on that child, but also on their own interests.  Parents need a balanced picture of how the 
disability will affect them and their child in order to make the difficult decisions they face in 
this situation.  Parents should be afforded the opportunity to meet other people affected by the 
condition (either directly as the person with the condition, or indirectly by those living with that 
person, whose lives are also affected).  They should be made aware of the care and support that 
is available and ways in which the condition can be managed, not just medically but emotionally 
and practically, so that they have a full understanding of the impact the condition will have and 
what adjustments may need to be and can be made.  The provision of this type of information 
may have different outcomes.  In could result in some couples who may not have understood 
the seriousness of the condition opting for a termination when they otherwise would not have, 
or it may mean that other couples feel more reassured and decide to continue a pregnancy that 
they would otherwise have ended.  Either way, they have made a decision based on balanced 
information that has taken their interests and needs into account, and that of any other family 
members that may be affected. 
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However, even where prospective parents are given this information to help them reach a 
decision, if the abnormality is detected late in pregnancy the decision to terminate is not one 
that they have full control over. This is left with the healthcare professionals who discuss their 
‘case’ with respect to how it will affect the future child.  Whilst prospective parents should be 
given the opportunity to discuss their situation with other parties who can assist them in 
reaching a decision, healthcare professionals should also seek appropriate impartial advice and 
this may, for example, include approaching their clinical ethics committee to allow the complex 
ethical issues involved in such decision-making to be fully explored.22 
 
In my view, there needs to be more involvement with the prospective parents when decisions 
are made about late termination of pregnancy.  Healthcare professionals make decisions based 
on the clinical findings of the tests performed on the fetus and what is known about the 
condition generally, rather than how the abnormality may affect this particular fetus and those 
with full moral status who will have the responsibility of caring for and supporting the future 
child, and may also have other children to consider in addition to their own interests.  I have 
discussed in chapter four how the interests of others may be harmed by the birth of a disabled 
child and how it is those who will be affected that should be in a position to make a decision 
about the impact this will have on them.  It may be that by having a greater opportunity to 
express the views of prospective parents during discussions at management meetings different 
decisions may be made, which are tailored more towards the particular family who will be 
affected.  The impact on the prospective parents and other children can be taken into account 
when considering what harms may occur as a result of the fetal abnormality, but also a more 
rounded sense of how the life of the future child may be affected and influenced by those around 
it.  The parent’s emotional resilience can be taken into account, their ability to care for the child 
and how it may also affect their lives and future interests can be considered.  A more holistic 
view of the life of the future child, and not just taking into account the potential disability, 
                                                 
22 McLean SAM (2007) ‘What and who are clinical ethics committees for?’ Journal of Medical Ethics 
33(9), pp 497-500 
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should be considered and used to inform the decision-making process and this is something that 
the clinical geneticist should promote and encourage.  This will also assist the healthcare 
professionals involved as their decisions will also be better informed, being based on more 
extensive relevant information.   
 
The role of the clinical geneticist is pivotal at this point in the process, not only in terms of 
providing clinical information about the fetus and the prognosis in order to assist fetal 
management specialists in justifying whether or not a later termination can take place, but also 
in acting as an advocate for prospective parents.  The current format of fetal management 
meetings is to consider the clinical facts of a particular case and what the appropriate action 
should be based on those facts.  The geneticist, having been involved in the prospective parent’s 
care from the outset and having had the opportunity to have in-depth discussions with them 
about their anxieties, may be well placed to relay this to the rest of the team so that this can also 
be taken into account when decisions are made.  
 
 
6.5 Considering the reality of termination 
 
Whilst the termination process will be discussed with the patient and her consent sought it is 
easy to talk about late termination of pregnancy as a medical process from an academic 
perspective without taking the time to consider what it means, both practically and from an 
emotional perspective for those directly involved.  Feticide is performed by ultrasound-guided 
injection of a chemical, such as potassium or lidocaine, into the fetal heart.  This procedure is 
undoubtedly stressful and painful for the pregnant woman.  It is then necessary to wait until the 
fetal heart stops beating and this may involve the pregnant woman leaving the hospital to go 
home, knowing her fetus is dying or dead, to return the next day to complete the process.  A 
termination at this gestation is a very different procedure to those that occur earlier in 
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pregnancy.23   In the case of late termination of pregnancy, once fetal death is confirmed by 
ultrasound, labour is induced and the woman has to go through labour and give birth vaginally, 
just as she would have done had her pregnancy been normal.  It is easy to discuss late 
termination of pregnancy without considering these facts and the obvious psychological and 
physical trauma this will inevitably cause.  The process will be explained to the prospective 
parents before they make their decision and before their informed consent can be obtained as it 
is for any medically invasive procedure.  Some parents may choose not to terminate a pregnancy 
on receiving this information.  This may be the case, for example, when the neonate is likely to 
die soon after birth and the outcome will be the same regardless of whether active steps are 
taken to terminate the pregnancy or whether it is continued.  Either way the prospective parents 
will have to face the prospect of going through labour and delivery.  Psychological sequelae 
following termination are well known24 and as well as counselling prior to termination this is 
also available to couples after the procedure has taken place.25 
 
Other parents may opt for a termination rather than have to cope with the psychological impact 
of continuing a pregnancy, possibly to full term, knowing what the outcome will be.  They may 
prefer to expedite the inevitable outcome and take some control of the situation.  It really is a 
very personal decision and it is only those directly affected and who have to live with the 
decision that can really know what is in their own best interests in this situation.  This 
emphasises the importance of reproductive autonomy and, particularly for these types of cases, 
it highlights the fact that decisions are not made on the basis of discriminating against those 
with disabilities. 
                                                 
23 In early pregnancy a medical termination is possible which involves taking medication in the form of 
mifepristone and prostaglandin which induce a miscarriage.  From seven weeks a surgical termination 
is performed by vacuum aspiration or suction termination to remove the fetus from the womb under 
local or general anaesthetic.  In both procedures, the patient does not go through labour or normal 
delivery. 
24 Canario C, Figueiredo B, Ricou M (2011) ‘Women and men's psychological adjustment after 
abortion: a six months prospective pilot study,’ Journal Of Reproductive And Infant Psychology,29(3) 
pp 262–275 
25 Organisations such as the British Pregnancy Advisory Services offer counseling in the UK 
(www.bpas.org) 
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6.6 Is adoption a viable alternative? 
 
There are those who argue that where an abnormality will not result in very limited survival, 
but may result in severe physical or intellectual disability, adoption of the child is an ethically 
preferable alternative to a termination.26  This would relieve the parents of the burden of caring 
for a disabled child but would not deny the child of its existence and having a future of its own.   
This view may or may not take into account the effect of the disability on the future child, but 
it is unlikely to take into account the harm to the interests of the prospective parents, in terms 
of both their own psychological welfare and that of any family members, which may arise from 
having the child adopted.  It is one thing to have a child adopted who is unwanted; this may 
relieve the parents of any guilt they may have over not wanting the child and allows them to 
ensure that the child has the best chance of as good a future as possible.  Biological parents may 
be able to reassure themselves that they have done the best thing for the child and that it will 
have a life that it would not otherwise have had.  Despite this, however, there is evidence that 
biological parents do suffer grief and a sense of loss after having had a child adopted which can 
lead to significant psychological problems.27 
 
The circumstances where disability is concerned are very different, however.  Where an 
abnormality has been detected late in pregnancy prospective parents have begun to imagine life 
with their much-wanted child and have begun to make plans for the future.  Other siblings may 
also be looking forward to the birth of their brother or sister.  I have argued in chapter four 
(section 4.2.2.i) that decisions about prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy should also 
take into account the harm to the interests of others directly affected, and so too should decisions 
                                                 
26 Hare RM (1993) ‘The abnormal child. Moral dilemmas of doctors and parents’ in Hare RM (ed) 
Essays on Bioethics, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 185-191 
27 Condon J (1986) ‘Psychological disability in women who relinquish a baby for adoption’, Medical 
Journal of Australia 144, pp 117-119 
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about adoption due to the emotional and psychological effects it could have on those making 
the decision (the parents) and other family members who would also inevitably have emotional 
ties to the child.28  Prospective parents may make a decision to end a pregnancy due to the 
impact the disability will have on their child and their desire not to see their own child suffer, 
in addition to the harm it may cause to them and others close to them.  Making a decision to 
have a child adopted under these circumstances does not remove the harm that is caused to their 
future child.  In addition to this, the harm to their own interests in having to support and cope 
emotionally with having a disabled child will be replaced with having to manage the emotions 
that are associated with knowing that the child, who was much anticipated, is now being cared 
for elsewhere by someone else.  This could potentially cause more harm to the parents than 
having had the pregnancy terminated.29  Adoption, whilst being a viable option, cannot be a 
mandatory alternative to having a termination due to severe disability.  If it is chosen it needs 
to be a decision that is made by the prospective parents and not one that is enforced on them if 
they make the decision that they do not want to care for a disabled child.  Any such policy 
would in itself restrict the reproductive freedom of prospective parents. 
 
 
6.7 Psychological impact on healthcare professionals 
 
I have mentioned that literature exists which discusses the emotional impact terminating a 
pregnancy has on women undergoing a termination.  There is very little literature, however, on 
the psychological impact it has on healthcare professionals who perform these procedures, 
which has been described as ‘agonizingly difficult’30 and a ‘heavy emotional burden’.31  Whilst 
                                                 
28 Logan J (1996) ‘Birth mothers and their Mental Health: Unchartered Territory’, British Journal of 
Social Work 26(5), pp 609-625 
29 Giubilini A, Minerva F (2013) ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 39, pp 261-263 
30 Lilford R (1994) ‘Decisions about sever abnormality, damage and death’ in Bewley S, Ward RH 
(eds) Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG Press, London, pp 277-284 
31 Lilford R (1994) ‘Decisions about sever abnormality, damage and death’ in Bewley S, Ward RH 
(eds) Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG Press, London, pp 277-284 
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they may not conscientiously object to abortion in itself they will have their own views as to 
when termination is and is not appropriate based on their own moral judgements.  There are 
those who believe that termination of pregnancy should be allowed for all pregnancies,32 
regardless of the reason.  If a woman wants to end her pregnancy she should be entitled to do 
this and for her to have control over her own bodily integrity.33  Again, it is one thing to put 
these arguments forward but we also need to consider the fact that the procedure itself has to 
be performed by another person with their own moral views and beliefs. 
 
Termination of pregnancy, whether or not it involves feticide by injection, involves killing a 
member of the human species.  Whether or not one argues that the fetus has full moral status, 
or whether or not the fetus is a person, it is understandable that termination is unlikely to be 
seen as a neutral act.  People choose a career in medicine for many reasons but generally they 
have a desire to help people.  There tends to be a general assumption, particularly by the public, 
that the role of doctors is to save lives.34  In fact a more accurate description of a doctor’s role 
is to act in the best interests of their patient.35  For example, sometimes it is more important to 
ensure that a patient has a comfortable and dignified death rather than to try to keep them alive.  
This is recognised by the development of specialities such as palliative care and the introduction 
of ‘Do Not Attempt Resuscitation (DNAR)’ orders. It is inevitable that doctors will have a view 
on abortion, just like anyone else, and those who object to it will avoid specialities that involve 
it.  However, even those doctors who do go into relevant medical specialities are likely to have 
their own limits as to what they believe is acceptable.  These beliefs will inevitably affect the 
decisions they make with regards to late termination and disability.  Whether a woman is 
allowed to have a late termination, therefore, may depend on the healthcare professional she 
                                                 
32 Purdy L (1999) ‘Are Pregnant Women Fetal Containers?’ in Kuhse H, Singer P (eds) Bioethics: An 
Anthology, Blackwell Publishers, pp 71-81 
33 Purdy L (1999) ‘Are Pregnant Women Fetal Containers?’ in Kuhse H, Singer P (eds) Bioethics: An 
Anthology, Blackwell Publishers, pp 71-81 
34 Reyes EA (2013) ‘More in U.S. say doctors should try to save lives, no matter what’, Los Angeles 
Times November 21, ( www.articles.latimes.com as cited on 2 January 2016) 
35 General Medical Council (2013) Good Medical Practice, GMC: London, p 2 
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sees, and it is possible that she could have received a different decision had an alternative doctor 
been involved in her care.36  There is evidence of professionals having a difference of opinion 
when considering what abnormality is severe enough to justify termination of pregnancy and, 
therefore, the options that are open to a patient is determined by the subjective values of those 
caring for them.37  Presumably this is partly why two healthcare professionals have to be 
involved in the decision making process, to ensure some objectivity.  It is difficult to see how 
this issue can be overcome.  Doctors who perform terminations have to be able to justify their 
decisions, not only in terms of complying with the law, but also for themselves personally.  
They too are likely to be psychologically affected by the decisions they make and forcing 
doctors to perform terminations that they themselves do not feel comfortable to perform could 
cause harm to their own interests and well-being.  Forcing doctors to undertake such procedures 
against their own personal views could potentially discourage doctors from going into this 
branch of medicine, which could ultimately then limit the availability of terminations 
particularly in the late stages of pregnancy.  If a list of criteria existed as to what makes a late 
termination justifiable this may make it easier for doctors as the decision would not be based 
on their own personal judgements but on set guidance.  However, I have discussed the reason 
why having such criteria, or a list of conditions, would not be appropriate.   
 
While doctors have to perform feticide and be involved in the process of late termination it is 
difficult to see how this situation can change.  However, there are ways of ensuring that as 
much consideration is given to the parent’s interests as possible.  In order to respect the doctor’s 
autonomy and aid them in making decisions they too need to weight up all the relevant 
information. Therefore, rather than doctors basing their decisions solely on the condition of the 
fetus, they should also ensure they have a full understanding of the views of the prospective 
parents.   
                                                 
36 Chervenak FA, McCullough LB, Campbell S (1999) ‘Third trimester abortion: is compassion 
enough?’, British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 106, pp 293-296 
37 Savulescu J (2001) ‘Is current practice around late termination of pregnancy eugenic and 
discriminatory? Maternal interests and abortion’, Journal of Medical Ethics 27, pp 165-171 
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Just as for DNAR orders for patients for whom resuscitation is deemed inappropriate those 
directly affected by ending the life of the fetus should be included in the decision-making 
process.  Before a DNAR order is placed on a patient good practice dictates that a discussion 
takes place with the patient (assuming they have the appropriate mental capacity) and their 
close relatives (with the patient’s consent).38  Whilst discussions do obviously occur with the 
prospective parents, usually with their obstetrician who advises them about the termination 
process and with a clinical geneticist who will advise them about the condition, they do not 
play a part in the fetal management meeting where decisions about the justification of 
termination are discussed.  Parents should be afforded the opportunity to explain why they feel 
a termination of pregnancy is appropriate under the circumstances so that the healthcare 
professionals who ultimately have to justify their decision to proceed can take this information 
into account. 
 
 
6.8 Involving prospective parents in fetal management 
 
I have argued about the importance of reproductive autonomy in chapter three, and why this 
needs to be of overriding importance. In this chapter, I have highlighted how this may be limited 
when decisions are being made as to whether a late termination should be allowed (particularly 
as doctors have to take into account the current legal limitations).  I argue that placing greater 
emphasis on reproductive autonomy by considering the harm that can be caused to prospective 
parents and their pre-existing children will help healthcare professionals to reach a decision 
which takes into account the best interests of those who already exist, and who will be affected 
for the rest of their lives.  As it stands at the moment abortion law does allow termination of 
pregnancy up to birth if it is necessary to prevent ‘grave permanent injury to the physical or 
                                                 
38 General Medical Council (2010) Treatment and care towards the end of life: good practice in 
decision making, GMC: London, paragraph 14, p 14 
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mental health of the pregnant woman’.39  Again, as with serious handicap, there is no definition 
of what this means.  However, the best way of this being assessed with regards to late 
termination of pregnancy is for the healthcare professionals involved including and involving 
the prospective mother in their decision-making processes. This will allow them to be in a 
position to assess exactly what impact having a disabled child may have on her future health 
and well-being in view of the impact caring for such a child may have on her future interests 
and the potential harm it could cause to her. 
 
As things currently stand late termination of pregnancy is restricted by the law, by arguments 
about the moral status of the fetus and due to concerns about disability discrimination.  
Although these arguments will prove highly difficult to resolve in light of the continuing debate 
about prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy the purpose of this chapter has been to 
argue how it is possible to enhance reproductive autonomy by involving parents more in fetal 
management decisions and by taking into account the harms that can occur to those other than 
the fetus and future person itself.  In this age of enhancing personalised medicine, with the 
introduction of genomics and pharmacogenetics, so too should decisions about prenatal testing 
and termination be personalised to ensure that they are made in the best interests of all of those 
who will be affected, and not based on views and decisions by those who are not ultimately 
going to have to live with the consequences of the decision that is made.  
 
Prospective parents should be allowed to contribute to fetal management meetings to ensure 
that the decisions made take all of these important factors into account.  It is important to 
acknowledge, however, that having prospective parents attend these particular meetings could 
have a very detrimental effect upon them and this prospect alone may deter them from seeking 
a late abortion, even where this would be the best outcome for them in terms of their QOL 
considerations.  Prospective parents may not feel able to articulate their views to a group of 
                                                 
39 Abortion Act (1967), HMSO: London, section 1(b) 
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professionals when they are facing such difficult circumstances and are emotionally fragile.  
The clinical geneticist, having already established a supportive relationship with them and 
having discussed their concerns and established the effect having a disabled child will have on 
them personally, can act as an advocate, putting their views forward in a measured way having 
ensured that the prospective parents have had the opportunity to weigh up the positives and 
negatives of their situation.  Where prospective parents do want to be directly involved in 
discussions consideration could be given to a specially convened fetal management meeting in 
a supportive environment with a more limited number of professionals. 
 
 
6.9 Summary and conclusions 
 
Having established in chapter two that the fetus does not have full moral status and having 
argued for the importance of reproductive autonomy in chapter three, I concluded that prenatal 
testing does not discriminate against those with disabilities following my discussions in 
chapters four and five.  Having satisfied myself of this, in this chapter, I have discussed the 
limitations that are then placed on prospective parents in terms of their decision-making in 
relation to late termination of pregnancy.   
 
In order to address this I have provided suggestions as to how the role of the clinical geneticist 
can be enhanced in order to ensure that parents understand these potential limitations at the 
outset, but also to ensure that decisions made by healthcare professionals when justifying late 
termination are made following deliberation not only of the clinical findings in the fetus and 
future disability, but also the impact on the interests to the wider family.  Where prospective 
parents do not feel able to articulate their views personally, in view of current format of fetal 
management meetings, I suggest that the geneticist is best placed to act as an advocate for 
families, having established a supportive relationship with them prior to prenatal testing taking 
place.  This will not only assist healthcare professionals in justifying their decisions to allow a 
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late termination to take place, but it will also ensure that reproductive autonomy is promoted 
where decisions about prenatal testing are made. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
 
 
 
As a clinical geneticist supporting prospective parents through the prenatal decision-making 
process it is important to be able to satisfy oneself that this area of practice is ethical. In order 
to do this the aim of my thesis has been to answer two specific questions.  The first is whether 
specific prenatal testing discriminates against those living with disabilities and, the second 
question, whether the existing decision-making process regarding termination of pregnancy due 
to disability supports reproductive autonomy or could be improved. The latter question is based 
on the fact that where late termination of pregnancy is being considered due to fetal 
abnormality, rather than it ultimately being a decision for the prospective parents, the 
justification for this will lie with the clinicians involved.  
 
 I have addressed these questions throughout my thesis with the important consideration of the 
position of the clinical geneticist, as this has not been a significant part of the debate on this 
topic to date.  As well as arguing in response to the above questions that this testing is not 
discriminatory, I have acknowledged that reproductive autonomy, whilst of paramount 
importance, may not be being respected where late termination is requested.  This has led me 
to make recommendations with regards to enhancing the role of the clinical geneticist in 
supporting prospective parents in an advocacy role so that as well as considering the clinical 
disability in the fetus and potential harm to the future child, consideration is also given to the 
potential harm to the interests of the wider family. 
 
In order to establish my position on these questions, I have discussed a range of relevant ethical 
and practical considerations.  I have argued that based on the personhood view of moral status 
the fetus does not have full moral status and as such has a lower moral status than a person 
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already born and living with a disability.  One cannot, therefore, compare killing a fetus with a 
disability to killing an adult with a disability. However, this conclusion did not address the 
apparent discrimination which exists when one considers that there are only certain 
circumstances where late termination is permissible, the most notable of which is severe 
disability.  This late termination is after the point of viability, which is currently regarded as 
twenty-four weeks gestation.  A pregnancy where a severe disability has been identified in the 
fetus can be terminated after this point but one that has no or lesser abnormalities cannot be, 
unless it is threatening the life of the mother.  I concluded that the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy based on the presence of disability was not discriminatory against those living with 
disability, but was based on the harm that may be caused to the interests of the future child and 
the wider family, and it is these interests that also need to be considered in addition to the 
clinical status of the fetus. 
 
I also argued that although the fetus does not have full moral status, its moral status does 
increase as gestation progresses meaning that greater justification is needed for a termination 
to take place as pregnancy advances.  Although this justification may still be based on the 
finding of disability this is not due to any discriminatory attitudes towards disabled people.  
This led to my discussion about the importance of respecting reproductive autonomy, as well 
as the importance of prospective parents being fully involved in decision-making throughout 
the whole process, particularly as their future interests also have the potential to be harmed.   
 
If decisions are made on behalf of a competent adult their interests may be harmed and they 
may be prevented from living the life they may have wanted.  I discussed the importance of 
being able to make our own autonomous decisions because not everyone shares the same beliefs 
and desires and we do not all aspire to the same outcomes.  Reproductive decisions are part of 
this autonomous decision-making process and, therefore, affect not only the fetus but also other 
people who will be closely connected to the future child, making these decisions of utmost 
importance.  Despite arguing for the importance of this, however, I have identified that 
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reproductive autonomy can be limited in some circumstances by those healthcare professionals 
who are offering prenatal testing as an option for prospective parents.  Where the outcome of 
testing reveals a severe abnormality late in gestation the choice of prospective parents may be 
limited by the fact that this is ultimately a decision made by clinicians who tend to focus on the 
clinical findings of the pregnancy and potential disability to the future child, rather than taking 
a holistic view of the fetus in the context of the wider family and considering the potential harm 
to the interests of other relevant third parties. In order to ensure that reproductive autonomy is 
promoted as much as possible, I recommended that the role of the clinical geneticist include 
acting as an advocate for prospective parents during fetal management meetings to ensure that 
their views were fully considered. 
 
I have discussed the models and definitions of disability and harm and have considered these 
in terms of the individual who will be born with a disability and also in terms of other directly 
affected third parties.  I have concluded that harm is not simply caused by defective functioning 
of anatomy or physiology but occurs where a person’s interests are interfered with in a negative 
way.  A disability, therefore, may cause harm in differing degrees to different people and 
conclusions about the harm a disability may cause cannot be made on a general basis or be 
assumed to apply to everyone in the same way.   
 
Harm to interests is a very individual issue and only those who are going to be harmed can 
articulate this.  Disability means different things to different people and therefore this highlights 
the importance of promoting reproductive autonomy and providing prospective parents with 
the information they need to make informed decisions about their pregnancy and future child.  
The clinical geneticist is perfectly placed to ensure that prospective parents not only receive 
clinical, diagnostic and prognostic information about their future child, including the benefits 
the child may bring, but also have the opportunity to take part in deliberative discussions about 
how their own interests may be affected. 
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Having considered the moral status of the fetus and the importance of promoting and enhancing 
reproductive autonomy, I discussed the arguments put forward by those representing disabled 
people who are of the view that prenatal testing discriminates against those with disabilities.  I 
argued against the Expressivist Argument which claims that prenatal testing devalues disabled 
people and makes negative judgements about them.  This was on the grounds that the 
Expressivist argument did not take into account others who will be directly affected by the birth 
of a disabled child or the harm to their interests, bearing in mind that these third parties have a 
higher moral status to the fetus.  I also argued against the Parental Attitude argument which, I 
concluded, does not fully take into account why parents might not wish to have a disabled child 
in their family.  This may not only be for their own interests, which are not insignificant bearing 
in mind any decision will have a major impact on those interests, but also the interests of the 
future child and any pre-existing child, who may themselves be disabled by the same condition 
which is being tested for. 
 
What the Parental Attitude argument did highlight was the need for promoting reproductive 
autonomy in that it is essential to ensure that prospective parents do not base their decisions on 
misinformation and that they have balanced information to make autonomous decisions and to 
ensure that their reproductive choices are respected.  This balanced information needs to be 
gathered from a number of relevant sources so that they do not only have a diagnosis for their 
future child but also some form of prognosis, and to ensure that the positive benefits of having 
their child are also highlighted and discussed.  Rather than discriminate against those with 
disabilities, I concluded that prenatal testing and appropriate information-giving and 
counselling may encourage some parents to continue a pregnancy that would otherwise have 
been ended based on misinformation and misguided attitudes to disability.   
 
I argued that those living with disabilities are not necessarily in any better position to represent 
other disabled people than prospective parents, or those parents who have or are caring for 
disabled children themselves.  In addition to ensuring that prospective parents have balanced 
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information it is equally important that healthcare professionals looking after them also take 
into account the interests of prospective parents and those of others, such as siblings, in order 
to make decisions with respect to late termination of pregnancy. Again, the clinical geneticist, 
having established a supportive relationship with the prospective parents early on in the 
process, is well placed to act as an advocate for them to ensure that their interests are also taken 
into account when clinicians are considering the justifications for late termination. 
 
I have concluded that prenatal testing does not discriminate against people living with 
disability, based on the fetus having a lower moral status than people already born, and based 
on the need to consider the harms caused to third parties who have full moral status.  However, 
with regards to reproductive autonomy, whilst I am satisfied that this is of utmost importance 
and its promotion is essential to ensuring appropriate decision-making and avoiding 
discrimination in prenatal testing by preventing decisions being based on misinformation, I 
have highlighted problems with the current practices involved in late termination of pregnancy. 
 
In chapter six, I discussed these problems and the fact that ultimately it is the healthcare 
professionals who decide whether or not a late termination of pregnancy, based on the finding 
of a severe abnormality in the fetus, is justified.  There is no legal or professional guidance as 
to what constitutes severe disability and therefore this assessment is made by healthcare 
professionals involved in the care of the mother and fetus.  They are the ultimate gate keepers 
as to whether a termination of pregnancy can proceed.  My concern is that these decisions are 
taken after discussion within a multidisciplinary team that does not include the parents or 
consideration of the parent’s justifications for deciding to request a termination.  Whilst fetal 
medicine specialists and clinical geneticists will speak to the parents about testing that is 
available during pregnancy, this will be more in the form of providing them with information 
about the physical condition to help them decide whether they want to go ahead with prenatal 
testing with the aim of establishing a diagnosis.  It needs to be made clear to prospective parents 
at this point that, depending on the findings, their reproductive autonomy may then be limited 
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as a late termination will require two healthcare professionals, one of whom will perform the 
termination, to agree to it. 
 
Whilst it is unlikely that this position will change and the law will continue to require this gate 
keeping in view of the emotive nature of prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy, 
reproductive autonomy can be enhanced as can the decision-making of the doctors.  Clinicians 
also need to understand the views of the prospective parents and the potential harms to their 
interests in order to make an autonomous decision about how to proceed, and they should not 
only focus on the clinical picture presented before them.  If this is so then there is every reason 
why the considerations and arguments I have presented in this thesis should be incorporated 
into professional thinking and guidance for doctors working in this area. 
 
If the implications of having a disabled child are taken more into account with regards to the 
impact this will have on the harm to the interests of other family members, including the 
parents, this may assist doctors in being able to justify a late termination.  They will not only 
be taking into account the physical abnormality identified in the fetus and its potentially 
disabling effects on the future child, but they will also take into account the harm that may be 
caused to the life of others who have current interests and have full moral status.  All of these 
factors are relevant to the assessment of the permissibility of late terminations under these 
circumstances. 
 
Whilst this thesis has sought primarily to help guide professional thinking about the role of 
reproductive autonomy and disability discrimination, in order for it to be incorporated into 
medical practice and to change the attitude of the relevant healthcare professionals, it is 
necessary for the issues raised and argued in this thesis to be incorporated into the training 
received by medical students, and to be revisited in more depth for those who choose to 
specialise in the field of clinical genetics and reproductive medicine.  This will ensure that 
future doctors have a good knowledge of medical ethics in relation to autonomy, reproductive 
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choice and potentially affected fetuses.  Further, this thesis adds to the current guidance issued 
by the Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology for medical practitioners in the UK1 when 
late termination of pregnancy is being considered.  Moreover, GMC guidance on consent,2 
which applies to all registered medical practitioners in the UK, and relates to doctors and 
patients making decisions together, would be another official channel through which these 
points could be applied to enhance future practice in this area.  
                                                        
1 Royal College of Obstetrics & Gynaecology (2010) Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnormality 
in England, Scotland and Wales: Report of a working party, RCOG: London 
2 General Medical Council (2008) Consent: Patients and doctors making decisions together, GMC: 
London 
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